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Sometimes the business of the military is security, other times the business of the military 
is business. There are some armed forces that have control of vast commercial 
enterprises, while others have never even dabbled in entrepreneurial schemes. This is a 
rather puzzling arrangement: the armed forces of a state are established to address 
security concerns, and dividing their attention towards commercial endeavors seems 
counter to their core mission. The idea that armed forces would ever have to engage in 
their own production or financing challenges core assumptions of many (especially 
Western-centric) civil-military models. The factors that lead the military into business 
have their roots in a variety of factors: the strength of political institutions, leader 
perceptions of their security, the level of development of the state, and the strength of the 
central government to provide adequate support for its soldiers are some of the few 
among others. This study seeks to find an approach to studying the phenomenon of 
military-owned businesses that is grounded in the strategic political decisions of a state’s 
political and military leaders, and comes about as a result of a leader’s attempt to mitigate 
political risk of removal by the armed forces.  
 
More important than the reasons behind why the armed forces become commercial 
players in the first place is whether and what implications military control of enterprises 
has for the political development of a state. Military control of revenue-generating 
enterprises seems anathema to the received wisdom of fifty years of literature on civil-
military relations, and runs counter to the idea of military subordination to the political 
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institutions of a state.1 The central claims in much of the civil-military relations literature 
on what constitutes healthy relations between the state and the armed forces do not 
include institutional arrangements wherein the military has independent control of 
revenue-generating enterprises.23 In a literature dominated by the idea of military 
professionalism as a key driver of stability within civil-military relations, military control 
of business enterprises is an anomaly.4 Most conceptions of civil-military relations 
envision an armed force that receives its funding from a central governmental source, 
which means that the study of military-controlled business enterprises lies somewhat 
outside of even the most modern theories of state-military relations.5  
 
The older theories of civil-military relations would likely have the following analysis of 
military-controlled businesses: Independent control of revenue-generating enterprises by 
the military cannot be good for establishing stable civil-military relations, and certainly 
will not help establish civilian control of the armed forces, as it eliminates or weakens the 
most important source of civilian leverage over the military, which is civilian control of 
the budget.6 In many cases of military ownership there is little to no civilian oversight of 
military-controlled enterprises (MCEs), and there is often a total lack of institutions with 
                                                 
1 Feaver, Peter, “Civil-Military Relations”, Annual Review of Political Science 1999. 2:211-41  
2 Ibid.  
3 Mulvenon, James, “PLA Divestiture and Civil-Military Relations: Implications for the Sixteenth Party Congress 
Leadership”, China Leadership Monitor, No. 1 Part 2  
4 Huntington, Samuel. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil -Military Relations. New York: Belknap 
Press , 1957 
5 There are of course exceptions, as scholars l ike Kristani Mani have sought to take a more systematic 
approach to the military and business.  
6 Pantev, Plamen; Ratchev, Valeri; Tagarev, Todor; Zaprianova, Viara, Civil-Military Relations and 
Democratic Control of the Security Sector: A Handbook for military officers, servicemen and servicewomen 
of the security and intelligence agencies and for civilian politicians and security experts , United States 
Institute of Peace, Washington DC, USA, 2005  
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formal auditing authority.7 In addition, officers and enlisted personnel receiving their 
benefits straight from the military institutions themselves instead of through the 
government will likely not produce much loyalty to the civilian government. This kind of 
financial arrangement weakens the mechanisms of political oversight, and can potentially 
give generals additional leverage over political leaders when political squabbles do arise. 
Military control of enterprises could also give military leaders additional autonomy when 
it comes to policies or procurement by limiting the capability that the political leaders 
have to sanction a wayward military establishment.  
 
While classic theories of civil-military relations frown upon this arrangement from a 
normative perspective, these military-controlled enterprises (MCEs) have to be studied 
empirically as the products of complex political interactions in their own right. Most 
prominent theories of civil-military relations are based heavily on the Western 
democratic model of politics, which sees military subordination to civilians as the most 
important and challenging aspect of civil-military relations.8 MCEs may be perceived as 
a sacrifice of strong civilian control in civil-military relations, a normatively negative 
outcome. But MCEs could also be seen in another light, which is that the establishment 
of MCEs are the results of political activity by political leaders to limit the likelihood of 
the most disruptive military behavior in politics: the coup d’etat. Viewing these 
enterprises outside of the strictly normative interpretation allows for more careful review 
                                                 
7 Transparency International UK Defence and Security Programme, “Military-owned businesses: 
corruption and risk reform”, January 2012, London   
8 Caparini, Marina, “The Relevance of Democratic Control of the Security Sector”, Geneva Centre for the  
Control of Armed Forces, Switzerland, Working Paper Series no. 24, April  2002  
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and analysis, seeing the establishment of MCEs as the result of political processes both 
within and outside of the military establishment.  
 
As the armed forces are variously both a leaders’ greatest asset and greatest threat, 
political leaders in both autocratic and democratic states have taken a variety of actions to 
keep the armed forces under control. Purges, reassignment, coup-proofing, increasing 
spending, etc., are all ways that leaders can keep the armed forces content or in control.9 
In this light of political leaders making decisions for political expediency, the 
establishment of revenue-generating MCEs is essentially a transferring of benefits 
directly from one political group to another, and as the theory and case study sections will 
expand upon, these transfers were made during times of heightened political instability 
and fears of a military coup. By providing the armed forces with businesses, leaders act 
to minimize the possibility of a coup attempt, making exceptions to taxation, customs 
duties, and offering subsidies to cover the initial start-up costs of these enterprises. Once 
established, these MCEs provide benefits to officers and soldiers alike, and enjoying the 
legal financial exceptions to their business operations that other businesses would face, 
often are able to expand quite rapidly.10  
 
This study examines the phenomenon of military-controlled enterprises with an original 
dataset on the institution and traces the effect that such institutions have on political 
behavior by the military. This study will have a “Theory Chapter” beginning with an 
                                                 
9 Jun Koga, “Military Purges in Dictatorships: A New Dataset” 
10 Rieffel, Alex, & Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, Out of Business and On Budget: The Challenge of Military 
Financing in Indonesia, June 2007, Brooking Institution   
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examination of the theoretical exploration of MCEs, setting up both the theoretical 
framework and the expectations of how MCEs should affect military political behavior. 
Next the study will have the “Dataset Chapter” introducing the dataset, gathered from a 
variety of interviews and secondary sources, with an explanation of the methods used to 
construct the dataset, as well as the major trends of most important variables. The next 
section on analysis and methods will include a statistical analysis of the dataset on the 
major theoretical expectations of the theory chapter. There will be a case study chapter on 
Egypt which will delve into the mechanisms of MCEs creation and its effects on the 
political development of the state. Finally the study will wrap up with a “Conclusion” 
chapter.  
 
Literature Review on Military-Commercial Ties  
The literature on military ownership of business enterprises is sparse within academic 
circles, but has more attention within advocacy circles, transparency and corruption 
monitoring NGOs and those studying security-sector reform in the developing world. 
While the civil-military relations field continues to have a robust literature and following, 
examination of military-entrepreneurial relationships has not developed much in the way 
of consistent scholarship. Civil-military relations has received a boost in interest in recent 
years with several high-profile coup attempts catching world and scholarly attention in 
places like Turkey, Egypt and Mali, and an important democratic transition from a long-
standing military regimes in Myanmar.11 Despite this upsurge in activity, most of the 
                                                 
11 Bunte, Marco, “Burma’s Transition to ‘Disciplined Democracy’: Abdication or Insitutionalization of 
Military Rule?”, GIGA Working Papers, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, August 2011, No. 117  
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literature has focused on the causes of military defection and loyalty from or to long-
standing dictatorships in regions such as the Middle East during the Arab Spring.12  
 
There remains no systematic, cross-national study of the effects of MCEs within either 
the civil-military relations literature or the comparative politics literature. There are 
several important authors who have examined the phenomenon within their own spheres 
of expertise, and their analysis remains limited to a particular country or region. James 
Mulvenon wrote extensively of the phenomenon of the meteoric investment in 
commercial business enterprises, and the later quick but incomplete divestment, of the 
People’s Liberation Army in China between 1980 and 2000.13 Carl Thayer wrote 
extensively of the party-military relations in Vietnam, highlighting the large development 
role of the Vietnamese military in society as a mechanism through which the military 
supported the party’s development goals, as well as the establishment of several large 
firms such as South East Asian telecommunications giant Viettel.14 Other important 
single-country studies included examinations of Egypt, Cuba, Syria, the Congo, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Indonesia, each of which highlighted the particular aspects of military-
business relationships in their countries of expertise.15 Brommelhorster and Paes were 
                                                 
12 Ulrich, Marybeth; Atkinson, Carol, “The Arab Spring and Arab Militaries: The Role of the Military in the 
Transitioning Middle East”, International Political Science Association World Congress, 8 -12 July, Madrid, 
Spain  
13 Mulvenon, James, “Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall  of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 
1978-1999”, Taylor and Francis, 2001  
14 Thayer, Carl, “The Political Role of the Vietnam People’s Army: Corporate Interests and Military 
Professionalism”, Paper to panel on Understanding Vietnamese Politics: New Approaches and Issues from 
the Field, March, 2012  
15 Marhsall, Shana “The Egyptian armed Forces and the Remaking of an Economic Empire”, Carnegie 
Middle East Center, April  2015; Mora, Frank, Wikotorowicz, Quintan, “Economic Reform and the  Military: 
China, Cuba and Syria in Comparative Perspective”, de Sitter Publications; Paes, W.C. and Shaw, T. 
“Praetorians or Profiteers? The Role of Entrepreneurial Armed Forces in Congo -Kinshasa” in 
Brommelhorster, J. Paes, W. (eds), The Military as an Economic Actor – Soldiers in Business, Houndsmill, 
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able to call upon several important experts and bring the study of military commercial 
enterprises in several different countries together in one book, though it lacked a larger 
theoretical framework in which to examine the political implications of such a 
phenomenon.16  
 
Kristani Mani took a regional approach by analyzing military-business relationships as a 
function of three major factors: critical economic junctures, military’s strategic priorities 
and coalitional opportunities. Mani theorized that based upon certain configurations of 
these factors different kinds of military entrepreneurship have evolved along two 
complimentary axes of military goals and military political strength. Building off of her 
expertise in Latin America, Mani has proposed that these factors can help explain the 
disparate types of military business, and their political consequences across the region.17 
The strength of Mani’s approach is that military involvement in economic activities can 
take on a range of approaches, from nation-building to industrializer, though with the 
caution that she does seem to exclude the possibility of rent-seeking or wealth-
maximizing behavior by the military. Her typology is interesting in that it discusses 
military involvement in economic activities as a result of political conditions and 
                                                 
2003; Siddiq, Ayesha, Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, June 2007; Rieffel, Alex, & Jaleswari 
Pramodhawardani, Out of Business and On Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia , June 
2007, Brooking Institution   
16 J. Brommelhorster, & W. Paes, The Military as an Economic Actor: Soldiers in Business, Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, 2003 It also combined several different types of military-business relationships that are out 
of the scope of this study but are important nonetheless.  
17 Kristani Mani, “Military Empresarios: Approaches to Studying the Military as an Economic Actor”, 
Journal of the Society for Latin American Studies, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2010; In addition: 
Mani 2010, 2007, 2011a, 2011b 
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coalitions, with varying degrees of political viability. This approach is satisfying in that it 
situates itself in the larger political arena of a state.  
 
Outside of the strictly academic scholarship, military businesses have been the focus of 
several prominent NGO, think tanks and other watchdog organizations. Transparency 
International includes a measure of military-owned businesses on their Government 
Defence Anti-Corruption Index, which includes survey information on corruption 
indicators in armed forces starting in 2010.18 Human Rights Watch has noted the role of 
military-commercial activities in a multitude of human rights abuses that illegal lumber 
operations under the control of military officers have engaged in.19 Other organizations 
like the CMI (CHR. Michelson Institute) or the Geneva Center for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces have noted the presence of military businesses and the potential 
democratic deficit created by these organizations.20 The phenomenon of MCEs remains 
understudied, even within the more policy-oriented and security-sector reform minded 
organizations. This is likely due to for several reasons: 1) information on the operations 
of these enterprises is sparing, 2) examining these institutional arrangements likely strikes 
a nerve with military members which they perceive as a threat to their core security and 
developmental missions, and 3) in many states with MCEs, access by NGOs or security-
sector reform organizations to key personnel and institutional information is likely 
limited.  
                                                 
18 Transparency International, Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, 2015, London   
19 Human Rights Watch, Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military’s Economic 
Activities, New York, June 2006. 
20 CMI Insights, Dr. Zenaib Abul-Magd, “The Egyptian military in politics and the economy: Recent history 




The field as a whole does not have much written about these relationships, which means 
that there are important gaps in the civil-military relations literature which this study 
seeks to fill.  
 
Literature Review on Civil-Military Relations and Coups   
While the field of scholarship is quite thin with regards to military-business relationships, 
the study of the coup d’etat is undergoing somewhat of a renaissance. The field is rife 
with recent scholarship on this most destructive of military interventions. New 
quantitative models and game theoretic approaches have been applied to the area of civil-
military relations. New approaches to understanding coup risk as a contagion utilizing 
methods such as the extreme bounds analysis find that coups and elite-driven movements 
are much less likely to spread as mass-driven movements such as demonstrations or 
riots.21 The role of international institutions such as IMF intervention has also been 
brought into the analysis, showing that economic rents are key to maintain the support of 
regime elites and when IMF programs erode leaders’ ability to distribute rents the 
chances for a coup rise.22 The interaction between electoral institutions and dictatorships 
has also been explored, as close elections can reveal a dictator to be much weaker than 
originally thought, emboldening insider political elites to try to seize power.23  
 
                                                 
21 Miller, Michael; Joseph, Michael; Ohl, Dorothy; “Are Coups Really Contagious? An Extreme Bounds 
Analysis of Political Diffusion”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, May 26, 2016, p. 1 -32  
22 Casper, Brett, “IMF Programs and the Risk of a Coup d’etat”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, August 
2015, 1-33 
23 Wig, Tore, Rod, Espen, “Cues to Coup Plotters: Elections as Coup  Triggers in Dictatorships”, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, October 2014, 1-26 
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Leaders have it tough: they must balance between different threats both internal to their 
party, their regime, armed forces and enemies abroad. This model of leaders being pulled 
in multiple directions to keep their political coalitions together while fending off threats 
from other directions is what informs the rest of this paper, derived from studies where 
leader must select how to defend against different removal risks. Newer, more expansive 
models of leader succession and regime turnover include a discussion of coups and 
removal from power by the armed forces as one of a multitude of threats that a leader 
must balance against with limited resources.24 The interrelated processes of coups and 
civil wars have also been explored, with evidence suggesting that resource-strapped 
leaders in poorer nations often have to make strategic choices of resource apportioning 
that balances between their chances of removal via government insiders in the form of a 
coup versus removal via outsiders in the form of a civil war.25 The threats leaders face 
can come from within their elite structure, from within opposition parties, excluded 
political groups, the armed forces or from outside the state, and the leader must use their 
resources wisely to reduce the risk that they face from being removed by any one source. 
It is this leader balancing between threats with few resources to control that can lead to 
the creation of institutions like MCEs, which will be fully explored further in this study. 
When leaders face resource constraints, such as a very small budget or few resource 
endowments, and a high threat of removal by groups like the armed forces, leaders must 
get creative in how they limit their exposure. MCEs are one option that leaders can 
pursue if they are strapped for resources and face a threat of removal by the armed forces.  
                                                 
24 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, “Political Succession: A model of coups, revolution, purges 
and everyday politics”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 2015, 1-37  
25 Philip Roessler, “The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups and Civil War in Africa”, World Politics, 63, 




Current research now focuses on treating the armed forces as one of a multitude of 
political groups instead of as its own special category of political actor. By treating the 
armed forces as one more political group that leaders must account for, the behavior of 
the armed forces can be more accurately modeled. And indeed this seems to be 
appropriate: previous research has shown that armed forces are responsive to material 
incentives, with higher spending leading to a lower coup risk. This finding informs the 
idea that other material incentives beyond military spending might serve the same 
function as a coup-proofing arrangement.262728 While the precise mechanism of how 
spending reduces coup risk is undetermined, it is suspected that higher spending fulfills 
the core needs of the armed forces, decreasing the grievances that the armed forces may 
have against the government. Other research has shown that governments are also 
responsive to coup risks as they raise military spending when there is an active or 
suspected coup plot.29 Kim et al. find that military regimes tend to increase military 
spending to appeal to their winning coalition, consisting mainly of other generals.30  
                                                 
26 Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective”; Byman and Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North 
Korea”; Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and 
Turkey; Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” 
Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 1 (2000): 67–92;   Powell J., “Determinants of the Attempting and 
Outcome of Coups d’etat”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(6): 1017 -1040 
27 Ibid.; Collier P., Hoeffler A., “Military Spending and the Risks of Coups d’etats”, Centre for the Study of 
African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, March 2007; Gabriel, Leon “Loyalty for 
Sale? Military Spending and Coups d’Etat”, Feb 1. 2012, Faculty Workshop; Barka Ben, Habi ba & Ncube, 
Mthuli “Political Fragility in Africa: Are Military Coups d’etat a Never -Ending Phenomenon?”, African 
Development Bankm Chief Economist Complex, September 2012;   
28 Ibid, Powell,  
29 Collier P., Hoeffler A., “Military Spending and the Risks of Coups d’etats”, Centre for the Study of African 
Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, March 2007 
30 Hong-Cheol Kim, Hyung Min Kim & Jaechul Lee, “The Post-Coup Military Spending Question Revisited, 




Leaders are well aware of the threat posed by the armed forces and evidence shows that 
leaders cater to the needs of the armed forces in order to guarantee their political survival 
by increasing military spending. Higher spending is just one strategy for a leader to 
pursue to lower coup-risk: James Quinlivan shows that regimes often times employ 
selective benefits in order to placate their armed forces, using divide and conquer tactics 
on the armed forces by lavishing equipment, pay and copious perks on several important 
factions within the military while leaving the rest substantially underfunded and far away 
from critical government and military centers such as the capital31. The armed forces in 
general, and the officer corps in particular, are shown to be sensitive to material 
incentives such as spending, and that by varying ones’ tactics, a leader can pursue 
multiple strategies simultaneously to reduce their coup risk. The study cited not only 
coup-proofing divisions along ideology and ethnic lines, but also outlined how the 
material benefits given to privileged units raised their loyalty to the regime and enhanced 
their ability to respond to internal threats. The important element of Quinlivan’s study 
above is to show how the armed forces are responsive to material incentives when they 
are apportioned correctly, and that multiple strategies of both deprivation and lavishing of 
material benefits can be effective in curtailing coup risk.  
 
The question of this study is whether MCEs can fill a similar role in coup-proofing by 
providing material benefits to military personnel. As will be shown both in this and later 
chapters, MCEs can provide both short term benefits in the form of subsidies towards 
                                                 
31 Quinlivan, James, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East”, RAND 
Corporations, 2000  
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meager salaries and longer term benefits such as retirement benefits doled out by 
enterprises under the sole control of the armed forces. In addition to these material 
benefits, MCEs can help fulfill critical military materiel needs with native defense 
industries, assuaging the security imperatives of military officers.  
 
Again, the primary claim of the paper is that MCEs can be used as a coup proofing 
mechanism to keep the armed forces out of politics. Leaders, under pressure from a 
variety of challengers for resources, respond to the risk of a coup by the armed forces 
with higher spending, or other benefits such as MCEs. When leaders are unable to 
increase spending from the government’s budget they need to find alternative ways to 
either assuage military grievances or win military loyalty when political battles erupt 
between elites. Poorer, conflict-ridden nations are especially susceptible to the 
establishment of MCEs, as leader may lack resources but face many threats. Leaders may 
turn a blind eye towards military business activities or actively empower them, in the 
hopes that the military establishment will stay out of politics. Once established, these 
MCEs will reduce the risk of a coup as the officer corps has one or many fewer 
grievances against the central government since they are able to provide substantial 
benefits to the officer corps that the central government would not have been able to 
provide.  
 
The case study later in the study will explain in greater detail, but an example may be 
instructive: in the 1970s, Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat was facing incredible political 
pressures from within and without during his reign. Having just come out of a costly 
14 
 
engagement with Yemen, and facing the Israeli military juggernaut, Sadat was not 
expected to last as leader. Increasing military spending was not an option, as military 
spending of the government regularly topped 30% of the government’s budget in his first 
years, and reaching a peak of 70% in 1974.32 As a way to cope with the limits of his 
state’s resources, Sadat turned over control of more economic enterprises to the military. 
This gambit worked, and Sadat remained in power until his assassination at the hands of 
extremist Islamists.  
 
This relationship between the armed forces, leadership survival strategies and resource 
endowments is central to this study. Strategic behavior to reduce the risks of removal are 
central to how civil-military relations develop, especially in developing states. As leaders 
face threats they may leverage their access to businesses or state-owned enterprises to 
reduce the threat from the military, and use these businesses to gain military loyalty 
which they can then use against other political rivals. By turning over business 
enterprises to the military, leaders pursue a short-term politically expedient strategy 
which offers them a cheaper solution to political stability than they might have been able 
to do otherwise. Leaders have to make decisions in the short-term, such as handing over 
control of state-owned enterprises to military leaders, which can have lasting impacts on 
the nature of civil-military relations and how the business of the security of the state is 
managed in the future. Leaders, under pressure in their own times, have sometimes had to 
choose between their political survival and long-term political control of the armed forces 
by the state.  
                                                 
32 Stephen Gotowicki, US Army, “The Role of the Egyptian Military in Domestic Society”, National Defense 




MCEs, as one kind of solution to a leader’s coup risk, appear to work on the aggregate, 
reducing the risk of a coup in the long term as well as the short term. The rest of this 
study will be spent reinforcing this claim and exploring the mechanisms of how MCEs 
can help leaders stay in power. MCEs are not a silver bullet to ending or reducing coup 
risk, as the turning over of MCEs might have to happen multiple times and over multiple 
political crises as leaders again have to work to mitigate their risks of removal. Indeed, 
the story of most states with MCEs is that the armed forces are continually empowered 
with more MCEs as leaders are faced with more challenges over the course of their rule. 
It is rare for the armed forces to be stripped of their MCEs, likely because the armed 
forces remain a constant threat that must be placated.  
 
These MCEs do not function in a political vacuum, and their effects will be tempered by 
their political environment. The role of the military and military governments in both 
democratization and democratic breakdown is well-established and explored via both 
qualitative and quantitative methods.33 The “kingmaker” role of the armed forces in 
autocratic societies is also very important, and MCEs are expected to have differential 
                                                 
33 Stepan, Alfred, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone , Princeton University Press, 
March 1998; --- “The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil”, Princeton University Press, June 
1971; Bebler A. 1973. Military Rule in Africa: Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali . New York: 
Praege; Biglaiser G. 2002. Guardians of the Nation? Economists, Generals, and Economic Reform in Latin 
America. Notre Dame, IN: Univ. Notre Dame Press; Cheibub JA, Gandhi J, Vreeland JR. 2010. Democracy 
and dictatorship data set; Finer SE. 1976. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. 
Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. 2nd ed.; Johnson JL. 1962. The Latin-American military as a politically 
competing group in transitional society. In The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. JL 
Johnson, pp. 91–129. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press; Nordlinger E. 1977. Soldiers in Politics: 
Military Coups and Governments. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall; Potash RA. 1996. The Army and 
Politics in Argentina, 1962–1973: From Frondizi’s Fall to the Peronist Restoration . Stanford, CA: 
Stanford Univ. Press; Remmer K. 1989. Military Rule in Latin America. New York: Unwin Hymen 
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effects based on regime type. The armed forces have been examined as important agents 
of regime transitions, and sometimes as the pivotal actor for the political direction of a 
state.  
 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper, the strategies that these leaders pursue have 
implications beyond mitigating coup risk. A further study of the long-term impact of the 
establishment of MCEs on civil-military relations and authoritarianism would most 
certainly be appropriate since the turning over of MCEs could almost certainly lead to the 
empowerment of military forces as political actors. There might be a long-term versus 
short term tradeoff when it comes to MCEs, where leaders secure their regime but saddle 























This chapter explores how military involvement in business can have potentially 
profound effects on military institutions, incentives of those in the officer corps and 
actions by the military elite. The chapter will contain a discussion of how the incentives 
of military personnel can be shaped by the establishment of military-controlled 
enterprises (MCEs). The chapter will introduce military enterprises as a mechanism for 
leaders who want to leverage military support for themselves or to control the risks of a 
coup attempt, and how this kind of institutional arrangement affects milita ry behavior. 
The central claim of this study is that MCEs serve as an institutional arrangement to keep 
the armed forces from seizing power in a coup by both satisfying basic military needs and 
acting as a channel of patronage from leaders to the officer corps. Leaders act 
strategically to remain in power and use MCEs as a way to keep military officers loyal, 
resorting to turning over businesses to the control of the military establishment to reduce 
the likelihood of officers trying to remove the leader from power.  
 
This chapter will start with a literature review on the most recent civil-military 
scholarship before moving to a discussion of the major findings among the coup d’etat 
and coup-proofing literature. Then there will be a discussion of the literature on the 
origins of MCEs, ranging from the mundane origins to the more interesting political 
origins of such institutions. Then the theoretical framework will be laid out with the 
primary actors in the model and how their choices are shaped by their environment, and 
why some leaders resort to the creation of MCEs. Finally, the major theoretical 
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expectations will be laid out in the form of hypotheses, ending with a discussion of the 
endogenous nature of the expected findings.  
 
Literature Review on Coups and Coup-proofing 
Despite a relative lull in the interest of civil-military relations in the broader academic 
field, research on this important relationship has recently been on the upswing, with a 
special focus on one of the most important political activities the armed forces can 
engage in: the coup d’etat. Assumptions about military behavior and previous findings 
have been challenged as new quantitative models and game theoretic approaches have 
been applied to the area of civil-military relations. Deeper and more expansive 
approaches to the study of civil-military relations have created a much richer scholarly 
environment with respect to civil-military relations.  
 
Other new approaches revolve around treating a coup as a game in which officers, the 
potential coup plotters, engage in both learning and coordination simultaneously in 
iterated games, with those regimes that survive several early coup attempts being much 
less likely to suffer them later on, even if the grievances of the officers are high.34 Newer, 
more expansive models of leader succession and regime turnover include a discussion of 
coups and removal from power as one of a multitude of threats that a leader must balance 
against with limited resources.35 This trade-off between resources and regime 
vulnerability is present in strategic decision-making on the national level as well, with 
                                                 
34 Little, Andrew, “Coordination, Learning, and Coups”, Journal of Confli ct Resolution, February 2015, 1-31   
35 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, “Political Succession: A model of coups, revolution, purges 
and everyday politics”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 2015, 1 -37  
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leaders pursuing diversionary threats of force only when they believe their current stocks 
of resources are insufficient to placate officers.36  
 
Initial civil-military literature focused on the ideal versions of the military: a 
professionalized, non-political armed service whose actions were guided by the political 
wing of a civilian government. Professionalism, esprit d’ corps, and a non-political 
orientation were thought to be the foundations of a system of stable civil-military 
relations, with the civilian regime calling the shots.37 The failure of many a states’ 
military to keep themselves out of politics, even in nations that had highly trained and 
well-equipped militaries, presented a challenge to this initial conception of civil-military 
relations, as those militaries that did seize their respective state governments could hardly 
be called “unprofessional” in the sense of technical proficiency of undertaking violence.38  
 
Finer provided a succinct reply to Huntington’s thesis on professionalism when he 
pointed out that even with a technically proficient and professional military, the desire to 
intervene might be borne of a sense of responsibility to the state’s protection. If the 
military perceived that the civilian government might be failing in its job to protect 
society, the military would be well within its institutional objectives to seize the 
government and take over the state for itself. The divergence between loyalty to the 
“state” and loyalty to the “government” provided room for the military to intervene. 
                                                 
36 Powell, Jonathan, “Regime vulnerability and the diversionary threat of force”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, February 2012, 169-196  
37 Samuel Huntingon, “The Soldier and the State” 
38 Huntington’s conception of professionalism included expertise or “specialized knowledge in warfare”, a 
sense of responsibility to society to ensure its protection, and corporateness or organic unity and 
consciousness as being part of a group. 
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Professional militaries might be inclined to intervene “for the good of the state”, to 
ensure that its mandate of protection was upheld.39 Finer then highlighted two important 
factors that could determine military involvement in politics: motive to intervene and the 
opportunity to intervene. His subsequent focus was on political culture, domestic 
circumstances and civilian dependence on the military determining the severity of 
military intervention in politics.40 The military in Finer’s conception takes the best-case 
scenario of the military acting in what it thinks are the best interests of the state, which 
later researchers take issue with.41 The great value of Finer’s work was to highlight that 
the military was an independent political actor, meaning that it has its own institutional 
concerns and pressures aside from that of the government’s leaders or civilian groups 
within society which could cause divergence between the civilian and the military.  
 
Despite coup d’etats dominating the civil-military relations literature, there is a great 
amount of variation within the category of coups. Not all coups are the same, with some 
of them being undertaken by a few determined officers, such as the Malian coup of 2012 
while others are the result of series of decisions by the top military leaders that 
incorporates the whole organization. In his work on Bolivia, Bruce Farcau found that far 
from a coup being a solitary and high-risk venture for a small cabal of plotters, coup 
leaders would openly recruit as many officers as possible despite the risk of discovery so 
                                                 
39 Finer, Samuel, “The Man on Horseback”  
40 Finer also further differentiated military intervention into several different categories, ranging from 
simple advisory functions to full -on military control in the form of coups. Military non-action was also a 
form of intervention, as not suppressing a popular movement means that the military is implicitly making 
a political decision. 
41 To be sure, Finer did not actually think all militaries were incorruptible, but wanted to demonstrate 
how, even in the best-case scenario the military could stil l have an excuse to intervene. 
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as to increase the chances of success and to spread the culpability for the coup to as many 
people as possible in the case of a failure.42 In others, the coup is planned solely within 
one branch of the military, and is executed to the surprise of other branches, as famously 
occurred in Argentina when the Navy decided to bomb the Plaza de Mayo during protests 
in support of the then-President Peron buildings in 1955.43 Still others are the result of 
leadership at the highest levels executing a carefully orchestrated takeover, as in recent 
takeovers in Burma or Thailand, where the military suspended the constitution, instituted 
a caretaker government and arrested opposition leaders. Still others are hastily arranged 
affairs that breakdown within hours, such as the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey that 
resulted in the deaths of over 200 people and over a thousand injuries.  
 
The answer of what constitutes a coup is an important one in the literature. There is some 
disagreement as to what can be classified as a coup, with Powell and Thyne (2011) 
survey of the coup literature revealing fifteen different classifications. Most of them 
include a definition of the perpetrator, the tactics used and the target of the action as 
important elements in defining a coup. There is widespread agreement that coups 
generally come from within the state apparatus (Luttwak 1969), the political elite 
(Marshall et. Al 2007), or some militarized actor within the state (McGowan 2007; 
Moreno et.al 2004; Thompson 2973). The target of the coup is alternatively the 
government (Ferguson 1988), the regime (Lunde 1991), or the chief executive (Taylor & 
Jodice 1983). The tactics used in perpetrating the coup range from a forceful seizure 
                                                 
42 Farcau, Bruce, “The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power”, Praeger, 1994  
43 Portugheis, Elsa, “Bombardeo del 16 de junio de 1995”, Buenos Aires: Secretaria de Derechos Humanos 
de la Nacion Argentina  
22 
 
(Marhsall et.al, 2007), the use or threat of the use of force (Kennedy 1974), or forced 
changes (Banks 2001). The common elements of these definitions include some elements 
of “within regime-actors” taking quick action to displace the chief executive of the state 
and/or his political allies by means of the threat of use or actual use of force. Powell and 
Thyne synthesized the definition of a coup into an “illegal attempt by the military or 
other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive”. Powell and Thyne 
go to great lengths to synthesize the multiple facets of a coup attempt into one kind of 
distinct political activity, and in so doing eliminated extraneous definitions and 
constraints present in other studies. For example, Powell and Thyne dropped the need for 
a coup to be relatively bloodless, the coup needed to come from within-regime elites, the 
coup attempt must be illegal, and the coup attempt must have some kinetic action – thus 
eliminating alleged coup plots which might be the result of political intrigue. For their 
due diligence in synthesizing the coup attempt literature, Powell and Thyne’s definition 
of a coup attempt will be used for this study as it encompasses the kind of political 
activity by the military that is important for this study.  
 
Coups are the result of complex political activities that have profound consequences for 
the political development of a nation. The academic understanding of coups though is at 
once both exhaustive and indecisive as to the core reasons for coups: In their 2003 article, 
Belkin and Schoefer take a sample of the most popular coup-related literature, and 
identify 21 different factors that could explain coup likelihood.44 While the purpose of 
                                                 
44 Belkin, Aaron and Schoer, Evan, “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 2003 47: 594 
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their paper was to highlight their own conception of structural coup risk, (the underlying 
likelihood of a coup occurring on a given year such as the latent risk of a heart attack in a 
person), their study highlighted the multiplicity of views on the causes of coups, and just 
how many different hypothesized causes for coups there are.  
 
A half century of research into civil-military relations has revealed a plethora of 
independent variables and mechanisms for military intervention into politics. In terms of 
motives, the personal grievances of officers have been found to be important,45 along as 
well as organizational military grievances.46 Grievances held by the military against the 
government over the methods of promotion to senior ranks, the pay of officers, or the 
lack of budgetary attention paid to the military needs have been cited as producing 
grievances worthy of taking over the state. In many states, historical military recruitment 
of officers or enlisted men has privileged some classes, ethnic groups or religions over 
others. In Syria, the French colonial government had recruited predominantly from the 
minority Alawite group into the military as officers over the majority Sunni population. 
Post-colonial policies designed to increase the number of non-Alawites into the officer 
corps (among other policies) provoked a decades-long series of coups which ended in 
1970 with Alawites firmly in charge of the military officer corps, and subsequently the 
rest of the nation.  
 
Newer studies have reviewed these older works with fresh eyes: The long-standing 
received wisdom of coup risk being positively associated with negative economic shocks 
                                                 
45Thompson 1973, 1980; Farcau 1994; Decalo 1976 
46 Thompson 1973; Nordliner 1977 
24 
 
has been challenged with a greater dissection of permanent versus transitory economic 
shocks, suggesting that the negative material impacts of a shock can spur intervention by 
the military.47 The interrelated processes of coups and civil wars have also been explored, 
with evidence suggesting that resource-strapped leaders in poorer nations often have to 
make strategic choices of resource apportioning that balances between their chances of 
removal via government insiders in the form of a coup versus removal via outsiders in the 
form of a civil war.48 The interaction of civil wars with coups has been explored in work 
showing that civil war greatly increases the likelihood of a coup, though not coup 
success, with the likely mechanism being that as war continues the welfare of coup 
plotters continues to diminish, leaving them more risk acceptant towards risky coups as 
the resources that could keep them happy dwindle.49 The interrelated processes of coups 
and civil wars have also been explored, with evidence suggesting that resource-strapped 
leaders in poorer nations often have to make strategic choices of resource apportioning 
that balances between their chances of removal via government insiders in the form of a 
coup versus removal via outsiders in the form of a civil war.50 
 
A common thread through many of these studies though, is that the military has been 
consistently found to be responsive to material incentives when it comes to coup attempts 
and coup risk. Powell finds that higher military spending is associated with a lower 
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overall coup risk.51 Collier finds that the government often raises military spending when 
there is an active or suspected coup plot.52 This suggests that one important route to a 
military coup is that when officers are discontent about their material conditions or the 
conditions of the armed forces in general, they are more likely to resort to rebellion, in 
this case in the form of a coup attempt. This can be compounded by the lack of official 
channels for officers to redress these financial woes, especially if they are geographically 
distributed. An officer class that sees itself as being consistently underfunded might see a 
coup as the only way to redress some of its major concerns, among which could be 
salary, equipment and a lack of other benefits.  
 
Instead of looking at the military in isolation, civil-military relations literature has also 
begun to adopt theoretical models focusing on the military as just one political actor 
embedded in an environment rife with political actors, and how strategic political 
decisions by leaders have important consequences for political behavior by the military. 
Importantly, the military has begun to be considered as yet another one of many political 
actors posing a threat to leader tenure that must be sated through the distribution of 
resources. Some literature considers the military as an actor in a larger web of actors, 
which forces leaders to engage in a strategic balancing of resources by those same leaders 
between different threats to leader tenure, which is also the approach adopted by this 
study.  
 
                                                 
51 Though not a higher l ikelihood of coup success. Powell J., “Determinants of the Attempting and 
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As the armed forces are responsive to material incentives in terms of lowering the 
likelihood of coup risk, it stands to reason that other forms of material incentives beyond 
military spending might serve the same function.53 Higher military spending by states is 
strongly associated with a lower coup risk in past studies, with the mechanism that higher 
military spending makes the military much more content with the status quo.54 While a 
much better funded military could theoretically have a better chance of seizing and 
holding power, higher spending seems to be associated with a much lower coup risk.55 
While the precise mechanism of how spending reduces coup risk is yet to be determined, 
it is suspected that higher spending fulfills the core needs of the armed forces, decreasing 
the grievances that the armed forces may have against the government.  
 
That the armed forces are responsive to material incentives is not lost on either leaders or 
academics: It has been shown in other research that governments are also responsive to 
coup risks, often raising military spending when there is an active or suspected coup 
plot.56 Kim et al. find that military regimes tend to increase military spending to appeal to 
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their winning coalition, especially when it consists mainly of other generals.57 Generals, 
and civilian leaders with a military background, are well aware of the threat posed by the 
armed forces and cater to the needs of the armed forces in order to guarantee their 
political survival by increasing military spending far above those of other regimes. In a 
ground-breaking qualitative study of civil-military relations in the Middle East, James 
Quinlivan shows that regimes often times employ a large toolkit in order to placate their 
armed forces, using what could be called “coup-proofing” tactics. Quinlivan shows how 
some regimes use divide and conquer tactics on the armed forces by lavishing equipment, 
pay and copious perks on several important factions within the military while leaving the 
rest substantially underfunded and far away from critical government and military centers 
such as the capital58. The study outlined how leaders not only coup-proofed divisions 
along ideology and ethnic lines, but also outlined how the material benefits given to 
privileged units raised their loyalty to the regime and enhanced their ability to respond to 
internal threats. These strategic decisions have had profound implications, as the divide-
and-lavish coup-proofing strategy of Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad was successful in keeping 
him in power from other military challengers, even as the neglected parts of the Syrian 
army disintegrated, and the country descended into civil-war.  
 
The central claim of this study is that, along with increases in the military budget, MCEs 
act as a way to address the grievances of the officer class and thereby reduce the 
likelihood that elements of the officer class will perceive themselves as neglected. MCEs 
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providing benefits to the officer class make it less likely that the state will face internal 
threats from the armed forces. MCEs provide benefits to officers and encourage them to 
stay loyal, or at least reduces one potential avenue for the officer class to feel aggrieved 
with the state’s or the military’s leadership. In the long term, the presence of MCEs 
means that armed forces have more resources at their disposal which means that the 
military is able to apportion benefits towards the officer class, and keep officers well-
provided for.  
 
After a discussion of the origins of military-controlled enterprises (MCEs), detailing the 
various ways in which different kinds of MCEs were formed, this section will move into 
a theoretical discussion of how MCEs may change incentives for actors within the armed 
forces. The building blocks of the theory rest upon the reality of the onerous material and 
financial requirements of outfitting a professional armed force capable of projecting 
power both within and beyond a state’s borders. The large financial burden of equipping 
and maintaining a military, especially upon poorer states, often leaves individual military 
personnel at a disadvantage financially, sometimes well below others in their socio-
economic peers.59 Many governments are unable to afford both a strong military one in 
which its members are well-taken care of financially. Armed forces use MCEs as a way 
to relieve financial pressure on the military institution to maintain a well-paid, well-
equipped and effective fighting force, and use the profits from MCEs to provide benefits 
to officers that the state could not. While there is a great deal of variety in the ways that 
MCEs came to be in the hands of military officers, these MCEs, however they were 
                                                 
59 Grefer, James E., Gregory, David, Rebhan, M., Chapter 1 “Military and Civil ian Compensation: How do 
they compare?”, Eleventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, 2011  
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established, then create an incentive structure for the officer class that leads to a lower 
risk of discontent within the military and subsequently a lower coup risk.  
 
Literature Review on Military-controlled enterprises 
The literature on military ownership of business enterprises is relatively new within 
academic circles, with the first publications on the subject being written around 
individual case studies as odd cases within civil-military relations. This subject has 
tended to garner more attention within advocacy, NGOs and those studying security-
sector reform in the developing world than in the academic field. The institutional 
relationship of military control of economic enterprises receives some attention, 
especially in scholarship in places like Egypt, but generally has not attracted attention 
enough to garner prolonged study in its own right.  
 
There is no systematic, cross-national study of the origins and possible effects of MCEs 
within either the civil-military relations literature or the comparative politics literature. 
There are several important authors who have examined the phenomenon as single-off 
cases within own states of expertise, but their analysis remains limited to a particular 
country or region. For example, James Mulvenon wrote extensively of the PLA’s 
investment in commercial business enterprises in China between 1980 and 2000.60 Carl 
Thayer, an expert on all things South-East Asia, wrote on party-military relations in 
Vietnam, highlighting the development role of the Vietnamese military as an extension of 
the Communist party’s development goals, as pointed to the establishment of several 
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large firms such as South East Asian telecommunications giant Viettel as an outcome of 
this trend.61 Other important single-country studies included examinations of Egypt, 
Cuba, Syria, the Congo, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia, each of which highlighted 
their particular aspects of military-business relationships.62  
 
The only cross-national study of MCEs was done by Brommelhorster and Paes, who were 
able to call upon several important experts and bring the study of military commercial 
enterprises in several different countries together in one book. The publication looked at 
various types of military-commercial relationships through different countries, trying to 
find a common theme as to their development. While highlighting an important series of 
relationships, it lacked a larger theoretical framework in which to examine the political 
implications of such a phenomenon. The book stopped short of offering a unified 
approach to studying military-commercial relationships in favor of expanding upon the 
range of possible relationships that do exist.63  
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A step in the direction of a larger theoretical framework to understand military-
commercial relationships, Kristani Mani took a regional approach by analyzing military-
business relationships as a function of three major factors: critical economic junctures, 
military’s strategic priorities and coalitional opportunities. Mani theorized that based 
upon certain configurations of these factors different kinds of military entrepreneurship 
have evolved along two complimentary axes of military goals and military political 
strength. Building off of her expertise in Latin America, Mani has proposed that these 
factors can help explain the disparate types of military business, and their political 
consequences across the region.64  
 
NGOs and prominent think tanks have approached the study of military business. 
Transparency International includes a measure of military-owned businesses on their 
Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index. 65 Human Rights Watch has noted the role 
of military-commercial activities in a multitude of human rights abuses that illegal 
lumber operations under the control of military officers have engaged in.66 These 
organizations have larger objectives, and as such have not dedicated as many resources to 
gathering data on the phenomenon of military-owned businesses. Despite this, these 
organizations have provided a wealth of data to use in order to construct a new typology 
and dataset of military-business relationships.  
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The Types of Military Controlled Enterprises  
From various sources it became clear that there was a wide variety of MCEs and 
institutional arrangements between the armed forces and economic enterprises. Only a 
few of these kinds of relationships are politically relevant, but included below were the 
primary metrics by which the theoretically important categories were constructed. With 
respect to the relationship between the armed forces and economic enterprises, there are 
several distinguishing characteristics: individual vs. institutional control, ministry or 
armed forces and commercial versus defense. The following section will delve into the 
differences between these categories.  
 
The first distinction between MCEs is between individual versus institutional control. 
This is important because it distinguishes between the concentration of control of MCEs 
in the hands of a few officers (individual) versus control of the MCEs being distributed 
through many bodies or agencies within the armed forces (institutional). The difference is 
not trivial, as distinguishing between different patterns of control affects the kind of 
patronage network that develops. Within an individual control scheme, the individual 
owning officers are in control of their MCEs totally as it is their property, and may 
choose how they use them. Institutional arrangements are schemes wherein the 
management of these MCEs is integrated into the larger military structure, and 
management decisions are made by a body or bodies of active duty or retired officers.  
 
Institutional MCEs, by virtue of being integrated into the armed forces’ administrative 
bodies, are much more likely to distribute benefits widely due both to their size and 
complexity. Institutional MCEs are often pension funds, charitable trusts, holding 
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companies or other large corporations with complex governance structures. Institutional 
MCEs are typically governed by multiple bodies, such as assemblies or boards that are 
composed of acting or retired senior officers. Representation by the officer class is much 
broader, and subsequently institutional MCEs tend to distribute their benefits widely to 
the whole of the officer class (or to all members of the branch to which the MCEs 
belongs) in regular patterns according to a schedule, such as a pension fund. Institutional 
MCEs tend to be regulated by military officers for the benefit of other military officers 
and distribute benefits to the officer corps as a whole.  
 
Individual MCEs have a much more concentrated and narrower distribution due to their 
smaller size and ownership patterns. Individual MCEs tend to be enterprises that are 
relatively simple, such as farms, travel agencies, mines, or malls, that do not have the 
complex governance structures of the institutional MCEs. This is a meaningful 
distinction, because a different arrangement can have a profound effect changing the 
incentives those controlling MCEs. Individual owners of MCEs would have incentives to 
maximize their gains while keeping their patronage network as small possible. Those in 
charge of institutional MCEs do not have the same personal financial stake, even though 
they will themselves benefit from the MCEs, and thus do not have an incentive to keep 
the patronage network as small as possible.67 
 
There is another clear divergence between two kinds of institutional relationships: ones in 
which the ministry was the final authority with respect to MCEs and another in which 
                                                 
67 It is possible for there to be both individual and institutional MCEs existing at the same time in a state. 
In the data section there is a breakdown of which country-years have both versus one or the other.  
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was armed forces itself was specifically named as the owner or manager. This is an 
important divergence as in some states the difference between the ministry and the armed 
forces is non-trivial. In some states the ministry is a clearly civilian-dominated institution 
with strong auditing, oversight, control of budget and direction by civilians. In other 
states the ministry is not much more than a public-facing institution of the military itself, 
with nominal control by civilians if that. Indeed, there are some states where a ministry of 
defense does not exist at all. And of course there is a full spectrum of different kinds of 
civilian-military control of ministries across time and space. For the purposes of this 
study it was important to establish if the control of the MCEs was directly attributable to 
the ministry or the armed forces directly. The purpose of differentiating is to separate out 
those relationships that highlight armed forces independence and power separate from the 
rest of government, and those that reflect much more mundane, administrative 
relationships between civilian-controlled military agencies and commercial enterprises. 
For the purposes of this study, while there will be a discussion of the data with respect to 
ministry versus armed forces control, this study will concentrate on the role of control by 
the armed forces.68  
 
Finally, MCEs can be either commercial or defense in nature. By “commercial 
enterprise” it is meant to include any enterprise that engages in the production or goods 
or services that are available to the general public. While this may seem obvious, this is 
an important distinction that separates two entities: those that have offerings to only the 
                                                 
68 It is possible for there to be MCEs controlled by the armed forces and the ministry at the same time in a 
state. In some cases the ministry shares control of the same enterprises, or has control of separate 




military members versus those that offer services to the general public. All armed forces 
offer some kind of benefits to their members in the form of cheaper goods or discounts, 
but if the armed forces are offering services outside the military it implies a much larger 
reach of commercial enterprises as well as implies greater economic capacity by the 
armed forces. By “defense enterprise” it is meant an enterprise that engages in the 
production of military equipment, ammunition or weapons.  
 
The inclusion of commercial MCEs should be fairly obvious, as these enterprises can be 
profitable, and their profits can be ploughed back into the armed forces’ coffers and other 
holdings. The inclusion of defense MCEs might seem odd, but the production of military 
equipment is big business and very expensive, which gives opportunities for military 
leaders to spread the money earmarked for defense purposes around both for legitimate 
warfighting purposes as well as for patronage purposes. By having control of these 
enterprises it enhances the military’s political power relative to other actors in society, in 
addition to providing the military with the ability to supply itself with needed equipment 
and munitions. Outside of deep investigative reporting on notable cases, it is difficult to 
say if these funds are used honestly by military institutions or for patronage purposes. 
Having control over such enterprises, at the least, does pose a corruption risk and can 
only add to the ability of military leaders to use such resources for non-warfighting 
purposes. This is especially true in environments where the budget is not regularly 









Figure 1: MCE Typology Examples  
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El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
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Argentina, Bangladesh, Chile, 
Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Myanmar, 




There are nine possible institutional arrangements where MCEs are concerned.71 The 
most important of these cells is the institutional control where both MCEs exist. Where 
the armed forces have control of both kinds of enterprises as well as have a strong 
institutional control of these enterprises implies that the military is both very well 
organized and has considerable assets. Having control of both commercial and defense 
assets means that the armed forces have multiple channels through which to channel 
patronage and reap profits. This kind of institutional arrangement provides the ideal 
relationship through which patronage can operate – providing both the size and channels 
                                                 
69 Does not have the full  l ist of all  states in each category.  
70 I could not find any examples of privately-owned defense MCEs by armed forces personnel, nor in the 
other two adjacent categories.  
71 This does not include the typologies including ministry control, but as stated above earlier, they are not 
important theoretically in this study. 
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through which military patronage can flow.72 For this study, the most important 
relationship is that in which the armed forces have institutional control of both 
commercial and defense enterprises as it implies the greatest degree of organization and 
size of the economic strength of the armed forces.  
Anatomy of an MCE 
To demonstrate a typical example of an institutional MCE, and how MCEs can be used to 
provide benefits to officers, the case of Indonesia is instructive. The Indonesian Armed 
forces (TNI) have never in their history been fully funded by the central government.73 In 
2002, the Indonesian defense budget was $800 million, less than one percent of GDP and 
less than 4 percent of the government budget.74 This amount is estimated to have been 
less than a third of the TNI’s total operating cost in that year, with the rest being made up 
from their business holdings. The TNI’s business holdings are quite large, and are 
responsible for providing healthcare, schools and social services to its soldiers. In 
addition, these MCEs provide a social safety net and provides a supplement to the low 
salaries of its members.75  
 
There are three different levels to the TNI’s MCE: the first are the state enterprises under 
military management, military cooperatives and the military foundations or “yayasans”. 
The state enterprises, such as Pertamina which is an Indonesian state oil corporation, or 
                                                 
72 During the data acquisition phase, only six of the nine possible categories could be populated with 
examples, as no examples of individually controlled defense MCEs could be found. This is not entirely 
surprising, as owning defense industries are not the most profitable of enterprises, especially when other 
alternatives exist such as extractive and loot-able resources exist. 
73Rabasa, Angel., Haseman, Angel, The military and democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics and 
Power, RAND Corporation, 2002, pg. 70  
74 Ibid. pg 70  
75 Ibid. pg. 71  
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the Badan Urusan Logistik, which is the state logistic agency, controls the distribution of 
foodstuffs.76 Other state enterprises operate telecommunications agencies, banks, and 
electricity companies.77 The second component of the armed forces’ MCEs are the 
cooperatives, which are wholesale distribution businesses that operate at both the local 
and national level. Their operations help to fund shortfalls left by the central budget as 
well as provide affordable goods to service members. Their operations are in turn funded 
by member dues and the holding companies that the cooperatives own.  
 
The final, and perhaps most important component of the TNI’s MCEs are the yayasans, 
which are technically charitable foundations exempt from a variety of laws such as tariffs 
and taxation that allow them to operate their holding companies without having to 
compete on the same level as other Indonesian businesses. These yayasans are funded by 
several large holding companies, usually at least one each, which are typically joint 
ventures with private businessmen.78 There are at least nine yayasans, with each 
belonging to a particular branch or military agency. These yayasans were expressly 
created to provide benefits to the members of their particular agency or branch, 
supplementing officer salaries directly or just covering other operating costs not covered 
by the central budget.  
 
The Indonesian Army has a large network of business holdings, including the foundation 
Yayasan Karitka Eka Paksi (YKEP), a military cooperative called the Inkopad and 
                                                 
76 Ibid. pg. 73  
77 McCulloch 2000, pg. 23-24  
78 Samego et. al, 1998a pp. 77-79  
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another cooperative named the Primkopad.79 These MCEs collectively own or manage 
the land of a business district in Jakarta, banks, insurance companies, hotels, real estate, 
timber, construction firms, fisheries, chemical storage, plastics companies, luxury car 
import business, shipping, forestry businesses, golf courses and manufacturing 
enterprises. These holdings provide social welfare that assists in finding and funding 
housing for soldiers, the Army University, and distributes holiday bonuses to officers. 
The army’s Red Berets Welfare Foundation, founded in 1993, provides salary 
supplements and retirement packages to current and former soldiers.80 The Indonesian 
Navy similarly has MCEs in the form of the Yayasan Bhumiyamca, the cooperative 
Inkopal, and another cooperative named Primkopal. Through its yayasans and 
cooperatives the Navy owns or manages shipping, resorts, oil refineries, property rental, 
import-export companies, cocoa plantations, maritime electronics, telecommunications, 
taxi companies and driving services.81 Among the services that these business perform 
for the service men are providing orphanages for the children of dead seamen, provide 
scholarships and operates schools for the children of seamen. The air force and national 
police also have their own business interests, though they are smaller than the other two 
branches: golf courses, container services, hotels, logging, aviation, insurance companies, 
etc., all provide cheap housing, scholarships, and healthcare to their members.82  
 
The base salaries in Indonesia are quite low, owing in part to the underdeveloped state of 
Indonesia’s taxation system. Much of the profit generated from these MCEs goes right 
                                                 
79 Rabasa, Ibid. pg 74  
80 Singh, 2001, pp. 19-20  
81 Samego, et al. 1998a, p.83  
82 Ibid. 1998a  
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back into the businesses, but a substantial amount is given away as salary relief to its 
soldiers. Both national and local commanders distribute supplemental income to their 
soldiers.83 According to one study by Lex Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, the 
base salary of a civil-servant typically represent less than one-half of total compensation, 
including those who serve in the military.84 For soldiers serving in the TNI, the rest of 
their compensation comes in the form of off-budget compensation such as housing, 
healthcare, scholarships, direct transfers or bonuses.85  
Indonesia is instructive as a single case, but it also quite typical of these kinds of 
institutionally-owned and operated MCEs. The pattern is repeated in many states in much 
the same way – the Burmese armed force’s Myanmar Economic Holdings Corporation 
(MEHC) was established in 1990 for much the same reason as the yayasans: veterans 
who were in dire economic straits needed support from the state that the state-allocated 
military budget could not provide.86 The capitalization of the MEHC was provided from 
shares being sold to current military officers as well as the Ministry of Defense, 
amounting to $1.4 billion in initial capitalization. The 34 subsidiaries that make up the 
MEC87 are responsible for both producing a wide variety of goods, as well also providing 
support to veterans. Active duty officers are the only ones allowed to purchase private 
shares in the MEHC, and the business decisions of the largest Burmese conglomerations 
are controlled entirely by military officers.88 
                                                 
83 Rieffel at al. pg. 54  
84 Rieffel et al. “On budget and out of business”, pg. 108  
85 Rieffel et al. Ibid. pg. 54   
86 Steinberg, David I. “Burma/Myanmar: The role of the military in the economy”, Burma Economic Watch, 
1/2005  
87 As of 2014.  
88 Min, Aung; Kudo Toshihiro, “Chapter 6: Business Conglomerates of Myanmar’s Economic Reform”, 




These benefits provide soldiers of all types with relief from their base salaries, and most 
importantly, the benefits are channeled directly from a military institution to its members. 
There is little to no civilian oversight, and commanders from the national level down to 
the local level have a great deal of leeway in how they distribute benefits within their 
networks. The central government plays almost no role in providing additional benefits to 
soldiers, instead funding capital acquisitions such as new equipment. The soldiers, 
especially the officers, are well aware that the source of much of their benefits lies in the 
military establishment, and not all in their state’s government.  
Origins of a business  
There are numerous historical factors that led to the development of military controlled 
enterprises, and their origins are quite varied. The ultimate claim of this paper is that 
MCEs were developed as a way to mitigate political risk, but it is worth exploring the 
disparate origins of many MCEs. In Pakistan, the tradition of MCEs grew out of a 
military-controlled pension fund which got its start in 1953 with the founding of the Fauji 
Foundation, paid for with the money owed by the UK to Pakistani soldiers serving in 
World War II.89 Indonesia’s business activities can be traced back to 1945 with the 
constitution of Indonesia giving the armed forces a distinctly non-military role in the new 
state. In 1957 the Indonesian military took the opportunity of violent instability to expand 
their economic role and seized control of formerly Dutch enterprises, putting officers in 
charge of enterprises such as village-level rice mills90. The Egyptian military’s foray into 
business began after Nasser’s seizure of power in 1952, when the state began to 
                                                 
89 Sidiq, Ayesha, “Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy”, Pluto Press, 2007  
90 J. Brommelhorster, W. Paes, The Military as an Economic Actor: Soldiers in Business, International 
Political Economy Series, BICC, pg. 100  
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nationalize the assets of the muamassirum, handing control of their assets over to the Free 
Officers over time9192. Routes to the establishment of MCEs are varied, and are often the 
products of complex interactions between actors and environments.  
 
There are six conditions that led most MCEs: budgetary assistance, pensions and welfare 
support, developmental role of the military, import substitution, economic opportunism, 
and opportunities for corruption. This project posits that there is an additional reason, and 
that is that MCEs play a role as a crucial link in a network of patronage that connects 
military and government leaders, which both use to engender the support of the officer 
class by offering them tangible financial benefits. Below is a discussion of each of these 
motivating factors, before moving on to this project’s theory as to the political role these 
organizations can play within the armed forces themselves. 
 
Budget and Welfare  
In many nations, the combination of poverty and insecurity led states to turn to MCEs as 
one way for the armed forces to overcome these budgetary restraints. Armed forces 
capable of producing their own financial support can free themselves from reliance upon 
the state’s coffers and the whims of government leaders who might not prioritize military 
needs above other state concerns.93 Budgetary assistance is one reason for the 
                                                 
91 Springborg, Robert, “Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East”, Cambridge 
University Press 2010 
92 Mutamassirum is a term referring to the capitalist class of Egypt at the time, a large group of native 
Egyptians who were wealthy business people. Mutamassirum were of both Egyptian and foreign, mainly 
Greek, origin. Most had fled by 1960, some leaving before their assets could be seized, triggering a  flood 
of outgoing wealth from Egypt during this period.  
93 Franko, Patrice, “De-facto Demilitarization: Budget-Driven Downsizing in Latin America”, Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 36, No.1 (Spring 1994)  
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establishment of MCEs, as military leaders sought ways to take care of their soldiers, and 
minimize their organization’s exposure to changes in political climate and thus their 
budget.94  
 
Several prominent examples of states with MCEs have a history of MCEs beginning their 
existence as pension funds. Offering subsidies to these pension funds from MCEs are one 
way that the armed forces can reward servicemen for their work. Turkey’s Armed Forces 
Pension Fund (OYAK) is an example of such an organization, which is a large holding 
company that finances the armed services’ pension fund by investing heavily in other 
businesses around Turkey95. The OYAK group currently employs about 28,000 people in 
roughly 70 companies in a variety of sectors, including industry, finance and services96. 
OYAK is funded from profits made by these operations as well as a 10 percent levy on 
the base salary of Turkey’s military officers. In addition to its estimated $15 billion 
revenue, the group also has a 49% share in OYAK-Renault, the largest Renault factory 
outside of Western Europe, among other holdings. OYAK is owned, operated and 
managed by the Armed Forces of Turkey. The Ministry of National Defence has a role in 
its governance, but serving officers are present in all its governance bodies. The 
Representative Assembly consists entirely of military officers; the General Assembly of 
20 has at least 5 officers; the Board of Directors has 7, of whom 3 are serving military 
                                                 
94 J. Brommelhorster, W. Paes, The Military as an Economic Actor: Soldiers in Business, International 
Political Economy Series, BICC, pg. 189 
95 Ahmad, Ishtiaq, “The Role of the Military in the Polity and Economy under Globalization: A Comparative 
Study of Turkey and Pakistan”, European University Institute, Workshop 12, “The Role of the Military in 
the Politics and Economics of the Middle East”, 2003  
96 “OYAK Group Subsidies” Website, http://www.oyak.com.tr/EN/corporate/subsidiaries.html  (Accessed 
May 16, 2016) Uniformed military personnel are directly represented on each governance body.  
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officers.97 The armed forces have a great deal of leverage with regard to the operations of 
OYAK, but it should be noted that as far as the typical governance of MCEs goes, Turkey 
is itself somewhat exceptional for how integrated civilians are into its corporate structure.  
 
For many MCEs, such as the Burmese military’s Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings 
(UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), the two major 
conglomerations of the Burmese military, civilians are almost entirely excluded from 
governance positions or from having a stake in its shares.98 While technically under the 
control of the Ministry of Defence, a nominally civilian organization, the Ministry is 
itself staffed and managed almost entirely by either current or former military officers. 
This pattern is repeated in MCEs like the National Service Products Organization of the 
Egyptian military, which is run under the management of the Ministry of Defense and 
Military Production which is itself both headed by and run primarily by officers.99 The 
Fauji Foundation (FF) of Pakistan, an enterprise founded as a charitable trust in 1947 as a 
pension fund for soldiers, employs more than 12,000 people among dozens of privately 
owned companies.100 The FF has two major governance bodies, the Committee of 
Administration and the Central Board of Directors. The Committee is wholly staffed by 
serving or retired military officers while the Board of Directors is nearly all retired 
                                                 
97 Military Personnel Assistance and Pension Fund Law, No. 205, 3 January 1961, Available at: 
http://www.oyak.com.tr/oyakdosyalar/media/editor/fi les/CORPORATE/oyak-in-brief/lawofoyak.pdf 
(Accessed June 16, 2016)   
98 Singh, Ravi Shekhar Narain (2005). Asian Strategic and Military Perspective. Lancer Publishers. 
p. 209 
99 “Egypt’s Military Factories”, Federation of American Scientists, 1998 Available at: 
http://fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/facil ity/mark0033.htm (Accessed June 16, 2016)  
100 “Fauji” in Urdu means “soldier”.  
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officers.101 The exact institutional arrangements may be slightly different, but for most 
MCEs the armed forces retain a controlling or significant amount of control over the 
operations, investments and disbursements of their enterprises.  
 
Assisting the military in budgetary matters is one function that MCEs fulfill. By taking at 
least some of their financial needs off the books of the state, the military is able to be 
more independent from the state government and have much tighter control of how many 
resource they have and where those resources are allocated. Many military officers in 
states with MCEs like to highlight that having MCEs relieves the state budget of the 
onerous task of funding the military, thus freeing up resources for development and other 
civilian purposes.102 While this claim may be dubious, the reality of over-stretched state 
budgets in states with large security concerns is not. As a matter of course, many MCEs 
do indeed fulfill the function of filling the gaps in perceived resource deprivation within 
the armed forces.  
 
National Development & Import Substitution  
MCEs also aid the state in a development role, and are often a technological spearhead in 
delivering infrastructure projects to underdeveloped regions. Armed forces have very 
well-developed construction and earthmoving capabilities, and member of the armed 
forces are also some of the most technically proficient member of society, with many 
members having had years of technical training in engineering, logistics and 
                                                 
101 “Governance Structure”, Fauji Foundation Website, Available at: http://www.fauji.org.pk/fauji/about-
us/governance-structure (Accessed June 16, 2016)  
102 Interview with Egyptian officer, 2014  
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construction103. This is especially the case for developing societies that initially lacked 
well-established university- level engineering schools. Even in the highly developed and 
engineer-saturated United States, the US Army Corps of Engineers for decades has been 
regularly tasked with heavy construction work that other companies are either incapable 
of doing or would be too costly for strictly commercial businesses such as dam safety, 
flood risk management, levee safety, navigation, etc..104  
 
The engineering corps of many armed forces have been put to work constructing roads, 
canals, bridges, levees and managing important strategic waterways105. For many states, 
the armed forces have had a long history of development work, and it is not a huge leap 
for members of the military to be re-tasked from state-tasked development work to 
operating MCEs with technical and engineering specialties.106 For example, the Frontier 
Works Organization (FWO) of the Pakistan Army has been an important agent in its 
state’s development, constructing bridges, roads, railways, canals, fencing, tunnels, 
airfields and dams all across Pakistan.107 The FWO was also responsible for building the 
“Eighth Wonder of the World”, the highest paved road in the world, known as the 
Karakoram Highway. The Highway connected China and Pakistan, covering 
                                                 
103 J. Brommelhorster, W. Paes, The Military as an Economic Actor: Soldiers in Business, International 
Political Economy Series, BICC, pg. 188 
104 US Army Corps of Engineers website, (http://www.usace.army.mil/Missions/CivilWorks.aspx) Accessed 
May 16th, 2016  
105 The Egyptian armed forces, for example, manage the strategic Suez Canal through the Suez Canal 
Authority. An Egyptian officer has been in charge of the Suez Canal Authority since at least 1965, with an 
admiral directly in charge since 1996. Suez Canal Authority Website, 
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106 Joseph Babatunde Fagoyinbo, “The Armed Forces: Instrument of Peace, Strength, Development and 
Prosperity”, Authorhouse, 2013  
107 “Overview”, Frontier Works Organization website, Available at: 
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approximately 550 miles, completed in 1979, running through some of the toughest 
terrain in the world. Without an accompanying industrialized and competitive 
construction sector, the government of Pakistan, as have many other governments, had to 
rely upon the military to provide the necessary expertise and manpower for national 
development projects.  
 
Many armed forces have as part of their raison d’etre and organizational mission to help 
their nations develop and modernize economically. In many cases the military took center 
stage as the primary driver of development through massive national projects with the 
express purpose of revitalizing and modernizing the economy108. Still others leveraged 
their technical skills to become one of the largest economic actors in their states. There 
are also cases where military were envisioned as taking an important role in industrial 
development, leading to policies of military-directed import substitution. In some states, 
armed forces wanted to lessen their dependence on foreign suppliers of strategic 
commodities such as fossil fuels, aircraft, and especially of weapons systems. Thus, many 
armed forces assumed control of industrial organizations such as coal mines, aerospace 
firms, coal mines and shipyards and were heavily subsidized109. Many of these 
enterprises were state-owned enterprises put under military management, while others 
were entirely the products of military entrepreneurship.  
                                                 
108 Nasser came to power through the armed forces, but also helped found the Arab Socialist Union both 
give the military regime more legitimacy and to promulgate a policy of what was termed “Arab Socialism”, 
seeking to use the armed forces as a way to help develop the nation and create a larger role for the 
government in the lives of Egyptian citizens.  
109 Scheetz, Thomas, “The Argentine Defense Industry, its Past and Current State, an Evaluation”, 
Universidad de Argentina de la Empresa, Buenos Aires. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Thomas_Scheetz/publication/254718013_1_The_Argentine_Defense_I





National security also involved improving national self-sufficiency, with many armed 
forces leading the way to create new industries as both its manager and its biggest client. 
Some states were much more successful than others in this endeavor, with Brazil having 
a vibrant and large defense industry in aeronautics corporations like Embraer. Others 
were much less successful, such as Argentina’s flagship aeronautics firm struggling to 
compete for years, producing only 20 aircraft between 1980 and 2015110. Brazil is 
emblematic of this drive for total national security, as their national security doctrine, the 
National Strategy of Defense, lists self-sufficiency and a lack of relying upon imported 
weaponry and technology is listed among their many priorities.111 Other states have 
pursued similar, albeit smaller defense programs mainly focused on small arms and light 
vehicles, and have simply turned to relying upon foreign arms markets as their major 
suppliers for complex weapons systems.  
 
Economic Opportunism & Corruption  
In still other cases, armed forces came into business by way of opportunism. Generals in 
states without strong central governments were able to set up their own enterprises or 
seize control of them from others. High-ranking military officers were able to carve out 
lucrative economic empires in a variety of areas, which is prevalent in Africa and 
elsewhere with very weak central governments.112 Extractive resources such as timber, 
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111 National Strategy of Defense, p. 18, Available at: 
http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/estrategia/arquivos/es trategia_defesa_nacional_ingles.pdf 
(Accessed May 16th, 2016)  
112 J. Brommelhorster, W. Paes, The Military as an Economic Actor: Soldiers in Business, International 
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oil or diamonds are all products that military leaders have been able to secure for 
themselves and their supporters. The Indonesian military’s historic involvement in the 
timber industry has been traced to human rights abuses and violence between government 
and rebel groups.113 There are even cases of military leaders from neighboring states such 
as Rwanda setting up shop in countries such as the DRC as a way to funnel these 
valuable resources to foreign markets114. Cambodian military units, sponsored by 
powerful politicians and businessmen, have used their power to displace peasants for 
their powerful patrons in return for economic benefits.115 In all these cases, officers of the 
armed forces are able to leverage their strength over local populations to seize control of 
valuable resources from others for their own personal benefit and that of their patronage 
network.  
 
While some of these business ventures may be above board legally, some MCEs also take 
advantage of the opportunities for corruption that business can provide.116 Commercial 
operations provide a way for military leaders to move money around within and between 
enterprises to avoid notice of any regulatory bodies and news organizations that may 
exist. These MCEs could be used as a means of strengthening the institution of the armed 
forces, securing loyalty of political supporters or simply subsidizing the generally low 
military wages. Military businesses are also susceptible to illegal business operations, as 
                                                 
113 Human Rights Watch, Too High A Price: The Human Costs of the Indonesian Military’s Economic 
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115 Email Interview with Global Witness expert, Sept. 2015  
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their access to both transportation and muscle gives them opportunities for business. The 
armed forces’ plausible claims of keeping operations secret for the sake of national 
security can also keep prying eyes away from business operations. Enterprising military 
leaders can establish MCEs as a way to set up or enhance patronage networks, shifting 
benefits as needed to ensure the loyalty of their troops. Transparency International lists 
military-owned businesses as a corruption risk for this very reason: it is already difficult 
enough to root out corruption for regular businesses, but the military adds a layer of 
complexity that makes it almost impossible to all but armed forces insiders to find 
evidence of corruption without insider help.117  
 
Taking Care of Their Own 
MCEs are run by officers, for officers and the primary beneficiaries are the officers.118 In 
the Indonesian case above, all MCEs are run by either active duty military officers or 
retired officers, with nominal or partial involvement by civilians. It is also worth noting 
that in almost all states where MCEs exist, there is a reliance upon conscription for 
enlisted personnel to fill out the lower ranks. The normal two-year rotation of enlisted 
recruits means that enlisted personnel are constantly shifting in and out of the ranks, not 
providing a permanent political bloc or voice within the military. Thus in most cases the 
enlisted conscripts are excluded from the more substantial benefits of the officer corps, 
and the officer corps remains the most powerful political unit within the armed forces.  
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May 16, 2016)  
118 In the Indonesian case, enlisted personnel are beneficiaries of the programs supported by these MCEs 
as well, but in other states, such as Egypt, conscripts  are excluded from second-order benefits packages.  
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Indonesia is certainly an instructive case in that there is clear leadership by the officer 
corps in the administration of these MCEs. Military control certainly is not uniform 
across all MCEs, however, in order to be considered an MCE in the first place there must 
be some substantial representation of the armed forces in the management of these 
MCEs.119 Going back to the example of Turkey’s OYAK, while the military does not 
have an absolutely majority in every administrative body, they are substantially 
represented in all bodies. An enterprise without significant representation or clear 
ownership by the armed forces in its governance bodies is not considered an MCE.  
 
Officers are the primary beneficiaries of the operations of MCEs. Having management or 
ownership over commercial enterprises means that the military leadership now has 
control over a potentially profit-making enterprise, or at the very least a vehicle through 
which benefits can flow. In many states the armed forces established at least a partial 
stake in some of their states’ most lucrative industries, ensuring that there would be a 
constant flow of income. In Ecuador and Peru, the military has a stake in the petroleum 
industry and the petroleum transportation industry120. In Egypt, the military has a 
management stake in the daily operations of the Suez Canal and its expansion, with every 
head executive of the Suez Canal Authority since 1960 being either an active or former 
                                                 
119 The later data section has a much more in-depth discussion of the components of what is considered 
“military-controlled”, which includes substantial representation on governance bodies.  
120 Mani, Kristina, “Military Empresarios: Approaches to Studying the Military as an Economic Actor”, 
Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2010  
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military officer121. In Chile, since 1958 the armed forces have been guaranteed a portion 
of the profits of the state-owned copper mines of CODELCO.122  
 
Through MCEs the armed forces have increased their own resources, which they can 
apportion out to others as the officers in charge see fit through internal decision-making 
process within the military leadership. Both junior and senior officers are the 
beneficiaries of MCEs: the military can afford to better pay junior officers, offer officers 
benefits packages that would otherwise be unavailable to them, provide a stable and 
guaranteed retirement package, and reward them with benefits related to the enterprises 
that are under control of the armed forces.  
 
These MCEs allow the leadership to subsidize the normal officers’ wages with earnings 
from these enterprises in the form of both direct supplements and secondary supplements 
like low-cost housing, healthcare etc. In addition, an important component of MCEs is 
that many of them also include an institutionalized pension fund that draws upon the 
officers’ own resources in the form of dues or withheld wages. Many MCEs either began 
as pension funds, and later expanded into economic giants, or began as business which 
later were used as a way to increase pension funds or related disability programs. Many 
of these pension funds utilize the wages of officers as a way to pool risk and to invest 
their officers into the larger military-commercial apparatus. This arrangement functions 
much the way of any pay-into-retirement plan, and by giving officers a direct financial 
                                                 
121 Suez Canal Authority Website, Ibid.  
122 Barton J., Campero C., Maher R., “’The Chilean Wage’: Mining and the Janus face of the Chilean 
Development Model”, from Resource Governance in the Global South: Critical International Political 
Economy Perspectives, Edited by Nem Singh and France Bourgouin, 2013  
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stake in the military institution, decreases their likelihood of rebellion against any regime, 
civilian or military, over poor conditions.  
 
Patronage and Corruption Risks  
Many MCEs are straightforward affairs where enterprises are used as a way to fund 
general benefits to the entire officer class, but MCEs can also be used for more targeted 
benefits in the form of patronage. There is a reason military ownership of business is 
listed as a corruption risk by Transparency International, and that is that military 
enterprises generally do not have outside oversight by civilian bodies123. Some 
enterprises, especially large, formerly state-owned enterprises, will be under much public 
scrutiny, but many MCEs, especially MCEs under the exclusive control of individuals or 
local commanders, have no such history of oversight. Indeed, many of them were created 
entirely from and for military personnel, with civilians playing either a minor or no role.  
 
This kind of patronage relationship can be present at multiple levels: either at the 
national, sub-national or local level. It was of little surprise that, when the list of winning 
contractors was announced for the newest expansion of Suez Canal, (the expansion itself 
was being managed by the Egyptian military) several large Egyptian military-owned 
construction firms were the primary beneficiaries and winners of the contracts.124 In the 
Indonesian case, in addition to the larger institutionalized MCEs that provide benefits to 
all members of their respective branches, there is also another strata of MCEs in which 
                                                 
123 Transparency International UK, Military-owned Businesses: Corruption and Risk Reform, 2012 Available 
at: http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2012-01_MilitaryOwnedBusinesses.pdf (Accessed 
May 16, 2016) 
124 “Bahrain’s Dar Al-Handasah, Egypt army wins Suez hub project”, TradeArabia.com, Available at:  
http://www.tradearabia.com/news/CONS_263935.html  (Accessed June 18, 2016) 
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local commanders own or operate smaller businesses or conglomerations within their 
territory. These MCEs are not regulated or subject to the same amount of scrutiny as the 
national or regional MCEs. In fact, many of the human rights violations reported by 
groups like Human Rights Watch seem to occur within this strata of MCEs, including 
logging operations in areas with marginalized or impoverished communities.125 Local 
commanders are given substantial autonomy in how they operate their unit’s businesses 
and how they distribute revenues from those businesses.  
 
The existence of these MCEs and their patronage behavior, tolerated or perhaps even 
encouraged from the national or regional level leadership, are a way for the leadership to 
keep their officer contingents happy.  With military operations having the cover of being 
vital security operations, and civilian oversight being generally low to non-existent, it is 
much easier hide the movement of goods and money. MCEs allow military leaders the 
opportunity to move goods through patronage networks to disaffected military members 
or to enhance the loyalty of key military officers. Military ownership of enterprises such 
as railways and airports allow the military to move goods at will and off book, while 
ownership of enterprises such as resorts or hotel chains allow leadership to reward loyal 
members with tangible benefits such as vacations or international travel.  
 
Economic Opportunities for Officers  
MCEs also provide substantial economic opportunities for officers during active service 
in the form of training and experience, but also after retirement in the form of a second 
                                                 
125 “Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of Indonesian Military’s Economic Activities”, Human Rights 
Watch, 2006, Available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/indonesia0606/ (Accessed June 18, 2016)  
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possible career. MCEs can also help alleviate the problems of advancement and turnover. 
Even the largest military institutions have limits on the benefits that they can provide to 
their soldiers. By enlarging the size of the military with MCEs the military has more both 
more benefits and more positions to offer its soldiers that are self-sustaining. A junior 
officer in a state with MCEs can reasonably expect that, if they stay loyal to the military 
they can expect to enjoy some of the benefits of those MCEs after they have retired.126 
These benefits can take the form of financial subsidies to their salaries or additional 
important business connections. Experience running businesses will also expand the 
opportunities that junior officers have should they ever choose to leave military service.  
 
The potential business connections made while in the service can also be a major 
incentive for junior officers who might think of leaving the service, as access to the 
correct military personnel at the right time can lead to lucrative contracts. This is well-
known in the American experience, as very senior officers are often hired very quickly 
after retirement by those firms that need an edge in the security industry or with 
government contracts. In the US, roughly 80% of retired 3-star and 4-star officers worked 
as defense consultants for major firms once they were out of service.127 One can 
extrapolate that an officer with substantial experience as both an officer, and with 
experience in non-military business affairs will have a wide range of opportunities, both 
within MCEs and out. A junior officer with an expectation of personal advancement and 
                                                 
126 126 Steinberg, David I. “Burma/Myanmar: The role of the military in the economy”, Burma Economic 
Watch, 1/2005, pg. 18  
127 Bender, Bryan, “From the Pentagon to the private sector”, Available at: 
http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/12/26/defense_firms_lure_retired_ge
nerals/ (Accessed May 17th, 2016)  
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opportunity within and without the military is much more likely to stay loyal and be 
happy with the leadership. A junior officer corps struggling to make ends meet is going to 
be much less predisposed towards giving their leadership the benefit of the doubt, and 
could provide ample motivation for rebellion in the form of a coup, mutiny or other kind 
of resistance.  
 
MCEs also fulfill a similar role in placating senior leadership. Senior officers are 
generally concerned with the long-term aspects of the military as an institution. 
Development goals and the establishment of MCEs can help alleviate concerns for senior 
leadership by giving a plausible goal and direction for the military of building up its 
capacity. In addition, as discussed above, the opportunities for senior officers to be put in 
positions of immense influence within military MCEs will almost certainly enhance their 
loyalty to any military regime. MCEs also provide a guarantee that after retirement most 
senior officers will have an income that can be traced right back to the armed forces 
instead of the government.  
 
MCEs and Political Origins 
The central claim of this study is that MCEs serve as an institutional arrangement to keep 
the armed forces from seizing power in a coup by both satisfying basic military needs and 
acting as a channel of patronage from leaders to the officer corps. In this way MCEs are 
established primarily to serve a political end, which is to keep the military out of politics 




The primary threat to military rule is other military challengers, and MCEs provide a way 
for leaders to mitigate their political risk. Anticipating challenges from within the ranks 
of the armed forces is important for the survival of any regime, military or civilian. One 
of the strongest predictors of an attempted coup is whether or not there was a coup the 
year before, suggesting that once a military coup has occurred other armed actors might 
be emboldened to act in the same manner in the future128. Indeed, military regimes are 
one of the most likely governments to be victims of a coup, other than new 
democracies.129 Military coups open up the rest of the military as a political actor, 
empowering not only the original coup actors, but empowering other groups within the 
military to organize and consider themselves political actors.  
 
Coups encourage other actors to attempt to seize power to claim the benefits of state 
capture. Military coups are also highly contentious events that are generally considered 
illegitimate usurpations of the political process, many even among member of the 
military.130 While many politicians spend years trying to build coalitions among key 
elites to maintain their power, coup conspirators may not have had the time to establish 
themselves in a larger political network and could face major challenges from elements 
both within and without armed forces that they had not yet had a chance to bring into 
their political fold.131 This pattern of coup and counter-coup can also be explained by 
reactions by the previous regime attempting to return to power, or fissures developing 
                                                 
128 Geddes, Wright and Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions”, Perspectives on Politics, 
12(2)  
129 Ibid 
130 This is especially true when there is an ethnic or religious component to the coup, which can 
encourage military members of a competing ethnicity or religion to oppose the new regime.  
131 There are of course exceptions to this  
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within the ruling military elite. Regardless of the reason, the military regime not only has 
the shortest average duration, but also has the highest chance of experiencing challenges 
to its rule from within the military itself.  
 
The greatest threat a military regime can have is a fracturing of the military’s loyalties 
from within. A military divided against itself can prove disastrous, especially in the worst 
case scenario of actual violence between armed factions. Even short of violence, 
publicly-known disputes between pivotal officers can provide opportunities for civilians 
to mobilize and demand change, which can be a thorn in the side of a military regime and 
provide a focal point for opposition to the regime. Ensuring that the military does not face 
internal divisions is of paramount importance to regime leadership, and there are 
certainly steps the leadership can take to co-opt potential rivals and keep the remaining 
officer corps happy.132  
 
The case study on Egypt will further elaborate on this point, but an instructive example is 
the relationship between the leadership and the armed forces in the aftermath of the coup 
bringing Nasser to power. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak all found themselves during the 
course of their reigns challenged by powerful opponents within the military.133 While 
each leader pursued slightly different strategies, each of them responded in a roughly 
                                                 
132 In many cases, military regimes have purged the officer corps of reactionary elements and supporters 
of the old regime. Koga, Jun, “Authoritarian Consolidation of Power: When can a dictator undermine the 
threat of coup replacement?”, Presentation at Annual Meeting of Southern Political Science Association, 
Orlando, Florida, 2013  
133 It should be noted that all  three were former military, but formally became civil ians when they ran for 
the Presidency. For only a few years Nasser was both a military man and in charge of Egypt, while both 
Sadat and Mubarak were formally civilians for their entire reigns.  
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similar way. As both an officer and later a civilian, Nasser increased the military budget 
and turned over property seized from political opponents to key officers for their support. 
Sadat, faced with a military budget already consisting of between 35-40% of government 
expenditures between 1970 and 1978, and nearly 80% in 1973, could not turn to the 
already cash-strapped government.134135 Instead, Sadat encouraged the creation and 
consolidation of commercial and defense enterprises under the direction of the armed 
forces. Mubarak also allowed the expansion of military enterprises, passed laws 
exempting military enterprises from taxation and tariffs, and sold poorly operated state-
owned enterprises at low costs to the armed forces. When faced with challenges, each of 
these leaders transferred enterprises into the hands of the armed forces to engender their 
loyalty and to keep the military from challenging their rule.  
 
Both military and civilian leadership is certainly aware of the coup challenge from the 
military, as Collier and Hoeffler find that when the risk of a coup is high in Africa, the 
government tends to increase the military’s budget, regardless of whether the regime was 
military or civilian136. One obvious solution is to raise salaries of junior officers or 
provide better benefits, which is one reason why the military’s budget often increases in 
                                                 
134 Gotowicki, Stephen, “The Military in Egyptian Society”, Available at: 
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/110173/ichaptersection_singledocument/f8f2e
e57-d498-4030-a2da-415bbd572790/en/7.pdf, pg. 108  
135 According to the United States Arms Control and Dis armament Agency, Egypt was spending roughly 
19.6% of its GNP on military spending in 1975, with an average of 14.13% between 1970 and 1979. 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-1979, United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, 1981, Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185663.pdf 
(Accessed June 17, 2016)  
136 Collier P., Hoeffler A., “Military Spending and the Risks of Coups d’etats”, Centre for the Study of 
African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, March 2007  
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the wake of a successful coup137. In fact, according to earlier work, higher spending per 
soldier is highly correlated with much lower coup risk, while lower spending is correlated 
with a much higher coup risk138. Lavish military spending can come at a price though, as 
a marked increase in military spending can come out of the budget for other non-military 
programs and undermine support for a military regime or topple a civilian one.  
 
Simply increasing salaries is also not a lasting solution: salaries can be just as sensitive to 
politics as anything else and it may not be possible for either a civilian or a military 
regime to commit to increased spending, especially if the budget is already overstretched, 
as was the case in Egypt under Sadat. There is also no guarantee that increased spending 
will last, as other priorities or crises may take the attention of either military or civilian 
regimes. Subsequent regimes might also not be as military-friendly, or have other major 
priorities that clash with military objectives.  
 
MCEs can be a longer-term solution to all of these considerations of budget and financing 
that those leaders with foresight can use to their advantage in placating military threats to 
their tenure. Turning over enterprises to military control can provide relief from military 
threats and creates a patronage relationship between leaders and the officer corps, 
increasing regime stability. Beyond just the immediate material benefits that MCEs can 
provide the officers, MCEs are also fundamentally different in that they also appeal to the 
more nationalistic or security-concerned officers who want to ensure that the military is 
                                                 
137 Leon, Gabriel, “Loyalty for Sale? Military Spending and Coups d’Etat”, Address, Faculty of Economics, 
University of Cambridge, Feb 2012  
138 Powell J., “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’etat”. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 56(6): 1017-1040  
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self-sufficient and independent of meddling foreign powers. By giving the armed forces 
control of their own enterprises, leaders can set up a patronage relationship while still 
appealing to the basic concerns of the security-minded officer.  
 
Theory of MCEs and Coup Risk: The Relevant Actors   
The military is a gigantic organization with a multitude of actors, all of which are 
important for its functioning. From a theoretical point of view, there are really only two 
groups that are politically relevant in this analysis: senior military officers and junior 
military officers. While other groups are important, it is the officers that are typically the 
most educated, most motivated, possess the necessary leadership qualities, have political 
connections outside the military and have the legitimacy and training to lead others139. 
Enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers and civilian employees of defense 
institutions are important in their own right to keep the military functioning, but they 
typically lack the same advantages that the officer class has when it comes to organizing 
action. More importantly, these groups are typically not politically important or relevant. 
The civilian components of the military establishment are certainly important, but they 
are often not subject to the same disciplinary structure or the ideological training as their 
enlisted or officer counterparts140.  
 
                                                 
139 For a full  demographic breakdown of the US military, for example, the latest Profile of the Military 
Community: 2014 Demographics has information on education attainment, income, family size etc. The 
overwhelming majority of enlisted personnel (92.1%) have only a high school or GED equivalent, while 
officers generally also have a high percentage of bachelor’s degrees (83.8%) or even an advanced degree 
(41.3%).  
140 In 2014, the US Department of Defense consisted of over 700,000 civil ian employees compared to 1.3 
mill ion active duty personnel. http://www.defense.gov/About-DoD (Accessed 5/15/2016)  
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Officers have an advantage over other personnel enlisted personnel as well by virtue of 
their training: they are much better equipped to organize people into action, whether on 
the battlefield, in non-combat operations or with regards to political activity by the 
military. Officers provide the leadership, organization and oftentimes serve as the source 
of the espirit d’corps that keeps the military functioning as a cohesive unit.  
 
This is borne out empirically as well, with numerous examples of military coups led by 
the officer corps. The Free Officers of Egypt and Syria are two examples of such coups, 
which were both perpetrated by junior officers, displacing both the current government 
and their military superiors. The Coup Group in Thailand was composed of forty junior 
officers who seized power in 1947141. Chile’s Augusto Pinochet was a senior general at 
the time of the 1973 coup, stepping into power within the military junta that seized 
control of the government142. The vast majority of military coups, especially successful 
ones, are organized and led by officers143144.  
                                                 
141 Judith, Stowe, “Thailand Becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue”, C Hurst and Co. Publishers, Ltd, 1991  
142 Valenzuela, Arturo, A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet. New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 
1993 
143 This stylized fact is largely due to many revolts by enli sted personnel being considered mutinies instead 
of coups. It is often the case that munities are put down by other groups within the armed forces, or that 
the mutineers’ aims are much more limited than seizure of the government. For a good discussion on 
mutinies, see: Hamby, E. Joel, “The Munity Wagon Wheel: A Leadership Model for Munity in Combat”, 
Armed Forces and Society, Summer 2002, vol. 28, no. 4 575-600.  
144 This is not to say that enlisted personnel have never rebelled or attempted to seize power, but it is a 
rare occurrence for their activities to have a large political impact. Indeed, in many cases of enlisted -led 
rebellion there is typically an attempt to recruit other officers to act as leaders of the coup to legitimize 
their cause. It is the officer that is almost always behind any political action of consequence by the armed 
forces, which is why officers will  be the subject of analysis for this study. 
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The two most politically relevant groups, senior officers and the junior officers, both 
present a threat to leaders, and each have unique personal and institutional incentives145. 
It is the interaction of these incentives and the political-security environment that can 
produce some important military behavior146. In the ideal Huntingtonian conception of 
senior officers, those who are in the highest leadership positions within the military, have 
among their highest priorities those which affect the institution of the armed forces as a 
whole: maintaining respect by the lower ranks of the internal military hierarchy, instilling 
discipline, managing the loyalty of their troops, administering the military organizations, 
providing equipment to their troops and pushing government leadership to prioritize 
security issues in the budget.147  
 
The above is not to say that senior leadership is without personal ambition, political 
agenda or aims that do not align with the defense of the government. There are multiple 
examples of military officers who came to power for personal benefit, delivery of 
patronage to their ethnic kinsfolk, or to stamp out a political ideology that directly 
threatened political allies.148 Mumamar Gaddafi, a politically active officer from an 
impoverished Bedouin family, seized power in a coup in 1969, lavishing his tribesmen 
                                                 
145 While there is of course a great deal of variety across time and state as to the priorities of either group, 
generally speaking these two groups in many armed forces face similar dynamics of being in leadership 
versus being one of many younger, less influential officers.  
146 For the purposes of this project, “junior” and “senior” designations do not align perfectly with a given 
rank. Rather, Senior officers are those in high command positions while junior officers are generally not. 
There are of course middle officer ranks such as captain to major. For the purposes of this project, any 
rank below that of brigadier general is considered “junior”, and brigadier and above considered “senior”.  
147 Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil -Military Relations. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957. Print. 
148 Harkness, Kristen “The ethnic army and the state: explaining coup traps and the difficulties of 
democratization in Africa”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 2016, vol. 60(4), 587 -616  
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with patronage over other Libyan ethnic groups.149 He also famously filled the ranks of 
his personal bodyguard with hand-picked women, his so-called Amazonian Guard of 
which allegations of sexual misconduct by Gaddafi and his inner circle were well-
known.150 151 Idi Amin, Commander of the Ugandan army at the time of the 1971 coup, 
established a regime characterized by vicious suppression of rival ethnic groups, along 
with lavishing his family and supporters with patronage. Indeed, even before his reign he 
was personally implicated in a scandal involving smuggling the ivory and gold through 
Uganda from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.152 That senior leadership have 
political and personal ambitions beyond those ascribed to them by their uniform is 
important, as a wealth of evidence suggests that even those in the highest military offices 
are sensitive to material incentives.  
 
Junior officers also tend to share many of these institutional priorities, along with the 
power to overturn a leader’s regime. Many junior officers are justly concerned about the 
future direction of the military, especially since their lives may depend upon the decisions 
of their superiors, both military and political. Where junior and senior officers tend to 
differ though relates to their relative position within the hierarchy. Senior officers in 
positions of high leadership are usually at the end of their careers, collecting much higher 
wages and better benefits, in addition to enjoying political access that such positions may 
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provide. In addition, a common complaint heard from junior officers in the developing 
world is that senior leadership reach their positions by virtue of their political 
connections, not their skill.153  
 
Threat to a leader’s survival can come from both the junior and senior officer levels. 
MCEs can help alleviate the concerns of both: senior officers will have opportunities in 
these MCEs after retirement, thus not having to worry about their livelihoods and giving 
them ample contacts within the military-business circles. Junior officers benefit 
especially because at early career stages, when their pay is much less substantial, they are 
better provided for with material benefits.  
 
A Model of MCEs and Coup Risk  
The above informs the theoretical underpinnings of the following theory about how 
MCEs come about, and have political effects. In the theoretical model for this study, the 
chief executive of a state is endowed with a certain amount of resources which it can 
apportion as it needs. Leaders face multiple threats of removal from power, be it 
replacement from within their own political party, opposition parties, removal by foreign 
enemies or removal by the armed forces via coup attempt. Leaders must use these 
resources strategically to reduce their likelihood of removal by any one actor and 
constantly face pressure by possible usurpers to increase their share of resources. Leaders 
must act rationally and strategically to maximize their chances of staying in office over 
time, and shift their resources as new threats rise or increase in magnitude accordingly.  
                                                 
153 This was a common complaint heard in the Free Officers’ movement of Egypt in the 1950s, mirrored in 




Leader decisions about how they allocate resources in this simple model are informed by 
two major factors: the risks they face from their potential rivals and their resource 
endowments. It is the combination of these two factor that can lead towards the 
establishment of MCEs. Leaders will be more responsive to those threats that they 
believe pose the biggest threat, and consequently allocate the resources commensurate 
with the amount of risk they face from each threat.154  
 
A major assumption in this model is that leaders want to stay in power because it 
guarantees them a larger share of resources than if they were not in power, even if there 
are risks associated with some modes of removal as a leader. Leaders have to choose 
strategically which groups they give resources to, whether those resources will 
accomplish their goal of reducing removal risk and what the chances of a removal 
attempt will be both pre- and post-distribution of resources.155 Those groups that can 
make credible threats and have the power to remove the leader will get more resources, 
while those groups that cannot will receive less.156  
                                                 
154 There is of course, the distinct possibility that leaders have different profiles when it comes to risk 
assessment and risk acceptance or avoidance. It is also possible that leaders weigh additional factors such 
as their fates post-removal: leaders l ikely to face death from removal are going to have a different 
strategic logic than those leaders faced with returning to be leaders of their own parties. The manner of 
exit almost certainly matters, but for the purposes of this model removal from power is to be avoided at 
all  costs.   
155 In a more complete model there would also be uncertainty about the actual to perceived threat, and a 
game within the game where different groups try to exaggerate the amount of removal risk they pose to 
the leader in order to get more resources. This strategic bluffing on the part of rivals, with the leaders 
having to assess the threat that each group poses is certainly interesting, but for the purposes of this 
study a simpler model of non-endogenous removal risk is not needed and beyond the scope of this paper.  
156 Again, a more complete model would include terms for uncertainty, and include additional choices 
such as the leader spending resources to try and discover the true magnitude of the threat by a group in 
order to maximize the risk reduction and the resources kept by the leader.  
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Table 2: Theoretical Breakdown of the establishment of MCEs 
  High Coup Risk Low Coup Risk 
High Income 
State 
Few cases - Low Probability of 
MCEs   
Low Probability of MCEs 
Low Income 
State 
High Probability of MCEs Low Probability of MCEs 
 
As has been shown above in the literature review, the armed forces are certainly both a 
threat to leader tenure and sensitive to material incentives. Armed forces that pose a 
greater coup risk to the leader are more likely to get more resources as leaders fear both 
the chances of coup success and the possible outcome of a successful coup attempt (i.e. 
imprisonment, exile or death). The threat of removal by the armed forces is enhanced by 
factors like prior armed forces coup attempts, statements by military leaders expressing 
dissatisfaction with leaders, arrests of political personnel or even violence by the armed 
forces. The threat posed by the armed forces, even if no explicit threat is given or 
verbalized, is easily recognized by leaders, and the risk of a coup is much more credible 
in a state with a past history of coups. Given what is at stake for leaders, placating the 
armed forces is often an important element in determining military spending. However, 
coup risk alone is not sufficient for explaining the establishment of MCEs. After all 
leaders could simply offer a higher budget for the military given sufficiently high coup 
risk and justify the high level of spending by reminding other rivals of what is at stake if 
the armed forces decide to act.  
 
The resource endowments of leaders are the second important element in the 
establishment of MCEs. In wealthier nations leaders may be able to afford providing 
enough resources to reduce their risks of removal to a negligible point for most threats, 
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and only face a handful of major threats to their removal, such as during elections or 
intra-party rivalries. In poorer nations leaders may not have enough resources to assuage 
the demands of any major rivals, leading to chronic instability and very real threats of 
removal from almost all political quarters. It is already known from copious literature that 
poorer states tend to have higher rates of instability, especially coups. Often times the 
leader faces a high coup risk just by being a leader of a resource-poor nation. So when 
armed forces have a high coup risk, leaders in poor nations may not have enough 
resources available to sufficiently reduce the risk of a coup attempt to a lower level.  
 
Poor nations often lack reliable taxation collection, suffer from poor credit ratings, low 
development and have major industries concentrated in a few export goods which are 
sensitive to price fluctuations. Thus leaders may not have the resources or the flexibility 
to quickly move resources when their threat profiles change.  
 
If the armed forces pose a big enough threat of removal, and they often do in poorer 
nations, leaders have to find something to distribute to survive. Leaders then can get 
creative by offering to turn over other state resources outside of the budget, or by offering 
the armed forces control over resources that the state does not currently reap much 
benefit from. Offering ownership or management of businesses to the military can help 
fill the coup risk gap by providing the armed forces with resources that would not have 
been of immediate help to the leader. Leaders can offer the armed forces recently 
nationalized properties, give them exclusive rights to certain industries, give them tax or 
customs exceptions or empower them as the only legal provider of transportation etc., all 
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of which may result in negligible increases in risk from other parties but greatly decreases 
the risk of removal by the military. Giving the armed forces MCEs can be a way of 
reducing coup risk relatively cheaply, at least in political terms.  
 
In Egypt and Cuba, the armed forces were given miles and miles of beach front property 
that at that time was completely undeveloped but was in a prime location for tourism. 
Much of the property had been in the hands of political opponents or businessmen that 
had fled the country after political turmoil. The state was not currently reaping any 
benefits from those areas in the form of taxes or other levies, but by handing it over for 
military ownership the leaders were able to off-load properties that were at the time 
useless for the leader but could prove useful to the military if given time and resources to 
be developed – resources that the leaders did not have at their respective times. Nasser 
was too busy consolidating his rule and building up his forces for a confrontation with 
Israel, while Castro was doing the same. By turning over properties that were not 
immediately valuable to the leader, the armed forces were able to gain future properties 
that would prove to be valuable.157  
 
The creation of MCEs then is a strategic choice by leaders, both civilian and military, as a 
way to discourage discontent and rebellion within the ranks of the officer corps. MCEs 
are a result of leaders making decisions about how to apportion their limited resources 
                                                 
157 In these two cases, the prospects of the leader being able to sell  these properties to interested buyers 
was l ikely beyond their capabilities and anathema to their political agendas as the time. Castro sell ing 
these properties in order to use the funds to consolidate his rule would have run against his political 
ideology. Nasser sell ing his properties to foreign businessmen would have been unlikely given the political 
climate, security environment and Egypt’s rather undeveloped tourism industry at the time.  
70 
 
both to decrease the chances of revolt within the military and to satisfy the basic 
requirements of national security. In the same way that previous studies had found that 
increased military spending is correlated with a lower coup risk, the financial benefits 
MCEs should also serve much the same function.  
 
This also means that the creation of MCEs and their hypothesized effects on civil-
military relations, which is to reduce coup risk, is also dependent upon initial coup risk. 
This endogenous relationship is important to note because MCEs are not created in a 
political vacuum, but rather as a result of leaders having to make strategic decisions 
under political pressure. By establishing MCEs leaders are turning over control of 
important entities to the military not necessarily because they have faith in the military’s 
ability to aid in development or have a high amount of confidence in military 
entrepreneurship, but rather because leaders are faced with extreme resource constraints 
and needed to provide something to the armed forces to survive as leader. Leaders are 
able to use MCEs as bargaining chips in order to gain political favor with the officer 
corps, turning over businesses and properties to military leaders in order to undermine 
rivals, all of which reduces the likelihood of a coup attempt.  
 
This strategic logic applies to civilian and military chief executives alike. This seems an 
odd statement to make, because after all if a military officer takes charge it is expected 
that the officer or officers in charge will represent the view of the officer corps. While 
military leaders may be more predisposed towards understanding military needs than 
civilians, both civilian and military leaders can be deposed by a coup attempt. Military 
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leaders may initially have more political capital with the officer corps than a civilian 
leader, but military leaders will be under intense scrutiny from the rest of the officer 
corps to deliver on their promises, and their chances of being punished for not living up 
to those expectations are non-trivial. Limitations on leaders by their resource 
endowments will still limit a military leader’s options, giving them very similar choice 
sets as their civilian leader counterparts. Military leaders will have to scare up additional 
resources that civilian leaders were unable to uncover if they want to change the 
equation, which means that resource endowments will remain an enduring constraint on 
leaders of any origins. Military leaders turning to the creation of MCEs also reduces the 
likelihood that a military leader will be removed via coup, as the turning over of MCEs is 
a visible sign that the leader is taking core officer interests seriously.  
 
Conversely, it is also expected that if a leader tries to take away MCEs from the armed 
forces there will be a higher coup risk. During times of low coup risk a leader might 
decide that taking control of military MCEs might be a good policy, either for reasons of 
professionalism or politics, and move to restrict access by the armed forces, remove 
monopolies or reduce subsidies etc. This can be seen as a direct threat to the welfare of 
the officer corps, especially as these MCEs usually provide direct financial benefits to the 
officers personally. Moving too quickly to remove MCEs from military control can result 
in a higher coup risk and a possible coup, as the officers will see a marked decrease in 
quality of life as a result of losing their MCEs with the sole responsibility being hung 
upon the leader’s shoulders. Thus leaders will have to move carefully to fill the financial 
gap left by the MCEs, and increase defense spending to cover the costs and previous 
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benefits the officer corps enjoyed as a result of the MCEs, if they do decide to remove 
MCEs.  
 
Two examples of this dynamic are Egypt and China. President Morsi was widely viewed 
within the military with skepticism, but the armed forces largely worked with him at 
arms’ length until his proposed Suez Canal proposal, which wanted to utilize non-
military contractors to improve the Canal. Military opinion shifted as Morsi was seen to 
be undermining military control of economic resources, and he was removed from power 
shortly after.  
 
A different example of this is with the Chinese PLA’s growth and fall in military 
entrepreneurship. During the 1980s and 90s, the PLA engaged heartily in business 
operations, with very nearly every military unit creating or establishing businesses. At its 
height, the PLA had thousands of businesses across China at all levels of command, and 
was a major driver of China’s explosive economic growth during that time. The 
Communist Party, in response to the growing potential threat this posed, and the renewed 
threat that the US posed during the Taiwan Straits crisis, decided to order the PLA out of 
business. While the PLA largely complied with the orders, the military budget over the 
next few years expanded considerably, which was seen as the result of bargaining 
between the party and the PLA. By taking on the role and responsibility of funding PLA 
personnel that MCEs had earlier provided, the Communist Party was able to limit the 




The establishment of MCEs then is not a one-way street of poverty and coup risk leading 
towards ever more and larger MCEs. As resource endowments change, leaders have more 
options to deal with threats to their leadership and can afford to decouple military control 
of MCEs with promises of more benefits coming from state coffers instead of MCEs 
themselves. So there is a route out of a MCE-coup trap: development. This also means 
that in states with chronic poverty and coup risk, both of which are related to one another, 
leaders may never be able to break the cycle barring outside intervention.  
 
It is important to remember the critical role that resource endowments have in this theory. 
Most wealthy nations need not worry about this issue, as they have enough resources to 
keep their officers’ salaries competitive, benefits reasonable, and their protectors happy. 
Poor nations often lack these basic capabilities, and MCEs usually fill this role that 
central governments are incapable or unwilling to take on. Wealthy nations’ leaders need 
not have MCEs as their state budgets can accommodate the financial needs of an 
expensive military, while poorer nations’ leaders develop them out of both political 
expediency to reduce the risk of a coup and to fulfill basic needs of their soldiery.  
 
MCEs, Regime Type, and Income  
 
The above theoretical framework makes it clear that resource endowments and coup risk 
are important factors for both the establishment of MCEs. The effects of MCEs on coup 
risk though, are themselves mediated by a variety of other related factors such as the 
wealth of a state and its regime type. The following section explores how the effects of 




Of primary importance to the theory, the mechanism through which MCEs affect coup 
risk are primarily through the transference of goods to the control of the officer corps 
which improves their material well-being. In states with lower income, MCEs allow both 
political and military leaders to distribute more goods to the officer corps. MCEs serve to 
fill in the gap for officer pay and benefits when the government is unable or unwilling to 
provide such benefits, and allow political leaders to reduce their coup risk cheaply. In 
poorer states, where the government is unable to pay competitive salaries or provide 
long-term benefits to soldiers, the benefits provided to officers by these MCEs will have 
a great impact on their livelihoods. As a state’s wealth increases, a state will be able to 
apportion more wealth towards its armed forces, decreasing the marginal increase in 
benefits per officer provided by MCEs. The richer the state, the lower the marginal 
benefit provided by MCEs, and thus the lower effect of MCEs on coup risk as income 
increases.  
 
An increase in wealth also has other related effects that could impact coup risk, and other 
scholarship has found that an increase in wealth leads to lower likelihood of coup 
attempts overall158. So while MCEs have a significant impact at lower levels of 
development, their effects will be muted as income rises.  An increase in the level of 
development of a state will override the benefits of MCEs, especially if the government is 
willing to spend more on the armed forces commensurate with their increase in revenue.  
 
                                                 
158 Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke, “Grand Extortion: Coup Risk and the Military as a Protection Racket”, 
Centre for the Study of African Economics, Department of Economics, Oxford University, April  2006  
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The long-standing debate about the relationship between democracy and development 
also figures into the discussion of MCEs. Przeworksi et. al. make the claim that income 
does not necessarily lead towards democratization, but rather that as income increases the 
likelihood that a state transitions away from democracy becomes increasingly unlikely159. 
The major claim is that democratization is the result of an exogenous change in 
development – democracy does not have a large impact on development but development 
has a large impact on the reversion from democracy to autocracy. The authors delve into 
the possible mechanisms of how development helps democracies from reverting to 
autocracy, but they remain agnostic on the subject of whether development has a 
relationship with the occurrence of regime transitions, only that it is extremely unlikely 
for a democracy to revert to autocracy past a certain level of development. The level of 
development that the paper arrives at for democratization is $7,000 – past this point it is 
exceedingly unlikely for a democracy to transition to autocracy.  
 
Przeworski et. al.’s work on democratization and development shows evidence that 
development is in some way related to regime transitions, but their argument is still 
lacking in disaggregated evidence that shows that certain types of regime transitions are 
more or less likely to occur given different levels of income. If their theory is correct, 
then at higher levels of income we should see fewer of those kinds of transition events 
                                                 
159 PRZEWORSKI, A., and LIMONGI, F. 1997. Modernization: theories and facts. World Politics , 49: 155–83.; 
PRZEWORSKI, A., ALVAREZ, M. E., CHEIBUB, J. A. and LIMONGI, F. 2000. Democracy and Development: 
Political Institutions and Well-Being in theWorld , 1950–1990. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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that are likely to lead towards democratic breakdown. Conversely, we should see more of 
those kinds of events at lower levels of development.160  
 
Coups are one such transition event that are likely to lead to military governments or 
autocracy. A plausible mechanism for the decrease in transitions from democracy at 
higher levels of income, left unexplored by Przeworksi et.al, is that as income increases, 
governments are able to spend increasing amounts on their armed forces. If this is true, 
then we should see fewer coup attempts at higher levels of development, which could 
confirm one part of Przeworksi et.al’s argument that development leads to lower levels of 
certain kinds of events that more likely lead to autocratization.161 This is not to suggest 
that coups and military political interventions are the most important part or even the bulk 
of all cases of regime transitions, but rather that as income increases it leads towards one 
particular avenue of democratic breakdown, the coup d’etat, becoming less likely.  
 
There is some evidence to support this proposition: Poor autocracies behave much the 
same as poor democracies when it comes to coup risk (6% chance of a coup attempt in a 
given country for autocracies year versus 4.5% for democracies).162 The coup risk in 
richer countries for democracies is only 0.3%, while in richer autocracies the risk is 2.3%. 
                                                 
160 A transition event is anything that leads to a change in leadership. Thus, you can have a transition 
event that leads from democracy to autocracy, autocracy to democracy, one level of democracy to 
another level democracy or one level of autocracy to another level of autocracy. The transition events 
Przeworksi et. al. focused on where primarily of the first two varieties.   
161 Military coups, to be sure, can also eventually lead to democratization, though there is also typically in 
those cases an interim military caretaker government in which the military is the political power of the 
state.  




This gives at least some preliminary evidence that, as income increases, one mode of 
regime breakdown that favors changes to autocracy are significantly reduced, which 
supports Przeworksi et. al.’s thesis, and this study’s claim that there is an underlying 
mechanism that reduces the likelihood of at least this particular form of democratic 
breakdown.  
 
Coups are not just a means of democratic breakdown, but also a means of autocratic 
breakdown as well. Poor autocracies are 50% more likely to experience coups than poor 
democracies, and rich autocracies are seven and a half more times likely to experience 
coups than rich democracies, which means that for autocrats the specter of a military 
takeover is a much greater worry on average. Autocrats are sensitive to the needs of the 
armed forces, and set up a wide variety of institutions to ward off challenges to their rule 
from a variety of potential challengers.163 Autocrats can set up nominally democratic 
institutions, single-party systems or engage in coup-proofing, depending on their 
particular removal risk profile. In the case of the armed forces, fewer political 
institutional options are available, so autocrats have to become more creative in order to 
lower their risk of removal – of which MCEs can play a part.  
 
Table 3: Average Spending per soldier by regime type and MCE presence   









All 13,596.40 4,786.00 34,077.30 7,161.00 
With MCEs 8,492.70 7,948.00 15,027.30 8,420.00 
                                                 
163 Gandhi, Jennifer; Przeworski, Adam, “Authoritaria n Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats”, 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 11, November 2007  
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Without MCEs 15,257.10 4,347.00 35,921.80 7,061.00 
 
Table 3 shows some interesting trends with respect to expenditures per soldier between 
democracies and autocracies, broken down by income. In this table, the division between 
a “rich” and a “poor” state is the $7,000 GDP per capita mark identified by Przeworksi et. 
al.. Interestingly, as row 1 shows, on average all autocracies tend to spend almost half as 
much as all democracies do on their soldiers. The difference between poor autocracies 
and poor democracies is a difference of roughly $2,300, with spending per soldier in 
autocracies roughly 66% of that in even poor democracies. This suggests that soldiers in 
democracies are much better taken care of than their autocratic counter-parts, which 
likely spills over into areas such as pay, healthcare, education and other benefits that have 
a meaningful impact on their personal welfare.164 Given that we are looking just at poor 
democracies, there must be something about democracies, not income alone, that lead the 
state to provide more for its soldiers than poor autocracies in the same wealth category.  
 
The difference is quite stark between autocracies and democracies when it comes to 
expenditures per soldier, and even more stark when it comes to the presence of MCEs. In 
those poor autocracies without MCEs, the spending per soldier is roughly the same as the 
full sample: $4,786. In those poor autocracies with MCEs, the military spending per 
soldier almost doubles to $7,948, or just $500 shy of poor democracies with MCEs, and 
higher than poor democracies without MCEs! This suggests that poor autocracies with 
MCEs are able to effectively use those MCEs to funnel material benefits to their soldiers 
                                                 
164 Poor autocracies generally have larger armies than poorer democracies, as poor autocracies on 
average have armies of 180,000 while poor democrac ies average 120,000.  
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through these MCEs.165 Moving from $4,786 to $7,948 is an over 80% increase in 
spending, which means that the marginal benefit of having an MCE in a poor autocracy 
leads is very high. By comparison, MCEs in poor democracies also increases spending 
per soldier, but only by 20% on average from $7,061 to $8,420. This marginal difference 
is substantial, but not nearly as great as an 80% leap in spending per soldier. This means 
that MCEs have an incredible marginal benefit in poor autocracies, and likely have a 
large effect on coup risk in poor autocracies. And conversely, that that their marginal 
benefit in democracies leads to a much lower effect on coup risk in poor democracies.  
 
Hypotheses  
This framework informs the first of several hypotheses about the role of MCEs in 
politics. MCEs provide the military with additional resources to buttress the financial 
situation of its officers. This in turn reduces the likelihood that officers will feel 
discontent and attempt to rectify their situation with violence. Having more benefits 
means that officers, of both the senior and junior variety, will be less likely to plan and 
execute coup attempts if they are well taken care of. An important note here is that when 
discussing MCEs, the type of MCE that should have the most important theorized impact 
are those highly institutionalized MCEs that encompass both commercial and defense 
MCEs.  
 
Institutional MCEs are the best equipped to take care of the welfare of its soldiers, owing 
that the fact that they are typically much larger, and those in charge of administering 
                                                 
165 It should be pointed out that for most armed forces with MCEs, expenditures related to their economic 
holdings are not reported in military spending according to sources such as the IISS and SIPRI, which 
tracks military expenditures.  
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these MCEs have a much different incentive structure than those officers who might own 
MCEs individually. In addition, those states where both commercial and defense MCEs 
exist simultaneously suggest several points 1) that the military is much better organized, 
suggesting a higher degree of institutionalization, 2) that the military controls more than 
one potential avenue through which it can push benefits and patronage, 3) that the 
military-business-defense complex is highly developed and 4) that by having both 
commercial and defense MCEs the military leadership’s concerns encompass the entirety 
of the military mission, not simply their own narrow personal interests.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Institutional MCEs will reduce the likelihood of a coup attempt within 
autocracies.  
 
This leads into a secondary hypothesis, which is that MCEs can take several years to see 
the immediate benefits. An MCE in its first year cannot possibly have the same reach and 
strength that a well-developed MCE in its 10th or 20th year could have. MCEs require 
time to grow in order to see much progress and to acquire new holdings to be able to 
disburse benefits. As many MCEs have a pension fund as a component of their financing, 
it may take decades for officers that were at a junior level when an MCE was established 
to actually see the financial benefits that they were contributing towards. So the longer an 
MCE is in operation, the more institutionalized the benefits will be, the greater benefits 
there will be for individual officers, and a higher chance that the officers will actually see 




Hypothesis 2: The longer a state has an institutional MCEs, the lower the 
probability that it will suffer a coup attempt.  
 
The primary mechanism through which Institutional MCEs work to reduce coup risk is 
by benefitting the material welfare of the state’s officers. In states with lower income, 
MCEs allow both political and military leaders to distribute more goods to the officer 
corps. This is especially important in states where states have smaller budgets and fewer 
resources to spend on the armed forces – Institutional MCEs are an alternative way for 
cash-strapped leaders to reduce their coup risk. As income increases though, the amount 
that a state is able to apportion towards the armed forces will increase. It is expected that 
as a state is better able to provide financial benefits directly from the state budget instead 
of through MCEs, that the effects of Institutional MCEs in reducing coup likelihood will 
fall.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Institutional MCEs will reduce the likelihood of a coup attempt at 
lower levels of income, and have increasingly smaller effects as income increases.  
 
In line with the above hypothesis, Institutional MCEs will have increasingly smaller 
impact with regard to coup risk as income increases. This hypothesis is based upon the 
literature on exogenous democratization by Przeworski et. al., in which higher income 
prevents democratic regimes from failing and reverting to autocracy. In their work they 
found that past $7,000 GDP per capita, the likelihood of a democratic reversion to 
autocracy was incredibly unlikely. While their overall conclusion was that development 
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has a role in preventing democratic failure, they remain agnostic on whether or not 
development has a  causal role in the frequency of any transition occurring. The 
following study disputes this claim, showing that development does seem to decrease the 
likelihood of one vehicle for regime transition: the coup attempt by armed forces.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter set forth the necessary background on MCEs, and provided both the 
theoretical framework and theoretical expectations for the relationship between military 
ownership of businesses and coup risk. MCEs are a strategic choice by leaders to 
minimize their coup risk given few state resources. This section laid out the expectations 
with regards to coup risk, income, and regime types, showing the disparate effects of 
MCEs by these critical categories. The next section will evaluate whether these 
hypotheses are correct using an original dataset that collected data on military control of 
enterprises between 1950 and 2010. The data will test the above hypotheses about the 
political impact of MCEs on behavior by the armed forces. Testing the coup-proofing 


















Chapter 3: Introducing the Military-Controlled Enterprises Dataset  
 
Introduction and Definitions 
This chapter will explore the primary explanatory variable of interest in this study, 
military ownership or management of economic enterprises. This chapter will begin with 
an introduction to the multiple approaches used to gather the data, how coding decisions 
were made, how the challenge of a data-poor environment was overcome, and ending 
with a discussion of the major descriptive statistics. The purpose of this chapter is to 
familiarize the reader with the primary explanatory variable of interest, Military-
Controlled Enterprises (MCEs) and describe the original dataset that has been constructed 
to answer the question of whether these MCEs matter for reducing coup risk. The chapter 
will familiarize the reader with the coding decisions making up the primary explanatory 
variable, Institutional Control of MCEs, as well as some summary statistics and data 
visualizations. A summary of the steps taken to create this dataset, including a full list of 
all sources used is available in the appendix under “Sources”.  
 
The motivating interest in this project is the relationship between military institutions and 
commercial institutions. The point is to explore whether there are any political 
consequences of military institutions having a large economic footprint in the form of 
ownership or management roles of enterprises. As the theory chapter delved into, there 
may be a compelling reason to think that MCEs are a vehicle for leaders to coup-proof 
their regimes. By creating businesses under the control of the armed forces, leaders create 
networks of patronage that provide tangible benefits to the officer corps, the class most 
able to seize power in the armed forces. An officer corps that feels neglected, underpaid 
or whose basic needs are not provided for in a dangerous line of work is fertile ground for 
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a rebellion. Exploring this particular coup-proofing strategy by leaders to address or head 
off grievances within the officer corps is the centerpiece of this study.  
 
Towards that end, at the outset this project needed to disentangle several important 
phenomena with clear definitions of each in order to move forward. Firstly, there must be 
an appropriate definition of terms for what exactly is meant by “military”. In the broadest 
sense, the military is the collection of officers, enlisted personnel, and the civilian 
employees of defense agencies who are tasked with the defense of a state. This should 
distinguish between the three major groups of military institutions: officers, enlisted and 
civilians. While there is a robust literature on the oftentimes major differences in both 
preferences and motivations of officers and enlisted, there is an undeniably closer 
connection between officers and enlisted than between civilian and either other 
category166. Officers and enlisted work and train together every day, belong to the same 
chain of command, and operate under the same set of legal rules and regulations. It 
makes sense then to group officers and enlisted under one umbrella group of the “armed 
forces” as distinct from the civilian members or civilian agencies. “Armed forces” shall 
refer to the officers and enlisted personnel of the state’s security services.  
 
In many states there are other groups besides formal, Western-style military 
organizations: many states include in their state security sector paramilitary 
organizations, gendarmerie, mercenary auxiliaries, national police, people’s defense 
                                                 
166 As a short example, the US military demographic report for 2013 shows a large disparity between 
minority representation in the officer corps versus enlisted ranks. There are further disparities along 
educational attainment, age, marital status gender,  
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units, subnational regional defense units, internal security, pro-government militias etc. 
For the purposes of this project, any organization that is not under the umbrella of a 
state’s official security apparatus is not included. This also excludes rebel groups unless 
they are able to capture the state and become part of the formal security sector of the 
state. Armed groups aligned with the government, but not formally part of the state are 
not included.  
 
The other pillar of this project is the observation of enterprises that could be under the 
control of the military. The term “military-controlled enterprise”, or MCE, refers to an 
enterprise under the control of the armed forces. The project is focused upon both 
commercial ownership and on enterprises engaged in the production of military 
equipment- weapons, ammunition, transports, armor etc., in addition to enterprises that 
produce goods of a non-military nature. “Commercial” MCEs are those that are engaged 
in the production of goods that are strictly non-military in purpose, including things like 
manufactured products, transportation, financial goods, hospitality etc.. “Defense” MCEs 
include all enterprises that are engaged in the production of military or dual-use products 
such as arms, equipment and ammunition for war-fighting. Including both of these 
phenomena is important for constructing the Institutional MCE variable and it is 
important at the outset to establish the parameter of what is being studied.  
 
Theory  
As stated in the theory chapter, leaders must make strategic calculations about how state 
resources are appropriated. These strategic calculations are molded by a variety of 
factors, though from the standpoint of a strictly rational choice theory, the chief among 
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these factors must be the motivation to stay in power and therefore to stay in control of 
state resources. Leaders face a variety of challenges to their rule, from opposition parties, 
rebels, intra-party rivals to the armed forces, and must allocate resources to minimize 
their risks of removal from any one source. The armed forces in particular is one group 
that has both the capability and oftentimes the credibility to remove a leader from power, 
with their access to weapons and history of intervention in many states. Leaders lavishing 
the armed forces with an increased military budget is one way to keep the officers of the 
armed forces from accumulating grievances, but by doing so leaders stretch state 
resources. In states with few government resources leaders may face many threats but not 
have nearly enough resources to lower coup risk to acceptable levels with available 
resources. As a result, leaders may have to seek alternative ways to lower their coup 
risks.  
 
MCEs are one alternative that leaders can turn to in order to lower coup risk. A leader 
may not have in their immediate control fungible monetary resources to give the armed 
forces, but could hand over control of state institutions, enterprises or sanction the 
exclusive rights of military units to engage in a commercial activity. Cash-strapped 
regimes can transfer state-owned enterprises to military control or provide start-up 
funding for military enterprises. Lower-income states that may not have available capital 
can turn to MCEs as a method to lower coup risks.  
 
These MCEs provide several coup-proofing benefits: by establishing MCEs the armed 
forces are able to generate their own funding to cover personnel costs and reduce 
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grievances that could be created by poor pay or benefits in a hazardous job. MCEs 
provide material benefits to the officer corps, lowering personal grievances while creating 
more financial opportunities for officers. Commercial MCEs fulfill the material needs of 
personnel through pension funds, income supplements and benefits. Defense MCEs 
provide the military with the ability to produce its own weapons and equipment, allowing 
the leader and military elites to publicly show that they take military concerns seriously. 
Defense MCEs also typically require intense financial capitalization in order to function, 
and as with commercial MCEs, the flow of capital can also be used as a channel of 
patronage between state leaders and military leaders and between military elite and other 
officers. The effect should then come from two routes: the officer corps should have far 
fewer grievances stemming from personal financial or material issues, and the military 
elite will be able to allocate resources across the officer corps to limit the likelihood of 
intra-service grievances among military leadership.  
 
The presence of both commercial and defense MCEs in a given country-year should 
reduce the likelihood that the armed forces will attempt to remove the leader in the form 
of a coup attempt. Commercial and defense MCEs are vehicles for resource allocation, 
both through the legitimate establishment of benefits programs and through more 
illegitimate forms of corruption and patronage. The data on MCEs below is designed to 
measure whether in a given country-year whether the armed forces have control of both 
commercial and defense MCEs. Below is the coding criterion, along with some summary 




Data – Coding Criterion 
The overall strategy for this data portion was to gather data on several major categories 
with the anticipation that they would be combined into meaningful composite variables 
later on. For this project, the unit of analysis is the country-year. In all there were 5 
variables coded for each country year with regards to the military-commercial 
relationships with an explanation to follow for each167:  
 
 
Table 1: Major Variables Collected  
Major Variables Description 
Military Controlled 
Enterprises Coded as "1" if there were any MCEs in that year 
Commercial MCE Coded as "1" if there were any commercial MCEs in that year 
Defense Production MCE Coded as "1" if there were any Defense MCEs in that year 
Individual vs. Institutional 
Coded as a "1" for institutional control, "2" for individual 
control, "3" for both 
Controlling Entity  Coded as a "1" for armed forces, "2" for ministry, "3" for both 
 
Table 1 displays the major variables that will serve as the larger categories to be used 
when creating composite variables. These variables differentiate between several kinds of 
military-commercial relationships. There were some methodological difficulties that 
arose when coding the data, and encountering certain circumstances and relationships that 
were not anticipated at the beginning of the data-gathering process. These are discussed 
below with each corresponding variable.  
 
                                                 
167 There were three additional variables that I collected early on, including military-ownership, state-
owned enterprises and a variable for which sectors the ownership/management occurred in but that data 
collection had to be dropped due to lack of consi stent, and quality data.  
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In addition there were three other variables that accompanied the above four that 
reference the relative confidence that was felt when coding the data. These will be used in 
the analytics section as a weight for each country-year data point:  
 
Table 2: Reference Variables  
Reference Variables Description 
Coder Confidence Coded "1-4" for level of confidence in coding decisions  
References Coded "1-8" for type of source used in coding decisions  
Coding Regime Coded "1" for original scheme, "2" for expanded 
 
Table 2 is has a list of reference variables. Further explanation of how each of these 
variables were coded is included below as well. These are available in the appendix.  
Military Controlled Enterprises 
The primary relationship that is of interest is that of control of an enterprise by the armed 
forces and uniformed officers. The first variable, Military-Controlled Enterprise, is a 
placeholder for whether any defense institution has ownership or management over any 
commercial or defense production enterprises. This is both the most important 
barometer, and a first-cut variable for the rest of the dataset: ownership and management 
give the armed forces access to resources, economic privileges and insider information 
that can be used to enhance its own power or use as leverage against opponents internal 
to the armed forces and political bodies outside the military. There had to be clear 
evidence that an enterprise was either owned or managed by a military or defense 
institution to be counted as a “1” in Military Controlled Enterprise.  
Ownership was established through several metrics168:  
                                                 
168 There are certainly other metrics to establish management or ownership between military institutions 
and commercial enterprises, such as laws allowing military voting rights in parliament, military control of 
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1) Formal legally sanctioned ownership of business enterprises  
2) Formal legally sanctioned management duties of an enterprise  
3) Majority or entirety representation of or by active military personnel on governance or 
executive bodies in an enterprise  
4) A controlling financial stake in the enterprise  
5) “Informal” management or ownership of a business enterprise  
A country-year was coded as a “1” if any one of these categories was found to exist, and 
“0” if none of them existed. Evidence of any of these relationships were found in a 
number of sources: national legislation, organizational charts showing clear hierarchy and 
placement of enterprises, financial reporting from 3rd party sites, audits of military 
organizations, enterprise websites, enterprise by-laws, news reports, government press 
releases, NGO reports, interviews with experts. If documentation clearly showed that 
there was a relationship where a defense institution had a clear controlling interest in an 
enterprise it would be included in this criterion. Ideally there would be multiple 
corroborating sources, but more often ownership was established through a collection of 
expert opinion, enterprise websites, and legal documentation found by other experts.  
 
Ownership metrics for one, two and three were the easiest to establish and the most 
plentiful. There are plenty of experts well-versed in their country of expertise who were 
able to uncover legal documentation of ownership or management. In addition, many 
enterprises had websites with the full panel of executive directors, board members or 
specifically include a governance panel that was made primarily of military personnel. 
The fourth metric was a bit trickier to establish outside of Europe and North America- 
oftentimes these enterprises would include some kind of statement of ownership in their 
                                                 
government, or official military membership on political economic committees etc. but I think that these 
provide the clearest and least ambiguous story with regards to patterns of power between military and 
commercial enterprises.  
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company histories or document changes of ownership. Third-party companies that 
collected financial stake or percentage ownership data were also sometimes available. 
The final metrics, informal ownership or management, was also plentiful but also the 
least verifiable. Often times this kind of relationship was difficult to pin down and was 
reliant upon expert opinions and accounts. When only expert opinion (and no other 
documentation verifying the relationship) was available, these were counted as evidence 
positive, but given the lowest confidence so as to have the lowest weight169.  
 
Finding positive evidence of the ownership by military institutions was complicated, but 
finding evidence of a lack of ownership was also complicated. If an exhaustive search of 
secondary literature and available open-source resources did not reveal any sources with 
evidence of military ownership of commercial enterprises, one could not simply use this 
as evidence that military-ownership did not exist. At best it could be considered a missing 
value, as coding it as a “0” would be suspect, even with the lowest confidence. Instead, to 
compensate for this the only time a “0” was coded was when an expert’s opinion 
explicitly said there was no ownership of business by military institutions. While it is 
likely that the expert themselves combed their own sources and went through the same 
process of not finding anything and forming an opinion, their expert opinions would 
hopefully go much further with a skeptical audience than a graduate student unfamiliar 
with the nuances of Moldovan military organization putting forward a similar opinion. 
Thus, in a strange twist for a dataset on an information poor subject, there are more “1”s 
                                                 
169 There were of course exceptions- some expert opinions did not seem wholly reliable and thus were 
treated as a missing value for that country year. Most experts were quite honest in their lack of 
knowledge however, especially in the TI surveys.  
92 
 
coded in the dataset than “0”s for the variable mce. A second coding regime to alleviate 
the issue of missing values will be explained later on.  
 
Military-controlled enterprises – Commercial  
The criterion for inclusion as a commercial MCE was that the enterprise be a:  
1) commercial enterprise that is 
2) owned or managed by a military institution that  
3) offered goods and services to the general public and  
4) there must be at least one named enterprise.  
If all of these criterion are met, that country year is coded as a “1”. What is meant by 
“control” has been established already. By “commercial enterprise” it is meant to include 
any enterprise that engages in the production or goods or services that are available to the 
general public. While this may seem obvious, this is an important distinction that 
separates two entities: those that have offerings to only the military “public” versus those 
that offer services to the general public.  
 
To some degree, all armed forces own or operate some enterprises dedicated to serving 
their personnel in which goods or services are exchanged for monetary compensation, 
often at deep discounts beyond what could be found on the open civilian market. The US 
military has ownership of and manages several such companies, such as the US Defense 
Commissary Agency, which secures food and other supplies for resale to military bases 
around the world as subsidized prices for military personnel170. These opportunities are 
available solely for military personnel and their immediate family. Other enterprises such 
as Navy Federal Credit Union operate under the jurisdiction of the National Credit Union 
                                                 
170 https://www.commissaries.com/history.cfm  
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Administration, but under its charter serves only uniformed and retired military personnel 
and their families171.  
 
While it is tempting to include these enterprises as examples of military-controlled 
commercial enterprises there are two points to be made: 1) including enterprises such as 
these would have undoubtedly expanded the dataset but it would have also let to 
absolutely no variation as virtually all countries would have had these kinds of military-
owned enterprises, 2) military-service only enterprises only serve a small portion of the 
population at any given time and thus their footprint is typically relatively small, 3) the 
dataset is supposed to provide an idea of military-commercial power outside of the 
organization itself- it should be no surprise that the armed forces is able to control the 
flow of benefits within its membership and 4) while these enterprises can certainly be 
used to influence its members, it is difficult to see how ownership of these enterprises is 
politically meaningful. For all these reasons the decision was made to include only those 
enterprises that serve a population outside of the armed forces establishment.  
 
The final criterion is that there must be a named enterprise in the country-year. This is to 
provide an extra layer of authenticity to the dataset, and provide additional credence to 
the coding decisions. If the enterprise did not have a name, and no names could be found 
to corroborate expert or secondary sources, then it was not included as a “1”.172 
                                                 
171 https://www.navyfederal.org/about/about.php  
172 The only exception to this is if there was an overwhelming majority of sources (i.e. more than 4) that 
confirmed the existence of commercial MCEs - but this was a rare occurrence to have such agreement 
without named enterprises. 
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Additionally, the same procedure for “0” coding decisions was used here, that an expert 
would have to explicitly say that there was no MCE.  
 
Military-controlled enterprises – Defense Production 
There are some very good reasons to include a variable on the production of military 
equipment despite its non-commercial nature. The production of military equipment is 
big business and very expensive, which gives opportunities for military leaders to spread 
that money around both for legitimate warfighting purposes as well as for patronage 
purposes. By having control of these enterprises it enhances the military’s power relative 
to other actors in society, in addition to providing the military with the ability to supply 
itself with needed equipment and munitions. Outside of deep investigative reporting on 
notable cases, it is impossible to say if these funds are used honestly by military 
institutions or for patronage purposes. Having control over such enterprises, at the least, 
does pose a corruption risk and can only add to the ability of military leaders to use such 
resources for non-warfighting purposes. This is especially true in environments where the 
budget is not regularly audited and financial oversight powers of other agencies are weak 
or non-existent.  
 
The criterion for inclusion as a defense production MCE was that the enterprise must be:  
1) capable of producing military goods  
2) owned or managed by a military institution.  
A country-year was coded as a “1” if all of these were found to exist simultaneous ly, and 
“0” if one of did not exist.  A slightly different criterion was used here for the defense 
production MCEs than for the commercial. There are more plentiful sources when it 
comes to native defense industries, and much more comprehensive and in-depth 
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resources to explore. Several reliable sources were consulted for each country to check if 
there was in face first a native defense industry. Then every listed entity was checked to 
see if it was or ever had been owned and operated by the military, and if so, the date it 
was created, and when management changed to or from civilian control, if at all.  
 
Military controlled Enterprises – Type 
There were three possible coding choices for this variable:  
1) institutional control of MCEs 
2) individual control of MCEs  
3) the existence of both kinds of control relationships.  
The purpose of this variable was to differentiate between different patterns of ownership- 
if the control was fragmented between multiple owners or if there was a tighter, stronger 
control of MCEs by a central institution. This is a meaningful distinction, because it is a 
profoundly different arrangement if a single general or cabal of officers has a personal 
financial stake in these enterprises than if they are controlled through an institutional 
arrangement.  
 
In order to be coded as a “1” for institutional control the MCEs had to be clearly under 
the control of the the armed services as an institution. There had to be a clear relationship 
between the MCE and the organization of the military, with the following kinds of 
organizations being designated as a military institution: a military agency, a branch of the 
military, a subcommand of the military, a military central directorate, a subsidiary of 
another MCE, a military council among others.173 The MCEs need not all report directly 
to a single body, but rather that there is an institutional control or direction. For example, 
                                                 
173 Other examples include evidence that the MCE is reporting directly to a military junta - as long as the 
evidence points to the junta as a body making the decision.   
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in Indonesia some MCEs report directly to regional commands instead of the branch 
command, or even the unified military command as a whole. This would still count as an 
institutional relationship, even if the body is not national in scope.  
 
The second coding possibility, individual control, can only be coded as such if there is a 
general agreement among sources that there is either 1) widespread ownership of MCEs 
by individual soldiers with individuals engaging in business activities while actively 
serving in their capacity military personnel, or 2) that ownership of MCEs is tied directly 
to the actual military person, not the office, command or rank while serving. An 
important consideration here is that the armed forces personnel are engaging in 
commercial activity while serving. In all sources, there was not found to be any 
individual ownership of defense firms or enterprises capable of producing arms, so 
individual ownership refers only to commercial enterprises.  
 
This is where there is a slight departure from earlier coding rules: There must be a 
general consensus among experts in order for this to be coded as such where a named 
enterprise must be found. In many cases where this was found, the business activity 
ranged from a general personally owning a colossal business to lower ranking soldiers 
owning stores, operating travel agencies or leasing military property for individual use. 
Many of these smaller enterprises were not large enough to have names, and indeed in a 
few cases of huge business holdings the enterprises did not have a name. This kind of 
relationship was mostly concentrated in African nations, and would have seemed odd not 
to at least make note of it. Thus, in order for this to be counted as ownership at the 
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individual level I do require there to be a consensus, even if this is a lesser threshold to 
reach than having a named enterprise.  
 
There was an additional difficulty with the coding of individual vs. institutional 
ownership being that in many countries with reserve or part-time military personnel, 
many of them do in fact have another, non-military related businesses when they are not 
actively serving. For the purposes of this study, I did not count veteran-owned or reserve 
troops owning businesses if there was no evidence that they were operating these 
businesses while on duty.  
 
If both kinds of ownership relationships were found to be active, where there existed both 
institutional control and individual ownership that country year was counted as a “3”.  
 
Ministry vs. Armed forces  
When coding MCEs in general there was a clear divergence between two kinds of 
institutional relationships: ones in which the ministry was the final authority with respect 
to MCE operations and another in which was armed forces itself was specifically named 
as the owner or manager. This is an important divergence as in some states the difference 
between the ministry and the armed forces is non-trivial. In some states the ministry is a 
clearly civilian-dominated institution with strong auditing, oversight, control of budget 
and direction by civilians. In other states the ministry is not much more than a public-
facing institution of the military itself, with nominal control by civilians, if that. Indeed, 
there are some states where a ministry of defense does not exist at all. And of course 




For the purposes of this study it was important to establish if the control of the MCEs was 
directly attributable to the ministry or the armed forces directly. For this study, all data 
presented in this chapter and all analyses will be performed only on the Institutional MCE 
variable, which is coded as the armed forces being the controlling entity. The purpose of 
differentiating is to separate out those relationships that highlight armed forces 
independence and power separate from the rest of government, and those that reflect 
much more mundane, administrative relationships between civilian-controlled military 
agencies and commercial enterprises. But for the purposes of this study only those MCEs 
under the control of the armed forces will be considered.  
 
Descriptive Statistics  
This section will describe in depth the overall landscape of the data that has been 
collected. It will be broken into three sections: the first describing the larger category 
variables, the second describing the composite variables and the third describing the 
reference and confidence variables. In each section there will be a breakdown according 
to important cross-tabulations and over time.  
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of major variables  
Descriptive Statistics for Main Categories  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MCE 8566 0.569227 0.721972 0 3 
MCE Commercial 8143 0.319538 0.466326 0 1 
MCE Armed forces 8087 0.349202 0.481651 0 1 
MCE Type 3838 1.310318 0.729049 1 4 
MOD vs. Armed forces 3527 1.943578 0.893947 1 4 
Coder Confidence 8172 2.58627 1.088327 1 4 




Table 8 contains the descriptive statistics of the major variables. Of special note is that 
there are 8,566 observations in total, ranging from the time period of 1950 to 2013. There 
were 3,694 observations of MCEs existing in the dataset for which there was either a 
coding of defense or commercial production. Out of those 3,694 observations, I was able 
to find enough data on the phenomenon to code the “MCE Type” and “Ministry versus 
Armed Forces” for 3,527 country years. The remaining were either missing or there were 
no MCEs for those country years. This accounted for slightly over 41% of all qualified 
country years174. As discussed before the coding regime 2 accounted for just over half of 
all observations, while coder confidence averaged around 2.5 for the entire dataset.  
 
Armed Forces MCEs  
The following section describes the distribution of Armed Forces MCEs and MCE types, 
along with a discussion of the trends found in the data.  
 
 
Table 9: Number of Armed Forces MCEs, Commercial and Defense Combined  
  MCEs No MCE Percentage MCEs 
Armed Forces Control - Total 2102 6464 24.54% 
Commercial 1690 6876 19.73% 
Defense 1491 7075 17.41% 
Both 1091 7475 12.74% 
 
                                                 
174 If no MCE was present, the “MCE Type” and “Ministry versus Armed Forces” variables were kept as 
missing values.  
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Table 9 is a tabulation of the Armed Forces control of MCEs broken down by 
commercial, defense and whether both MCEs existed simultaneously. Close to 25% of all 
country years in the dataset have at least one MCE under the control of the armed forces, 
with commercial and defense MCEs existing simultaneously in roughly 13% of all 
country years. Commercial MCEs make up the larger portion of MCEs, at almost 20% of 
all country years having at least one commercial MCE, with slightly fewer defense MCEs 
by only a percentage point. It must be pointed out that over 75% of all country years have 
neither kind of MCE throughout the dataset, which makes MCEs of any kind fairly 
uncommon but by no means unlikely to exist. Out of 161 qualifying countries, 89 states 
had commercial MCEs at one point in their history, and 70 states at one point had the 
armed forces in control over defense MCEs.  43 countries had at one point in their history 
both commercial and defense MCEs, which suggests that this institutional arrangement is 
a fairly common occurrence.  
 
Armed Forces MCE Data and Description by Type 
The following section describes the distribution of MCEs, of both commercial and 
defense types, with a discussion of the trends and major findings. In this section, the 
major explanatory variable is Institutional MCE, which as mentioned above is the 
combination of armed forces control of both commercial and defense MCEs that is 









Figure 2: Distribution of Armed Forces MCEs over time (1950-2010)  
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution and trends of the existence of armed forces’ MCEs over 
time, along with the percentage by year. The overall time span of MCEs shows that over 
time the number of MCEs has grown. There is a steady rise in MCEs throughout the 
whole dataset, with the growth leveling off between 1985 and 1993, at a little over 38% 
of all countries having any kind of MCE at all. The number of MCEs increases the most 
during the 1960s and 1980s until it reaches at early peak in 1985 at 50, before peaking 
again at 50 countries in 1994. The number of any MCEs per year never reaches more 
than 50. Two notable trends during this time are that the number of states with MCEs 
increases greatly during the 1970s and early 1980s peaking at the end of the Cold War 
before beginning to drop off by 1997. The early increase is explicable in that many 
military regimes came to power during the 1970s and 80s and set up enduring regimes 



















































Number of MCEs and Percentage of 
Countries with MCE by Year
No MCE MCE Percentage MCEs
102 
 
others. The shift after the Cold War is also explicable: the sudden inclusion of fourteen 
new Post-Soviet states explains why the percentage of states with MCEs drops while the 
overall number of MCEs does not significantly fall. The gradual decrease in MCEs is 
also explainable to some degree due to the change in many states’ civil-military relations 
as civilian regimes became more assertive in their control over their states where military 
political power receded.  
Figure 3: Distribution of MCEs by Type by year (1950-2010)  
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution in types of MCEs, by year along with showing those 
years where there was both commercial and defense MCEs (Institutional MCE). There 
are several points to highlight: one is the gradual nature of the increase of any kind of 
MCEs from its relatively low point in 1950 when only 2 nations had commercial MCEs, 
to its gradual increase to 13 nations having some kind of MCE in 1970. The explosive 
growth in both commercial and defense MCEs during the 1970s and 1980s is noteworthy 
because in the span of only a decade the number of commercial MCEs doubled to 29 in 
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and both MCEs by Year
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MCEs charted a similar course as the commercial MCEs. The second point to highlight is 
the main growth period of MCEs in the first decades after the sweeping independence 
movements of the 1950s, 60s and 70s, where MCEs saw the highest increases.  
 
There are two explanations for the growth in these early periods of the 50-70s. After 
independence many nations experienced political turmoil which saw the increase in the 
political and economic relevancy of the military in many post-colonial societies175. The 
first explanation is that in many states, the armed forces simply took over, and their 
leaders were able to secure for themselves a lasting seat at the political and economic 
tables of their nations, and increased the privileges of their martial comrades at the 
expense of other sectors of society.176 In some other cases, the military establishment 
delegated its needs to civilian ministerial agencies instead of taking direct control 
themselves, which is present in the full dataset that includes ministerial control.  
 
The second explanation is that the leaders of many of these post-colonial states were 
faced with armed forces that needed many resources but were in control of a state that did 
not have the resources available to fulfill their needs. The turning over of MCEs to the 
control of the armed forces was one way for leaders to maintain their hold on power. 
There was also a need in many newly independent nations for a steady supply of arms 
and ammunition to fight the frequent civil wars and inter-state wars, and stay well-armed 
to deter regime adversaries. Oftentimes that meant dependence on a foreign supplier for a 
                                                 
175 Ziankhan, Daniel D. “The Impact of Military Coups d’etat on West Africa’s Socio -Economic and Political 
Development”, Zion University College, Monrovia, Liberia, 2001  
176 ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians, “Parliamentary Oversight in the 
Security Sector”, Sept 29, 2010, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces , ECOWAS  
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country’s security needs, which would leave them vulnerable to the desires of foreign 
powers, greatly upsetting the local armed forces if they felt hamstrung by international 
regulations. Incidents would arise in which the supplier would use their leverage for 
political gain if they were the primary supplier. Egypt’s modern defense industry was, in 
part, motivated by Nasser’s fear of becoming a dependent of either the US or the USSR 
for its defense needs, and turning it over to control by the military allowed him the dual 
purpose of showing he was working to make Egypt independent while giving the military 
a new important enterprise to work with. The Arab Organization for Industrialization was 
formed in part to alleviate this fear in 1975 to provide the Arab world with its first 
premier defense production establishment.  
 
There is also an interesting trend in that while the number of commercial MCEs and 
defense MCEs are roughly equivalent in the 1950-1970s, commercial MCEs begin to 
outpace defense MCEs starting in the 1980s. This may have to do with the security 
environment both during the Cold War’s détente era and after: many militaries had 
become incredibly large and bloated during the Cold War or during their own civil wars 
or international wars. As their security environments changed, some countries’ respective 
militaries gradually shifted into commerce both as a deliberate policy shift and as a short-
term fix to cover costs. Defense production MCEs are capital intensive and not very 
profitable, so armed forces were were willing, if not entirely happy, to get them off their 
budgets and from under their jurisdiction, while civilians governments that came to 
power after the armed forces were likely looking to offload some military assets as a way 




Commercial MCEs, on the other hand, are lucrative and offer an alternative funding 
source to meet budgetary demands. Many armed forces have been reluctant to see these 
leave their control, as the case of Indonesia where in the early 2000s the armed forces 
pledged that they would fully divest themselves from their business interests. 15 years 
later and hardly any Indonesian businesses have been divorced from armed forces 
control177. The Chinese armed forces is another such example- at a 1998 meeting of the 
Central Military Commission, the armed forces was given an order to divest itself of all 
business holdings. While the large majority of enterprises were either sold off to private 
investors or to state entities over the next few years, several businesses still remain under 
direct armed forces control, with the another group of enterprises under the control of the 
ministry of defense178. This reluctance to part with commercial MCEs means that the 
institution of commercial MCEs is more “sticky”, in the sense that once it begins, it is 
very difficult to extract business interests from the armed forces once they are embedded 
in the military organization.  
 
Another reason for the enduring military presence in commercial affairs is that, given the 
many technical skills that military personnel learn during the course of their service, 
military members in developing nations often are at the forefront of industries where their 
skills can be put to commercial use. Armed forces around the world have been put to use 
                                                 
177 Rieffel, Alexis; Pramodhawardani, Jaleswari, “Out of Business and On Budget: The challenge of military 
financing on Indonesia” 
178 Many businesses were unofficially sold or divested to members of officers’ families or friends, which, 
though there might stil l  be a potential military-business connection, did assuage most of the Party 
leadership’s fears of a “military-business complex”.    
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on large national development projects, such as civil-engineering projects on 
environmental disaster mitigation projects, and sometimes these units are put to other 
uses as well. One prominent example of this is the military-run Vietnamese 
telecommunications giant Viettel, which is now serves over 76 million people across 
Asia. While in other states the military might help start a venture and then let civilians 
take over, in some states the military is a consistent source of technical expertise, and 
maintains a constant presence in commercial enterprises.  
 
Transitions in control by the armed forces  
This section describes the major transitions in the control of MCEs. The section will have 
information on when either the armed forces lost control or gained control of MCEs. It 
will also have a description of which kinds of MCEs came under the control of the armed 
forces.  
Table 10: Tabulation of Transitions To and From Control of Armed Forces  
Any MCEs Freq. 
To Armed forces 
control 62 
From armed forces 
control 18 
Commercial MCEs   
To Armed forces 
control 39 
From armed forces 
control 11 
Defense production 
MCEs   
To Armed forces 
control 23 





Table 10 displays information on when transitions in MCEs control occurred from 1950 
to 2010. In terms of change in control, the table above shows both the frequency and 
direction of control transitions. In the entire dataset, there were 61 transitions in which 
the armed forces gained control of either type of MCE. On the opposite trend, there were 
18 cases where the armed forces did lose control of some kind of MCE. The rest of the 
chart shows the distribution of commercial to defense production MCEs. The data show 
that far and away the armed forces acquired control over more commercial MCEs than 
defense production MCEs, and were slightly less likely to lose or cede control of 
commercial MCEs than defense production MCEs. This is consistent with the data above 
which shows more commercial MCEs being retained than defense MCEs over time.  
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Transitions from or to Armed Forces Control by year  
 
Figure 8 displays information on when transitions of control of MCEs occurred, both into 
and out of armed forces control. In terms of the timing, the striking trend follows that of 
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the armed forces in terms of commercial and defense production. The number of gains by 
the Armed forces leveled out by 1987, and between 1990 and 2010, the armed forces 
were gaining as many MCEs as there were MCEs transitioning from armed forces 
control. This matches well with anecdotal evidence on armed forces control and power 
throughout this period, along with the earlier data presented in figures above.  
 
An example of a transition from the control of the armed forces is in Argentina. The 
military had long had control over a number of important industries, some reaching back 
to the 1940s. In the wake of the armed forces’ withdrawal from power, the entities that 
were owned by the armed forces were some of the first to be targeted for seizure. Over 
the course of the late 1980s many of these enterprises were seized from the military and 
put under civilian control, with some going under the jurisdiction of the ministry of 
defense while others were privatized.179  
 
Regional Variation 
This section describes regional variation in the control of MCEs by the armed forces. 
There is a discussion of the trends and distribution of the kinds of both kinds of MCEs 
along with the major explanatory variable in Institutional MCEs.  
Table 11: Tabulation of Armed Forces Control by Region (Country-years with 
MCEs present)  
  Commercial Defense 
Institutional 
MCEs 
Percentage of Institutional 
MCE 
Africa 249 254 131 12.01% 
Asia 433 432 353 32.36% 
Europe 80 135 80 7.33% 
                                                 
179 Interview with an expert on Argentinian civil -military relations.  
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Middle East 358 332 275 25.21% 
The Americas 570 338 252 23.10% 
Totals 1,690 1,491 1,091   
 
Table 11 displays the total number of country-years in which there was armed forces 
control. The percent column displays the percent of the total number of country-years in 
which Institutional MCES under the control of the armed forces existed for the entire 
dataset. In terms of regional variation for MCEs under control by the armed forces, there 
are stark differences in distribution. Roughly 80% of Institutional MCE country-years 
come from Asia, the Middle East and the Americas. Europe has virtually no armed 
forces-controlled MCEs, while Africa consists of 12% of all Institutional MCE country 
years. Africa has roughly equal numbers of both commercial and defense MCEs, but only 
about half of those country years with MCEs are counted as Institutional MCEs, meaning 
both existed at the same time. In Asia and the Middle East it is the reverse, with the 
majority of the cases overlapping in the Institutional MCE category. The Americas have 
many more commercial MCE country-years than defense MCE country years, with less 
than half of those commercial MCEs belonging to a year in which Institutional MCEs 
also exist. The differences in these reveal that within Asia and the Middle East there was 
a great deal of consistency: those countries with MCEs tended to be the same countries 
and the armed forces held onto their MCEs for decades. These regions tended to have 
strong militaries or ruled outright, such as in Egypt or Myanmar, that established both 
commercial and defense MCEs and retained enough influence to keep control over both 
for long periods.  
 




Figure 5 displays the distribution of the number of states in which Institutional MCEs 
existed by year and by region. The trend in armed forces control is very striking over 
time, as it shows the consistent existence of Institutional MCEs in Asia with very little 
change past the 1980s. The growth and stability of Institutional MCEs in the Middle East 
is also important. The Middle East grows slowly until the 70s and peaks in 1990, 
remaining steady until 2010. Europe has a brief period between the 1970s and the 200s 
with a handful of Institutional MCE country-years. Africa also shows substantial growth 
beginning in the 1980s before leveling off in the 2000s with only minor growth. The 
Americas also have consistent growth in MCEs starting in the seventies and growing well 
into the late 80s before leveling off into a consistent number. It should be noted that these 
are all Institutional MCEs, not their constituent commercial or defense MCE values. 
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This chapter set out to familiarize the reader with the basics of the data collection, 
categorization, methods used to overcome difficulties of information-poor environments, 
and methods used to overcome difficulties relating to missing values. This chapter then 
turned to a discussion of the major explanatory variable, Institutional MCE, as well as its 
constituent variables of commercial and defense MCEs. Each section contained a 
discussion of the trends and distribution of the data in order to make the read comfortable 




Appendix - Sources  
Data Background  
The following will provide a background on how the data for this project was put 
together. The purpose of the project is to generate data on relationships between the 
armed forces and business. Of special interest in the project is when the armed forces of a 
nation are the direct owners and managers of commercial and defense interests, and 
whether or not there are political consequences from such a relationship. While finding 
data for this project it was discovered that there was a wealth of data beyond just simply 
information on ownership of commercial and defense enterprises by the armed forces. In 
fact, there was a whole range of interesting information related to the control of 
commercial enterprises by the armed forces, and the data collection effort was expanded 
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to include several other categories for further clarity.180 There were also very interesting 
relationships that did not fit into the simple categorization that inspired this project, 
which were noted in the country records made for this project181. There were a host of 
other variables of interest for the larger project of documenting the range of MCEs that 
exist, but are not included in this study.182  
 
The most important remains Institutional MCEs, which is a composite variable of three 
different variables that will be explained later on: having both commercial and defense 
MCEs, institutional control and control by the armed forces.183 Commercial enterprises 
and defense industries are included as a category because they are both vehicles for 
providing officers with benefits and with the necessary material for security. Commercial 
MCEs are very effective for creating opportunities for revenue and expanding into 
civilian markets, while defense MCEs can act as vehicles for patronage due to their high 
capitalization requirements. The hypotheses in the theory chapter refer to both 
commercial and defense MCEs since they are both vehicles for patronage, but those 
                                                 
180 Some examples of different arrangements are joint-ventures between the military and foreign 
companies, sponsorship of military units by businessmen, and of course military involvement in conflict 
resources or the trade in i l legal goods. 
181 Cambodia, for instance, was a special case. While there were some MCEs present in the Cambodia 
data, there was also an incredibly interesting relationship wherein units of the armed forces were 
supported monetarily by individual businesses, leading to a very corrupt environment where the armed 
forces have been known to partner with their sponsors to evict peasants from land with natural resources 
or for development. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/24/cambodia -commander-admits-partisan-use-
force  
182 The full  dataset includes variables differentiating between commercial and defense MCEs, control by 
the ministry vs. the armed forces, and institutional control vs. individual control. The appendix contains 
details of these variables that are not included in the body of the data chapter.  
183 Again this is to differentiate between those MCEs that could be controlled by the ministry, or are 
controlled primarily through individual military officers. The variable counting ministry control of MCEs is 
not included in this data chapter.  
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states with both commercial and defense MCEs imply more avenues for patronage than 
simply having one or the other.  
 
Institutional control versus individual control is gathered as it is important to differentiate 
between those states where the locus of control is the individual leaders within the 
military or the military as an institution. Individual control of MCEs means that the levers 
of control of the flow of benefits are in the hands of a concentrated few. Institutional 
control of MCEs means that the levers of control of the flow of benefits are centered into 
formal agencies within the armed forces, and the direction of these MCEs is under the 
control of a centralized body. The distribution of benefits to the officer corps is much 
more spread out to the officer corps as a whole, while the distribution of benefits with 
individual control is much smaller and targeted towards key members of the armed 
forces.184  
 
The following sections will have a broader discussion of the coding requirements for 
each of the variables that make up the Institutional MCE variable.  
 
Collection History 
Given the lack of an extant dataset on armed forces-commercial relationships the only 
possible option forward was to triangulate sources in order to construct a viable dataset. 
The literature on MCEs of any type was not systematic and largely regionally focused. 
No one has so far yet attempted to document these kinds of relationships before on a 
                                                 
184 It is of course theoretically possible that institutional control can lead to a more narrow distribution of 
benefits, but that has not been empirically found to be the case.  
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cross-national level. There were a few books of collected essays on the phenomenon, but 
again these were hardly the systematic sources one would hope to find on the subject. 
Four major sources for information on military-commercial relationships were used to 
code the data: 185   
1) Expert testimony  
2) Secondary sources  
3) Transparency International’s Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index  
4) Interviews  
All four were used in constructing this dataset, as explained below in greater detail. For 
each state there is a Country Narrative Document (CND) that has an account of all the 
information gleaned from the four above sources. These country narratives would form 
the foundation of the rest of the dataset, as I used it as both reference and depository for 
all information obtained. CNDs would have an evaluation of the information as well as 
an executive summary of the findings.  
 
 Expert Testimony 
In order to collect expert testimony I used the University of Maryland’s Qualtrics survey 
website. I sent over 500 emails over the course of six months to experts in civil-military 
relations requesting their assistance to fill out a short 10 question survey on the subject of 
military-commercial relationships, with a longer follow-on survey if they had the time 
and inclination to do so. The survey was designed to collect data on the nature and 
magnitude of the relationship between the military and the economic realm with a 
breakdown of five categories: manufacturing, finance, resource extraction, basic services 
                                                 
185 Additionally several news crawlers such as Factiva were used to find information on military-owned or 
operated businesses. While there was some useful information found that was added to the CND, it 




and production of military equipment. In addition, each survey also asked about the size 
of the military owned/managed portfolio in terms of the number of firms186. Each 
question also included a comment section where the respondents could share additional 
information. The survey is available in the appendix for this chapter.  
 
I received 40 completed surveys, 25 of which were usable187. The 15 excluded were of a 
very poor quality and the responses were suspicious in light of other sources. This was far 
below the 10% response rate hoped for, but did provide at least some useful information. 
The survey asked the experts to answer questions in the period of 1980-2015. 
Unfortunately, given the small volume of respondents, only two pairs of respondents took 
a survey on the same country, so the problem of inter-coder reliability could not be 
addressed with only the survey results received.  
 
Those 25 respondents did include commentary that ranged from single sentences to full 
paragraphs describing the reasoning behind their selections. Some of the most useful 
information gleaned came from the comments section below where the respondents 
named individual firms, relevant laws and named additional experts and sources for me to 
pursue on my own. All this information was logged into the individual CND I had on 
                                                 
186 Number of firms or enterprises was included in l ieu of other kinds of indicators because the data was 
quite sparse to begin with. On prominent expert suggested including monetary values or goods produced, 
but even in the cases with great information that kind of data was unavailable or would have had a great 
deal of uncertainty.  
187 At least 15 of the responses were not of high enough quality to include in the final dataset. Of those 15 
responses left out, they were highly suspect. Some did not include any comments, while stil l  others 
seemed to have been randomly fi l led out, and at least one was fi l led out in a purely step-function without 
comments, explanations or contact information. All  in all, roughly 70 responses wer e logged in Qualtrics, 
but nearly 40 of them only fi l led out one question then left the rest blank. 
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each country included in the dataset, and added to that country’s narrative, sources and 
data. In addition to the survey results, a number of experts respond without completing a 
survey but providing some commentary with sources, thoughts and further experts for me 
to follow-up with. These comments were logged into the CNDs. Despite the low returns 
from the survey, a great deal of information was gained from the few responses.  
 
With regards to the final portion of the expert survey, seven respondents came through 
and answered the follow-up survey, including even more in-depth information on the 
nature of military-commercial relationships in the country for which they were 
responding. This information was immensely helpful in finding additional information 
and directing me towards other sources that I had not yet consulted. Again, all this 
information was stored in the CNDs. Other experts provided information or further 
contacts via email without taking the survey. This information was included in the CNDs.  
 
The depth of some responses was incredibly helpful, but the lack of a critical mass of 
respondents, along with the lack of a way to address inter-coder reliability, meant that 
other avenues of investigation had to be pursued. It was an incredibly useful first step.  
 
Secondary Sources 
Secondary sources were the second major effort used to triangulate information on 
military-commercial relationships. Collecting major studies on military-commercial 
relationships, as well as works on civil-military relations had been occurring concurrently 
with the release of the survey. Secondary sources were used to log firm names, 
establishment dates of enterprises, controlling entities and additional information on 
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military-commercial relationships in those countries. This was a very slow and laborious 
process, as not every civil-military relations book had information on military-
commercial ties. While there was a wealth of information, more often than not these 
sources were used to confirm survey results as respondents’ information came in. As will 
be explained later with regards to coding regime, the secondary source literature was 
extremely useful in highlighting other sources and uncovering the presence of MCEs. 
Often times the sources made no mention of any MCEs, which was logged in the CNDs. 
It was very difficult to track down this information except outside of works authored 
specifically for the purpose188. Information gleaned from secondary sources was also 
added to the CNDs and used to make a determination on the variables listed above.  
 
The sources consulted for each country were as follows. These sources were included 
because: 1) they had consistent coverage across both years and different countries, 2) 
they had been used to find positive evidence of MCEs existing, or 3) because they are 
considered excellent sources of expert opinions.:  
1) Expert testimony from my surveys and interviews   
2) The 2013-2015 Transparency International Anti-Corruption in Government and Defence 
Index  
3) Publications on country studies from the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces189 (DCAF) 
4) The BTI Transformation reports from 2003-2016190 
                                                 
188 In this regard, The military as an economic actor: soldiers in business was a very handy resource. In 
addition to the list of experts, it provided a large bibliography and some good information on the 
countries explored. It was a collection of essays on military entrepreneurs, but only covered less than a 
dozen countries.  
189 DCAF is a government institution that partners with academics and practitioners to encourage security 
sector reform and has worked with many partners in other countries to encourage democratic civil -
military relations. They release occasional papers and regional round-ups of their works as well as 
country-specific reports.  
190 The BTI is an organization dedication to transforming politics in at-risk countries, including civil-military 
relations. They release country reports every 3-5 years on each country, leveraging over 300 experts.  
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5) The International Security Sector Advisory Team country reports191  
6) Armed Forces and Society & Journal of Democracy192 
7) JSTOR & regional studies journal193 
8) Factiva194 
9) Amnesty International195 
10) Ministry of Defense websites196 
11) Google Scholar and Google searches197 
12) Search of Social Science Research Network  
 
Transparency International 
The third leg of the data collection process was to use the Transparency International 
Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index. The index is a collection of surveys from 
military experts around the world on a given country with respect to corruption in the 
defense sector. The experts are asked a variety of questions on the military, with an 
emphasis on corruption with respect to issues of leadership, risk management, policies 
and code, training, and personnel. The surveys are used to create an overall index of a 
given country’s “Corruption Risk”, which also places it in a “band” of its relative 
corruption risk. Included in the survey are three questions about military-owned or 
managed businesses. The most important of these was198:  
                                                 
191 This is a subsidiary of DCAF, but it also puts out i ts own reports on its website. They support DCAF on 
the ground.  
192 AFAS and JoD was searched for each country- and articles specific to that country was searched for 
keywords.  
193 I would find the most popular regional security or regional studies journal a nd run searches for both 
that country and keywords, and save articles relevant to different time periods.  
194 Similar to the above I would run keyword searches for each and save relevant articles.  
195 Amnesty International has done an excellent job of uncovering military-political collusion to force 
people off lucrative land for development, seize natural resources or force people into labor. Their 
coverage is best closer to the present, but sometimes their sources extend further back in time, as well as 
point to additional sources for earlier times.  
196 I would search specifically for Organizational charts and investigate promising leads   
197 This would sometimes have publicly available articles, and would occasional l ink to books of interest 
that held important keywords. Generally speaking, regular google searches would return some very useful 
information- and often led to additional resources.  
198 There were two other questions with respect to military enterprises. One asked the question with 
explicit reference to natural resources, and the other with respect to oversight by other governmental 
offices. All  three were used and included in the CNDs.  
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“Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of 
commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and 
finances of such businesses?”  
The respondents were asked to assign a value from 1-5 on the “risk” that this posed in 
terms of a corruption risk within the military. While the number is useful in quantifying 
corruption risk (each value had a corresponding explanation) it was not particularly 
useful for coding a dataset. The numbering scheme did not have a latent scale that would 
easily distinguish the meaning of one number from another for the purposes of the 
project- the difference between a 2 and 3 score was not meaningful from a data gathering 
perspective. The most useful part of the Transparency International survey was that for 
each question each respondent was required to submit a summary of their own findings 
and sources. This was useful in its own right, but the TI survey goes a step further: it has 
each question peer reviewed by between one and three other respondents. Some of the 
comments were very short- a simple “agree”, while others were much more substantial, 
providing corroborating sources. When there was disagreement the reviewer would 
provide a justification, a critique, and importantly, additional sources. The TI survey even 
included responses by government representatives, though these tended to be much rarer 
and often objected to minor points in the summaries instead of the larger point about 
ownership or management. If there was substantial disagreement, another reviewer would 
be included and add their own comments. Transparency International also made every 
effort to make sure that reviewers did not know one another’s identities, using a 3 rd party 
website to allow the reviewers’ identities to be anonymous to one another to guard 




The TI survey has only been extant since 2013 when it included only 28 countries, and 
did not have peer reviewers, only summaries from respondents. The 2014 TI survey 
included 79 countries, and began including peer reviewers with their comments. The 
2015 TI Survey included 111 countries along with an expanded peer review section. Due 
to the quality of the data it was necessary, in the first iteration of the dataset, to code the 
responses only for the years of inclusion. The number of countries in the 2013 survey 
were 28 countries, 79 in 2014 and 111 in 2015199. 
 
The incredible breadth of information and additional sources was a huge boon and a great 
resource. The information included in the summaries contained entity names, dates of 
establishment, purposes, and reported ownership. Information on each entity, privately-
owned companies, state-owned enterprises or some other kind of joint-ownership 
scheme, were added to the CNDs. Many of these entities had websites or were mentioned 
in other sources such as stock websites or due diligence sites. Using company histories, 
secondary sources and the available TI sources in the reviews a history of some of these 
countries with respect to their military-commercial relationships could be constructed. 
The secondary data was used to backdate some of the coding choices for countries. Often 
times the investigatory process would lead to other entities, which would allow for more 
confident coding200.  
                                                 
199 And those entries included is always less than the max, given that sometimes the responses of the 
respondents was to say that there simply was no data or no way to know.  
200 For example, when investigating the UK, the ministry of defense website provided in the TI survey 
listed one entity as owned by the MOD. Further investigation revealed that it was not in fact owned by 
the MOD, but that a sister organization that was spun off from a government research organization as a 
private institution had, for a period of ten years, as its major shareholder the MOD, which had a 





The final data source used were interviews. In addition to interviewing experts on several 
countries, I also targeted interviews around constructing a case study on Egypt. I 
interviewed several past US officials, including one former ambassador to Egypt, several 
respected Egyptian military experts and Egypt’s military attaché to the US. Often times 
these interviews would lead to further leads for interviews, which I also conducted in 
person, by phone and via skype. The responses, along with notes on my impressions, are 
included in the CNDs. The information gleaned from these interviews was very useful, 
and gave much deeper insights into the role that these enterprises played in Egypt and 
elsewhere. In particular the meeting with the Egyptian defense attaché was very 
enlightening as the general was very much willing to give his own views on the role that 
Egypt’s armed forces play in society, and how the enterprises that they control further the 
military’s goal of stability and security. The meeting was conducted in the presence of 
several other highly respected Egypt experts, who took turns giving their own 
perspectives on the issue. It became apparent halfway through the interview that the other 
experts were there at the behest of the general, several of them being employees of a 
consulting firm whose primary client was the office of the Egyptian defense attaché. 
Their candor and extremely polished talking points revealed that they were likely running 
support for the general during the interview. Regardless, the interview was valuable in 
establishing a baseline as to what the Egyptian military would like outsiders to know 
about their enterprises. Other interviews with academics and experts did not have this 
manufactured sense, and provided valuable insights into the views of both insiders and 




Coping With Information-Poor Environments 
In order to compensate for the relative lack of high-quality information in many states, 
the dataset includes various markers for the quality of a given country-year’s coding 
decision. The three variables that used for this were Reference, Coding Confidence and 
Coding Regime. While the Reference variable is more of an internal document to track 
progress, the coding confidence is my attempt to let the quality of the data have more 
weight. While in many datasets there is an explicit understanding that there may have 
been errors in coding decisions which are taken care of by using inter-coder reliability 
measures, this project was not able to secure such support to do so. With other datasets, 
the understanding that there are errors made in dataset construction is implicit. This 
dataset includes an explicit measurement of the coder’s own confidence in making the 
coding decision. This is to both provide the highest degree of honesty with regards to the 
data, as well as give higher weight to better quality data.  
 
 Reference 
The first such variable is the reference variable which is an index from 0-8 of the 
different kinds of sources used for the dataset. It refers to different combinations of three 
sources: interviews/expert surveys, secondary material and news stories. A “0” means 
that no sources could be found while a seven means that a combination of all three could 
be found for that country-year. This is a measure of the breadth of the different kinds of 
sources, not the overall quantity or quality of sources used. The reference variable was 





 Confidence  
The confidence variable ranges from 1-4 and matches up very closely with the reference 
variable. Whereas reference refers to the kinds of sources used, confidence reflects the 
user’s confidence that the available sources point to a definitive coding decisions for that 
country year. The following scale was used for 1 – 4201:  
Table 3: Breakdown of Coding Confidence  
Confidence 
Level Name Description 




there were conflicting reports or low quality data; a few souces 




Most reports agreed, but there were some conflicting accounts; 
sources are authoritative but data is not completely conclusive; 
much better data and much less reliance on judgment by coder 
3 Confident 
Most reports are in agreement; minor quibbles between sources; 





All reports are in agreement; coding is obvious from plentiful, 
available and authoritative sources 
 
Table 3 shows that scale used for  Using these two confidence variables the relative 
weights of these variables are used in the analytical portion. While the descriptions above 
describe the confidence levels, the scale was influenced by 1) the authoritativeness of the 
sources, 2) the quantity of the sources and 3) whether or not I could independently verify 
some of the claims of one source in other sources.202 
 
                                                 
201 The confidence markers here are not normally distributed from a 0-100% scale of confidence: a “1” 
confidence level was coded to mean that, given the sources and my interpretation of them, 70% confident 
that the coding is correct; 2 was roughly 80%; 3 was roughly -90%; and 4 was from 95-100%.  
202 There will  be no frequency weighting in the analysis section, as this is included more as a reference for 




The information poor environment made data collection a challenge. Finding evidence of 
an MCE relationship, and the nature of the relationship, was quite simple. For many 
countries, finding data on existing relationships was a relatively straightforward matter: 
pursuing secondary sources, keyword searches, consulting the Transparency International 
Index, and asking experts would typically reveal positive evidence of MCEs if they exist 
or ever existed. It was much more difficult to find authoritative sources that would be 
able to declare that an MCE did not exist. If a relationship did not exist, an expert can 
hardly be expected to highlight the lack of such a relationship in their work on military 
history or civil-military relations in their given country. Thus, there was a clear bias in 
the original coding regime towards including positive evidence of MCEs, and an 
overreliance on expert opinion for the coding of a lack of MCEs in a given country year.  
 
In order to overcome this bias, I included two separate coding regimes: the first was the 
“restricted” dataset, which would include only those country years where a source could 
be found to corroborate the coding, either “1” or “0”. This is the much more authoritative 
dataset, but there are far fewer observations, and a clear majority of the cases are coded 
as “1”. Of 8,566 possible observations for qualifying country years203, only 3,737 country 
years could be coded according to the restricted coding rules.  
 
The seconding coding regime followed a procedure to systematically eliminate a missing 
value from a negative finding for a country year, and relaxes some of the restrictions of 
the restricted coding regime. The procedure was to consult the same series of sources for 
                                                 
203 Those states that were both independent, and had a population of at least 500,000.  
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each state, collect sources on their civil-military relations, military history, security sector 
reform, and writings on their military-societal relations, all to populate a checklist on 
each of their CNDs. The information gleaned was then entered into the CND.  
 
The CNDs have notes on the coverage of the sources found, as well as their quality. If, at 
the end of this coding procedure, there were sufficient sources, yearly coverage, and 
sources of sufficient quality, then a country year was coded as a “0”. If, on the other 
hand, there was not enough sources of sufficient quality, or there was not coverage for 
certain years, then the country-year remained a missing value. This rests on a very 
straightforward argument: if, for the entire time period from 1950-2015 no expert had 
ever made mention of an MCE, then there is a good chance that one never existed.  
 
Table 4: Coding results across the different coding regimes  
Coding Results By Rules 


























Percentages shown are calculated from “Total Coded” Column 
 
Table 4 displays the coding results by the two coding regimes, with the combined dataset 
in the bottom row. In the restricted model, the results can be broken down into two 
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different groups, the first as a percentage of coded cases, and in the second as a 
percentage of all qualifying country years. A majority of the cases for which a coding 
decision could be made found evidence of MCEs making up 80.6% of cases, whereas 
there was only evidence of no MCEs in 19.4% of the cases coded. In all there were 8,566 
qualifying country years. When looking at the percentage of MCEs in the larger set of 
qualifying country years, 40% of the years were coded as having MCEs, with no MCEs 
making up 10% of the dataset. The percentage of missing values made up the lion’s share 
at 48%, which is clearly problematic for analysis. The original coding regime was much 
too restrictive, and any statement about trends over time would have to be couched in the 
highest possible uncertainty.  
 
The expanded coding regime included an additional 3,694 observations, greatly adding to 
the dataset. In terms of the ratio of MCE/No MCE, the results were flipped, with the 
expanded coding regime having only 22% of the coded observations as MCEs. The other 
88% of coded observations were coded as no MCE present.204 When combined, the 
restrictive and expanded datasets have over 8,172 observations, with 394 missing values 
over the two datasets. This amounts to about 5% of the qualifying country years being 
missing values, an amount that decreases significantly as in later years. Roughly 78% of 
all missing values occur before 1980, with over 95% occurring before 1995. Again, these 
missing values are those country years for which there was little information on their 
                                                 
204 There was an additional change to the coding regime, where if country X was coded as having an MCE 
in 1980, no evidence in 1981, but evidence in 1982, the intervening year was also coded as a 1. Thus, 
many of the MCEs included in coding regime 2 were connecting those observations- as long as there was 
no information to the contrary.  
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civil-military relations for the given time periods. Below in Table 5 is the full list of 
countries and the number of years for which data is missing.  
Table 5: Missing countries 1950-2010  
Countries with Missing Data 
Country Years Percent 
Afghanistan 44 11.17 
Benin 10 2.54 
Burundi 18 4.57 
Central African Republic 40 10.15 
Comoros 15 3.81 
Congo Brazzaville 40 10.15 
Congo Kinshasa 40 10.15 
Cyprus 20 5.08 
Ethiopia 3 0.76 
Gabon 18 4.57 
Gambia 6 1.52 
Ghana 13 3.3 
Guinea 12 3.05 
Iraq 13 3.3 
Liberia 30 7.61 
Libya 9 2.28 
Romania 9 2.28 
Somalia 20 5.08 
Togo 20 5.08 
Yemen, Rep. 11 2.79 
Total 391 100 
 
The majority of missing values, 71.5% of all missing values, come from 13 African 
countries in years in which it was difficult to find coverage literature. The period of 
lowest coverage is between 1960 and 1980, in the two decades after most African states 
became independent. The events surrounding the process of independence and the 
resultant institutional changes, revolts and civil wars mean that data is sparse as data are 
hard to find for those years. In many cases there were transitions from the traditional 
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colonial army being replaced by an indigenous one, which would subsequently either 
disintegrate in the wake of a coup or rebellion, or itself become a rebellious faction205.  
 
There likely two big reasons for this trend: 1) in the wake of the transition there was an 
interregnum as it became difficult to differentiate between which faction was the formal 
military of a particular state, and 2) the majority of the literature at the time focuses on 
military units as a faction within a larger ethnic group engaged in a struggle for 
dominance and thus the characteristics of the armed forces was subordinate to the 
characteristics of the ethnic group, party or movement.  
Table 6: Distribution of Missing Values by decade  
Yearly Distribution of Missing 
Values 
Year Frequency Percent 
1950-59 52 13.2 
1960-69 130 33.0 
1970-79 112 28.4 
1980-89 47 11.9 
1990-99 36 9.1 
2000-2009 12 3.0 
2010-15 5 1.3 
 
Table 6 is a table of the distribution of missing values by decade. Each row is the percent 
of missing values from the total number of missing values, not the percent missing from 
that decade. I don’t believe that these provide a meaningful challenge to the integr ity of 
the data for the following reasons. First, the dataset focuses on states with a formal armed 
forces, and in many of these missing cases it would be arguable at best if an armed force 
                                                 
205 Harkness, Kristen Angela, “The Origins of African Civil-Military Relations: Ethnic Armies and the 
Development of Coup Traps”, Princeton University, June 2012  
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that called itself a formal armed forces representing a state government could actually be 
considered the formal military of the state. In many of the above cases, what was called 
the military might be better considered an armed faction of an ethnic movement. 
Excluding these I don’t feel would bias the results, especially since most of them are 
included in later years when better data is available. Second, the reason for the majority 
of the distribution of the missing values is known- which can be accounted for with 
proper statistical tests. The remaining missing values are also dependent very much on 
time, which again, can be accounted for using statistical tests and sampling within time 
periods. Most of the missing values can be explained by time, which, since it is known, 
can also be accounted for statistically. Different imputation tests can be used to see if 
these missing observations would noticeably change results, along with running models 
with restricted years.  
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Figure 1 displays the percent of missing cases by year. As the above shows, by 1968 the 
percent of observations missing per year is below 10%, with missing observations 
accounting for less than 3% in 1980. This means running separate tests on the data- one 
for the full dataset from 1950-2012, another from 1968-2012 and a third 1980-2012. This 
way it can be tested to see if the missing values over time produce significantly different 
results when the same models are run on different time periods. Thankfully, in the 
analysis section, most of these missing values drop out entirely as data are not available 
for the same country years in other datasets, which suggests that while the distribution of 
missing values is non-random, this is not a problem unique to this dataset.  
Additional Figures:  
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Table 1A: Complete List of Countries with Armed Forces Control of MCEs (part 1)  
Complete List of Countries with Armed Forces Control of MCEs 









Algeria 54 54 54 1962 2015 Ethiopia 0 22 0 1959 2015 
Angola 35 35 35 1975 2015 Georgia 0 12 0 1991 2015 
Argentina 20 38 20 1950 2015 Ghana 3 0 3 1957 2015 
Armenia 4 4 4 1992 2015 Guatemala 50 0 6 1950 2015 
Bangladesh 44 44 44 1972 2015 Ghana 0 3 0 1970 2015 
Belize 17 0 0 1960 2015 Haiti 6 0 0 1950 2015 
Brazil 47 47 47 1950 2015 Honduras 44 0 1 1950 2015 
Bulgaria 17 17 17 1959 2015 Hungary 6 6 0 1959 2015 
Burkina Faso 10 0 0 1960 2015 India 0 1 0 1959 2015 
Burundi 36 0 0 1962 2015 Indonesia 52 57 52 1951 2015 
Cambodia 26 0 0 1953 2015 Iran 28 39 28 1950 2015 
Chile 42 56 42 1950 2015 Iraq 0 36 0 1963 2015 
China 57 57 57 1950 2015 Israel 0 5 0 1959 2015 
Colombia 54 57 54 1950 2015 Jordan 12 17 12 1950 2015 
Croatia 2 0 0 1950 2015 Kazakhstan 0 15 0 1991 2015 
Cuba 57 57 57 1950 2015 Kenya 0 43 0 1964 2015 
Ecuador 44 0 0 1950 2015 Korea South 3 3 3 1950 2015 
Egypt 57 41 41 1950 2015 Laos 29 0 0 1954 2015 
El Salvador 42 0 0 1950 2015 Libya 38 25 25 1960 2015 
Eritrea 15 15 15 1993 2015             
 
















Table 1B: Complete List of Countries with Armed Forces Control of MCEs (part 2)  
 
Complete List of Countries with Armed Forces Control of MCEs  
Country Com Def Both Start Year End Year Country Com Def Both 
Start 
Year End Year 
Mauritania 29 0 0 1960 2015 South Sudan 2 2 2 2011 2015 
Mexico 0 32 0 1959 2015 Sri Lanka 11 0 0 1972 2015 
Myanmar 
(Burma) 57 57 57 1950 2015 Sudan 20 20 20 1959 2015 
Nicaragua 26 0 0 1950 2015 Syria 44 44 44 1950 2015 
Nigeria 10 44 10 1960 2015 Tanzania 34 34 34 1961 2015 
North Korea 0 38 0 1975 2015 Thailand 21 21 21 1959 2015 
Pakistan 57 57 57 1950 2015 Turkey 55 51 51 1950 2015 
Panama 31 0 0 1950 2015 USSR 12 12 12 1959 1991 
Paraguay 31 0 0 1950 2015 Uganda 27 24 24 1962 2015 
Philippines 14 0 0 1950 2015 Ukraine 9 9 9 1991 2015 
Poland 9 23 9 1950 2015 Uruguay 13 0 0 1950 2015 
Portugal 0 10 0 1959 2015 Uzbekistan 13 13 13 1991 2015 
Romania 10 10 10 1959 2015 Venezuela 32 37 32 1959 2015 
Russia 11 11 11 1992 2015 Vietnam 28 38 28 1959 2015 
Rwanda 14 0 0 1962 2015 Yemen 28 0 0 1988 2015 
Sierra Leone 10 0 0 1961 2015 Yemen, Rep. 15 0 0 1962 1987 
Slovak Republic 2 2 2 1993 2015 Yugoslavia 0 17 0 1959 1991 
South Africa 0 8 0 1959 2015 Zambia 16 0 0 1964 2015 
South Korea 5 5 5 1975 2015 Zimbabwe 8 36 8 1965 2015 
 



















Chapter 4: In Business but out of politics: Coup-proofing effects of 
MCEs  
 
Theory Recap  
As the previous chapter describes, MCEs should have a coup-proofing effect on the 
likelihood of elements of the military trying to seize power. There are many routes to a 
military coup, by one count close to 21 different variables have been hypothesized to 
have been important.206 One important driver of military coups is the degree of military 
discontent with the status quo. This discontent can be driven by things like deep-seated 
political differences, external vs. internal threats, etc. and it can also be caused by the 
level of the military’s endowment of resources. More resources are associated with a 
lower coup risk, while fewer resources are associated with a higher coup risk. Higher 
military spending is one way to funnel resources to the armed forces, but another way to 
do so is with military control over economic resources in the forms of institutional 
MCEs. These MCEs are one way for leaders to prevent one of the many possible routes 
to a military coup.  
 
Institutional MCEs, those under the control of the military establishment, tend to be 
larger, have more capitalization, and provide both immediate and long-term benefits to 
members of the officer corps. Institutional MCEs provide immediate benefits to the 
officer corps in many forms: educational scholarships, housing allowances, orphanages 
for the children of fallen soldiers, healthcare, direct supplements to officer income along 
with peripheral benefits offered by the type of business owned. Institutional MCEs also 
                                                 
206 Belkin, Aaron and Schoer, Evan, “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 2003 47: 594  
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provide long-term benefits to the officer corps in the form of a guaranteed retirement 
package in the form of pensions. In addition to monetary benefits, the existence of 
institutional MCEs gives officers opportunities to find employment after retiring from 
service, along with access to other officers still within the armed forces that can lead to 
access to lucrative contracts. Whether by enhancing the loyalty of the officer corps, or by 
simply eliminating particular officer grievances, MCEs are theorized to reduce the 
likelihood of a coup. The following analysis will attempt to show whether these 
institutions have the coup-proofing effects theorized in the previous chapter. 
 
Autocracies are more than twice as likely to have a coup attempt by their armed forces. 
Given the general lack of formal legal means of regime transition, or transitions between 
leaders, within autocracies it should come as no surprise that autocracies are almost three 
times as likely to suffer a coup attempt as a democracy. Autocratic leaders spend much 
time and energy eliminating possible rivals using a variety of means, either through 
coercion or cooptation, and changing the institutional rules to ensconce themselves in 
power. This leaves fewer legal means available for political change within a regime, and 
fewer actors capable of challenging the regime. Oftentimes autocratic leaders are so 
strong that the only means for regime change will often involve or be directly instigated 
by the armed forces.  
 
Autocratic leaders are not unaware of this possibility, and will undertake means to keep 
the armed forces from being able to move against their leadership. One particular means 
is through the use of Institutional MCEs, which allow the leaders to distribute patronage, 
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and give the armed forces the means by which they can improve the material welfare of 
their officer corps.  
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Institutional MCEs will reduce the likelihood of a coup attempt within 
autocracies. 
 
Some institutional MCEs start off small, and only over time are the able to accrue the size 
and property to be viable on their own. Indeed, the long term effects of MCEs might not 
be felt by the officers for years to come as retirement for many officers is far away. Thus 
it may be that the effectiveness of MCEs in lowering coup risk is felt only over time, with 
its coup-proofing benefits only becoming apparent over the course of a decade or more.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The longer a state has  Institutional MCEs, the lower the probability 
that it will suffer a coup attempt.  
 
The primary mechanism through which Institutional MCEs work to reduce coup risk is 
by benefitting the material welfare of the state’s officers. In states with lower income, 
MCEs allow both political and military leaders to distribute more goods to the officer 
corps. This is especially important in states where states have smaller budgets and fewer 
resources to spend on the armed forces – Institutional MCEs are an alternative way for 
cash-strapped leaders to reduce their coup risk. As income increases though, the amount 
that a state is able to apportion towards the armed forces will increase. It is expected that 
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as a state is better able to provide financial benefits directly from the state budget instead 
of through MCEs, that the effects of Institutional MCEs in reducing coup likelihood will 
fall.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Institutional MCEs will reduce the likelihood of a coup attempt at 
lower levels of income, and have increasingly smaller effects as income increases.  
 
The claims of these two hypotheses, that officers are sensitive to material benefits 
provided by institutional MCEs and that the coup-proofing effects of MCEs might only 
be seen in the long-term, will be tested below.  
 
Scope  
The timeframe of this analysis is from 1950 to 2010 including 173 countries, both 
developing and developed. Those excluded are those nations without formal armed forces 
or whose population has never reached 500,000. This analysis will include both 
developing and developed nations.207 Analyses will be run on both as tensions in civil-
military relations are not only the concern of developing nations, nor are ordinary issues 
of budgeting and officer salaries.  
 
                                                 
207 There will  also be a model run on only those states in which at least one coup occurred. As military-civil 
relations are an issue in all states , there are some that have had none, and as the risk of a coup is 
important for the establishment of MCEs, a separate analysis will be run for those states in which the 




In order to evaluate these hypotheses, a probit model will be used as the specification for 
the dichotomous outcome of attempted coups using cross-sectional time-series data. As 
the observations within the same country or the same year is expected to be non-
independent, the model will account by clustering standard errors by both year and 
country. In addition, each model will include either clustering or fixed effects by state 
and time period. The primary models in this study will be 1) a dichotomous Institutional 
MCE variable and 2) a temporal Institutional MCE variable that counts upwards from the 
date of an MCE establishment. They will be run on a full dataset including both 
autocracies and democracies, then on samples of only autocracies and democracies. The 
full model is shown below, with a full explanation of each variable after:  
 
P(Coup Attempt) = b0 + b1(Institutional MCE) + b2(Log of # of personnel) + b3(Log of GDP per 
capita) + b4(%  change of GDP per capita) + b5(Effective number) + b6(Years since coup) + 
b7(Instability Index) + b8(Military Regime) + b9(Expenditure per soldier) + C  
 
Data and Variables  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of variables  
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 




8 0 1 
Coup Attempts, Lagged 5323 
0.04283










2 0 1 




8 0 1 
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Institutional MCE, Continuous 5321 
2.82221
4 8.52473 0 58 
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Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable in this project is the coup attempt, following the definition set 
forward in Powell and Thyne (2011) data article: “attempts by the military or other elites 
within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of government using unconstitutional 
means”. In their dataset from 1950-2010, Powell and Thyne recorded 457 coup attempts 
total. In the full model, there are 401 years in which a coup attempt occurs, with the 
highest number of coups per country per year at 4, but the vast majority with only one 
occurring in a given year. For the purposes of this study the coup attempt variable has 
been recoded from a yearly count to a dichotomous variable, coded as “1” if there was an 
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attempt in a country year and “0” if there was none. In the full models on which the tests 
are run below, there are 252 country-years in which coup attempts occurred.208  
Figure 1: Coup Attempts over time by regime type, 1950-2010 209 
 
As Figure 1 shows, there are different trends with respect to coup attempts and regime 
type over time. The figure shows that, while over time the frequency of coups overall has 
gone down, the particular behavior of regime types with respect to risk of coup attempts 
is also quite different. Autocracies have seen a marked decrease in the occurrence of coup 
attempts over time, from a high in 1978 of 9 coup attempts to their first year without any 
in 1997. Democracies on the other hand have seen relative constant levels of lower coup 
                                                 
208 The majority of missing coup attempts in the dataset are either 1) multiple coups in the same country-
year so they are compressed to a “1”, or 2) they occurred in states that did not meet the requirements for 














Coup Attempts by Year by Regime Type
Coup Attempts in Democracies Coup Attempts in Autocracies
Coup Attempts in Anocracies
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risk from 1960 onwards. While the high for democracies was 4 in 1960 and 1967, 
democracies rarely broke even two coup attempts a year in the next 40 years. Anocracies, 
those states that are neither consolidated democracies or consolidated autocracies, have 
seen a trend roughly analogous to consolidated autocracies, with the early years of many 
states experiencing a high number of coups, and as time wears on the risks gradually 
lowers.210  
 
Figure 2: Plot of frequency of MCEs and Coup Attempts by year, 1950-2010   
 
In terms of the relationship between coup attempts and the presence of MCEs, Figure 2 
shows some preliminary evidence that MCEs could serve a coup-proofing function. 
There is a decline in the number of coups as the number of states with MCEs rises. As the 
                                                 
210 The Polity IV Project identifies all  those above 6 on the polity scale as “democracy”, below -6 as 
“autocracy” and those between -6 and 6 as “anocracy”. This study uses this same terminology so that 
when discussing democracy versus autocracy, both researchers and readers understand that there is a 
clear difference between the two. Anocracies can lead towards one or the other, but breaking down the 













































































number of countries with MCEs controlled by the armed forces have increased, the 
number of coup attempts has decreased. In the period when MCEs were virtually non-
existent, from 1950 to 1970, coup activity was at its highest, while coup activity began to 
peak and decline around the time that MCEs began their greatest growth. While this is 
certainly not definitive proof that MCEs provide coup-proofing benefits, it does suggest 
that one component of taming the military could involve ensuring that military financial 
needs are met.  
 
 Figure 3: Frequency of Regime Types over Time  
 
Figure 3 shows the frequency of regime types over time. One striking feature of this 
figure is the incredible reversal in the frequency of autocratic rule and democratic rule 
from the mid-1970s to the late 2000s. This wave of democratization began in the mid-80s 
and reached its peak in the early 90s. Many of the most consolidated autocratic regimes 






































































even democracies so that at the beginning of the 2000s, there were more anocracies than 
autocracies.  
 
Figure 4: Number of states with MCEs by Regime Type by Year  
 
Finally, figure 4 shows the trend in time over which regime types have MCEs. 
Autocracies have by far the most MCEs until the mid-90s, when democracies and 
autocracies have roughly the same number until the end of the dataset. Interestingly, 
autocracies seemed to adopt MCEs early on during the 70s and 80s until there was a 
sharp decline in the early 90s, commensurate with a sharp increase in democracies and 
anocracies with Institutional MCEs. This suggests either that autocracies transitioned 
away from autocracy, bringing with them some Institutional MCEs during the transition, 
or that autocracies shed their Institutional MCEs from the 1990s on. Combined with the 

































































Number of States with MCEs by Regime Type
Democracies with MCEs Autocracies with MCEs Anocracies with MCEs
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more strongly that the increase in democracies and anocracies having Institutional MCEs 
is more a function of autocracies bringing their Institutional MCEs with them during 
transitions.  
 
Table 2: Coup Attempts by Regime Type and Institutional MCE Presence  
Coup Attempts by Regime Type and Institutional MCE 
  Democracy Autocracy Anocracies 
Without MCEs 31 101 77 
With MCEs 9 5 9 
 
In terms of how the issues of coup risk, Institutional MCEs and regime type are related, 
Table 2 makes the point quite clearly: the above tabulation is of coup attempts by regime 
type and presence of Institutional MCEs. As the table shows, in 106 cases of coup 
attempts in autocracies, only 5 occurred while MCEs were present while 101 occurred in 
autocracies without MCEs. This is preliminary evidence that MCEs have some 
relationship with coup risk in autocracies, weak evidence in anocracies, and none within 
democracies. In the case of democracies, there are 9 coup attempts out of 40 where 
MCEs are present. In anocracies, there are also 9 cases of coup attempts in the presence 
of MCEs out of 86 total, suggesting weak evidence that MCEs work to reduce coup 
likelihood in anocracies.  
 
Independent Variables  
The first hypotheses proposes that in autocracies, MCEs serve a coup-proofing function 
in that once an institutional MCE is established, the risk of a coup attempt decreases. 
Prior research has shown that as spending per soldier increases, the likelihood that a coup 
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occurs decreases.211 MCEs serve a similar function, distributing benefits to officers in 
multiple channels and over different time frames. If the military has more resources with 
which to spend on its officers, then officers will be more content with the status quo and 
thus less likely to attempt to seize control of the state. Armed forces that are better able to 
equip and train their officers and provide them with financial support to their normal 
salaries are less likely to have dangerous divisions develop within the officer corps 
between junior and senior officers, and lessen the likelihood of a violent rebellion in the 
form of a coup attempt.  
 
The primary indicator for MCE is the Institutional MCE variable. Institutional MCE is a 
dichotomous variable on whether or not the armed forces are in control of both 
commercial and defense industries, with the primary ownership dynamic being that the 
MCEs are under the control of a highly institutionalized arrangement within the hierarchy 
of the armed forces.  
 
In addition to a simple dichotomous measure of the presence of MCEs, the model also 
includes a measure for how long an MCE has continuously been in existence, 
Institutional MCE Run. The variable is a count of years since the MCE was first 
established, starting over from zero if the MCEs are disbanded or handed over to another 
agency to administer. The logic behind including this variable is that the kind of strong 
institutional control of MCEs will not have benefits readily available immediately. It may 
take some time for officers to see the benefits of such a system, especially junior officers 
                                                 
211 Powell J., “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’etat”. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 56(6): 1017-1040 
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a long time away from retirement. So it is expected that, the longer MCEs exist, the more 
readily apparent the benefits to the officer class are, leading to a lower coup likelihood 
over time. It may take time for such institutions, once established, to have the desired 
effect of enhancing the loyalty of the officer corps through the distribution of benefits. 
Most MCEs began as modest enterprises that could not provide immediate large benefits 
to their officers, with many offering benefits only after retirement, or a small amount of 
extra income initially. Many MCEs need time to grow and for their beneficiaries to 
actually see any benefits, thus it is also likely that these MCEs will have a larger 
cumulative effect, and that the time since the establishment of MCEs should be 
negatively associated with coup risk. A simple variable, which is a count of every year 
since the establishment of an institutional MCE that resets if there are no MCEs in a 
given year, will serve the purpose of examining the time-varying dynamics of MCEs.  
 
Control Variables 
In terms of control variables, they are taken from some of the strongest claims in the most 
recent work on coup risk. One of the most important is military expenditures, as a larger 
budget usually means more and better equipped troops. Military spending has been 
consistently used in previous studies and has been found to decrease the likelihood of 
coup attempts.212 More spending also means that military priorities are being given 
higher consideration by the state government, making the status quo more palatable to 
                                                 
212 Powell J., “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’etat”. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 56(6): 1017-1040;    Collier P., Hoeffler A., “Military Spending and the Risks of Coups d’etats”, 
Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, March 2007;    
Gabriel, Leon “Loyalty for Sale? Military Spending and Coups d’Etat”, Feb 1. 2012, Faculty Workshop;    
Barka Ben, Habiba & Ncube, Mthuli “Political Fragility in Africa: Are Military Coups d’etat a Never -Ending 
Phenomenon?”, African Development Bankm Chief Economist Complex, September 2012;   
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military leaders. More important than just aggregate measures of spending though is the 
amount of funding per soldier as a general indicator of how well soldiers are treated. 
Unfortunately there are not easily found data on spending per officer, the most important 
groups of actors when it comes to coup activity, but Expenditure Per Soldier(EPS) should 
be a good enough indicator as officers are included in the category. There is not a high 
degree of correlation between EPS and MCEs.213 The source of data on expenditures 
comes from Correlates of War, which rely upon public data on military spending, 
whereas MCEs are almost entirely off-book in their finances.214  
 
Another feature of the armed forces included in the model is the composition of the 
security environment itself.215 The variable Effective Number of Armed Groups is a 
measure of the number of armed groups that exist in a state in a given country year. As 
many state leaders have faced a variety of challenges to their rule, both within their 
regime and outside of it, leaders have had to adopt a variety of coup-proofing strategies to 
secure their political power. Some of these strategies try to ensure military loyalty 
through “carrots”, but failing that, leaders also use “sticks” such as purges, assignment of 
troublesome officers to harmless positions and forced retirements, among others.216 An 
alternative strategy is for leaders to ensure that their potential enemies are divided, and 
                                                 
213 In the full  model, correlation between Institutional MCE  and Expenditure per Soldier is 0.0347.  
214 Singer, J. David. 1987. "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of 
States, 1816-1985" International Interactions, 14: 115-32.  
215 Alternate models also included measures of the size of the military, as measured by the number of 
personnel, but it was not found to be significant in any model.  
216 216 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, “Political Succession: A model of coups, revolution, 
purges and everyday politics”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 2015, 1 -37;   Koga, Jun, 
“Authoritarian Consolidation of Power: When can a dictator undermi ne the threat of coup replacement?”, 
Presentation at Annual Meeting of Southern Political Science Association, Orlando, Florida, 2013  
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that their regime has enough strength to resist attempts by challengers to displace them.217 
Towards that end many states have fragmented their security agencies, often creating 
what are termed “mutually suspicious” groups within the armed forces to lower the 
likelihood that a system-wide coup plot could develop.218 In addition to fragmenting the 
armed forces, many leaders set up competing armed groups such as paramilitary groups, 
secret police, local defense forces, etc., so that there may be additional obstacles to any 
attempted takeover to any one challenger. One such measure comes from Bohmelt and 
Pilster, who have collected information on the number of armed organizations that stand 
any chance of being able to resist an armed seizure of power.219 Their variable, Effective 
Number of Armed Groups, will be included as it represents an important alternative coup-
proofing strategy that could be used in tandem or in place of a coup-proofing strategy 
involves both “carrots or sticks” to secure a regime’s place. The relationship between the 
Effective Number of Armed Groups and coup attempts is expected to be negative.220  
 
Controls for economic and political variables are also included, using measures of GDP 
per capita and changes in GDP per capita. It is often in times of economic distress that 
civilian regimes are likely to face challenges from both opposition parties and from the 
armed forces.221 Economically difficult times will invite regime change, and give officers 
                                                 
217 Quinlivan, James, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East”, RAND 
Corporations, 2000  
218 Belkin and Schoefer, “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk, Journal of Conflict Resolution”, 
October 2003, vol. 47 No.5   
219 Pilster, Ulrich and Bohmelt, Tobias, “Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967-
1999”, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 28 (4): 331-350  
220 Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, “Coup Risk, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict,” Security 
Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 140–177; 




in the armed forces greater claim to remove civilian regimes.222 Indeed, in other literature 
it has been found that higher income leads to a much diminished likelihood of coups.223 
The inclusion of an economic variable cannot be overlooked, as the state of the economy 
is often a barometer of support for a regime or any sort, as it deeply affects the ability of 
the government to offer sufficient benefits to the armed forces.224 Both GDP per capita 
and Changes in GDP per capita are expected to have a strong negative relationship with 
the likelihood of a coup attempt.225  
 
As for political variables, I have used several indicators of regime type along with a 
measure of political instability. The first will be a simple measure from the Polity IV 
project, using both the aggregate measure of democracy vs. autocracy, as well as cutoff 
points of 6 and -6 for a dichotomous measure of democracy and autocracy 
respectively.226 The second comes from the Banks Cross National Time Series Dataset 
which has a variable of military regime.227 In all models none of the regime types were 
found to be significant with respect to coup attempts except for the Banks variable Banks 
Military Regime, which is included in the model.228 Political instability is also a concern 
                                                 
222 Nam Kyu Kim, “Revisiting Economic Shocks and Coups”, Journal of Conflict Resolution,  February 
2016 vol. 60 no.1 3-31; This study also shows that the impact of economic shocks on coups are dependent 
upon the duration and severity of the economic shocks.  
223 Londregan, John B. and Poole, Keith, “Poverty, the Coup Trap and the Seizure of Executive Power” 
World Politics 42(2): 151-183, 1990  
224 Steffen Hertog, “Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States: The Price of CoupProofing,” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 43, no. 3 (2011): 400–402  
225 Ibrahim, Amina, “Guarding the State or Protecting the Economy: The Economic factors of Pakistan’s 
Military Coups”, Development Studies Institute LSE, 2009  
226 Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers & Ted Robert Gurr. 2011. Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual. 
Center for Systemic Peace: Polity IV Project.  
227 Banks, Arthur S., Wilson, Kenneth A. 2015. Cross -National Time-Series Data Archive. Databanks 
International. Jerusalem, Israel;  
228 Other regime variables came from the Geddes Autocratic Regime dataset, which had further 
differentiation between autocratic regimes. A significant relationship was not found.  
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when it comes to coup risk, as a greater degree of political instability could lead military 
leaders to act and seize control of government to bring order back to the state. The Banks 
Instability Index comes from the Banks Cross National Time Series dataset, which is one 
way of capturing such dynamics, which is an indexed number that increases in magnitude 
with different instances of political instability such as anti-government demonstrations, 
assassinations, strikes, government crises, guerilla warfare, revolutions, purges, and 
riots.229 It is expected that political instability will be positively associated with coup risk.  
 
Finally, one of the best indicators of coup activity is prior coup activity.230 Thus, a 
temporal measure of time since a coup last occurred will be included to help measure 
prior coup activity. The simple count of years since a coup occurred, Years since Coup, 
will be used. Previous studies have shown that the most dangerous time for another coup 
is in the year right after a coup, with the risk tailoring off significantly after the first few 
years.231 It is expected to have the same negative relationship with coup risk.  
 
Results  
This section will evaluate the three hypotheses of the above sections: 1) that the presence 
of MCEs reduces the likelihood of coup risk in autocracies, and 2) that the longer an 
MCE exists, the greater its effect on reducing coup risk, and 3) that MCEs will have their 
highest effectiveness in lower income countries. Each subsection will evaluate the 
                                                 
229 Banks, Arthur S., Wilson, Kenneth A. 2015. Cross -National Time-Series Data Archive. Databanks 
International. Jerusalem, Israel; 
230 Powell, Jonathan; Chacha, Mwita, “Investing in Stability: Economic Interdpendence, Coups d’etat and 
the Capitalist Peace”, Forthcoming Journal of Peace Research, Available at: 
http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/investing_in_stability_condition_fu ll.pdf  
231 Collier P., Hoeffler A., “Military Spending and the Risks of Coups d’etats”, Centre for the Study of 
African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, March 2007  
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statistical and substantive effects of the major variables of interest and their included 
control variables.  
 
Institutional MCE – Dichotomous Model  
This section will evaluate both the statistical, then substantive results of the models. 
Table 1 presents the results of two different models with the primary variable of interest. 
Both models utilized a random effects probit models clustered on country.232233 The 
results in Table 2 are encouraging as they show support for the hypotheses that the 
presence of Institutional MCEs has a negative relationship with the likelihood of a coup 
attempt. Institutional MCE was lagged to account for the possibility of reverse causality, 
and all subsequent models shown are based upon the lagged Institutional MCE.234 235 The 






                                                 
232 Additional models were run with random effects by year, as well as regular probit models with 
standard clustering functions by both country and year. All  these tests are available in the appendix under 
Table 2A.  
233 Interestingly enough, Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 turned out to have coefficients roughly 20% larger 
than probit models without random effects and clustering.  
234 There are additional models run with the non-lagged version of both the dichotomous and continuous 
versions of Institutional MCE available in the appendix. The results are consistent with the models in Ta ble 
2.  
235 In some cases, sources would cite the start of a new economic program or institutional MCE as 
beginning the same year as the coup. In many cases the enterprise did not actually begin until  the 
following year, or a program did not receive funding or support until  the year after a coup occurred.  
236 The model was run from 1960 to 2010, but data on the full dataset of Powell and Thyne was presented 
so as to show the full range of information available.  
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Table 3: Full Probit Models of Coup Attempt, Institutional MCEs with Random Effects (1960-2010) by Regime 
Type   
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 - Primary 
Model 
Model 2 - Democracy 
Sample 
Model 3 - Autocracy 
Sample 
    
Institutional MCE -0.270** 0.0775 -0.688*** 
 (0.135) (0.265) (0.204) 
Coup Attempts, Lagged 0.252** 0.0480 0.320* 
 (0.122) (0.352) (0.170) 
Number of Soldier, Logged -0.0320 0.0234 -0.0377 
 (0.0316) (0.0715) (0.0403) 
GDP per capita, Logged -0.102* -0.241* -0.147** 
 (0.0542) (0.133) (0.0661) 
Change in GDP per capita -0.689* -0.738 -0.0186 
 (0.381) (1.326) (0.286) 
Effective Number of Security 
Organizations 
0.0305 -0.0765 -0.0473 
 (0.0732) (0.157) (0.105) 
Years Since Coup  -0.0232*** -0.0353*** -0.0141** 
 (0.00536) (0.0108) (0.00661) 
Banks Instability Index, Lagged, 
Logged 
3.72e-05** 8.42e-05** 3.27e-05 
 (1.82e-05) (3.57e-05) (2.63e-05) 
Banks Instability Index, Lagged 0.0281** 0.0268 0.0309* 
 (0.0131) (0.0315) (0.0183) 
Military Regime, Banks 0.203  0.349** 
 (0.130)  (0.152) 
Expenditure per soldier, Logged -0.150*** -0.171 0.0570 
 (0.0521) (0.132) (0.0650) 
Constant -0.233 0.393 -0.126 
 (0.423) (0.986) (0.500) 
Observations 5,323 2,119 2,125 
Number of ccode 152 97 100 
 
Table 3 displays a probit analysis of the effect of the dichotomous measure of 
Institutional MCEs on the full dataset, the sample of democracies and the sample of 
autocracies. In Model 1 Institutional MCE is statistically significant and in the expected 
direction of having a negative relationship with coup attempts. When broken down by 
democracy or autocracy, however, the effects of Institutional MCEs diverges 
significantly. In Model 2 for democracies, there is hardly any effect of Institutional 
MCEs on the likelihood of a coup attempt. In fact, in the sample of democracies hardly 
any of the control variables are significant aside from Years Since Coup and the Banks 
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Instability Index.237 Years Since Coup has a negative impact on coup risk across all 
models, while Banks Instability Index is only significant for the primary and democracy 
models. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that Institutional MCEs do not 
function as a viable coup-proofing mechanism for democracies.  
 
In Model 3, for autocracies the effect of Institutional MCEs on coup attempts is both 
statistically and substantively significant. The coefficient for Institutional MCEs in 
Model 3 is negative and significant, along with GDP Per Capita and Years Since Coup. 
With increases in the time since a coup attempt and with increases in GDP per capita, 
there is a decrease in the likelihood of a coup attempt. The variable Banks Military 
Regime is also significant, with the presence of a military regime increasing the chance of 
a coup attempt. Interestingly, expenditures per soldier is not significant in autocracies, 







                                                 
237 In Table 3B, available in the appendix, with a lternative measures of democracy the same pattern is 
found. In Table 3b, with fixed effects by country and year, the coefficient of Institutional MCEs is 
significant and negative, but the number of observations left after accounting for fixed effects is 26 7, 
which does not exactly inspire confidence in the results.  
238 There is also the possibility that that most outlays from autocratic regimes in terms of spending is on 
equipment, technology and ammunition and outlays on personnel are much smaller as a perc entage. 
Unfortunately, this is not a testable hypothesis with the current data.  
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Figure 4: Predictive Margins of Institutional MCEs on Coup Attempts – Model 3   
 
As Figure 4 shows, the presence of Institutional MCEs in autocracies has a strong effect. 
In autocracies without Institutional MCEs the predicted likelihood of a coup attempt is 
5.8% in a given country year. In autocracies with Institutional MCEs, the predicted 
likelihood a coup attempt is 1.4%, a decrease of more than three-quarters from those 
autocracies without Institutional MCEs. This shows strong support for the hypothesis that 
autocracies will benefit strongly from the presence of Institutional MCEs where reducing 






Figure 5 & 6: Predictive Margins of Years Since Coup Attempt on Coup Risk – 
Model 3 &  
Predictive Margins of  GDP Per Capita on Coup Risk - Model 3  
 
   Figure 5     Figure 6 
Figures 5 above shows the likelihood of a coup attempt given years since a previous coup 
attempt in autocracies. The effect is strong and negative, with a probability of a coup 
attempt in the first year after a coup at 6.3%. At 5, 10 and 15 years the predicted 
probability is 5.7%, 4.9% and 4.3% respectively. This decrease over time shows that, if 
the autocracy is able to survive the initial years after a coup attempt, it should face far 
lower coup risks as time goes on. Similarly, there is a huge effect with GDP Per Capita in 
Figure 6 on the likelihood of a coup attempt. At a GDP Per Capita of $445, the risk of a 
coup is 6.9% in a given country-year for autocracies. An increase from $500 to $1000 
leads to a coup risk of 5.6%. Finally, at $7000 GDP per capita, the likelihood of a coup 
attempt is reduced to 3.7% in a country year. This shows that development is also an 
important indicator of the risk of a coup attempt. This also suggests another line of 
inquiry – which is how the effect of Institutional MCEs might change across different 





Figure 7: Predictive Margins of Coup Attempts Given Institutional MCEs – Model 1  
 
Figure 7 above shows the results from Model 1, on the full dataset including both 
democracies and autocracies. The vertical line in the graph signifies $7000 GDP per 
capita, the development at which Przeworksi et. al. found that democracies are extremely 
unlikely to revert to autocracy. The graph shows two lines, the top one is the predicted 
probability of a coup attempt in all states without Institutional MCEs, and the bottom are 
all those states with Institutional MCEs over different levels of development. 
Importantly, for sets of cases, higher development decreases the likelihood of a coup 
attempt. In the case of Institutional MCEs, the overall likelihood of a coup attempt is 
lower over all levels of development, though the difference is only statistically significant 




The fact that around 8.8 – 9 (~$7,000 GDP per capita) the effect of Institutional MCEs 
begins to have less of an effect is significant because it matches up very well with earlier 
conclusions from research on development and democratization. This suggests that, 
consistent with the conclusion of Przeworksi et. al’s theory of exogenous 
democratization, development overrides other variables affecting regime stability and 
transition past a certain level. In the model of exogenous democratization, development is 
not a driver of political transition, but rather development acts to prevent regime 
transitions away from democracy. Development then is not the cause of democratic 
transitions, but rather it affects the direction and frequency of transitions, mainly that 
once a certain level of development is achieved a regime that transitions to democracy 
tends to stay a democracy.  
 
Consistent with this thesis, the models show that GDP per capita is associated with lower 
levels of coup attempts, one kind of regime transition. In Model 1 also shows that as 
development increases, the significance of the effect of Institutional MCE begins to 
decrease as development takes more of a role: at 8.8 ($7,000) the effect of Institutional 
MCEs begins to decrease, and at 10.5 ($30,000) the effect of Institutional MCE is entirely 
insignificant. Coup attempts (when they are successful at least) are one form of regime 
transition, either for autocratic or democratic failure. As development increases the 
likelihood of a coup attempt decreases to a negligible amount (2% by $30,000). All 
models above show the same relationship between development and coup attempts – 
which confirms the primary finding of exogenous democratization literature.  
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Figure 8: Predictive Margins of Coup Attempts Given Institutional MCEs – Model 3 
– Autocracies  
 
Figure 9 shows the same predicted probabilities of coup attempts, this time only on the 
sample of autocracies.239 Figure 9 shows the same methods though applied to the sample 
of democracies. In both cases, the level of development does have a relationship to one 
kind of regime transition. Whereas Przeworksi et. al. are agnostic about whether 
development creates opportunities for transitions, the above two figures do give some 
evidence that there is a relationship between development and the occurrence of coup 
attempts. While not all coup attempts lead to a transition, it is clear from the above that 1) 
at higher levels of development coup attempts are less common and that 2) this effect 
                                                 
239 Figure 8a also shows the same predicted probabilities on a sample of democracies.  
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appears to be the case regardless of regime type. The difference in coup risk between an 
autocracy and a democracy at $7,000 GDP per capita is 0.4 percentage points, which is 
almost negligible.240 While this study does not look at all possible transition types, at 
least with respect to coup attempts both autocracies and democracies behave roughly the 
same way with regards to development – that as development increases the number of 
possible transition attempts decreases.  
 
With respect to Institutional MCEs, autocracies and democracies have wildly different 
behaviors. While there are no effects of Institutional MCEs in democracies, there is a 
strong effect in autocracies before the $7,000 mark. The difference between those 
autocratic states with Institutional MCEs and those without is stark: below the $7,000 
mark Institutional MCEs have a large impact on the likelihood of a coup attempt, 
decreasing the likelihood by nearly 50%. It is also important to note that there are only 18 
country years of autocracies with Institutional MCEs past the $7,000 mark, and none past 
$15,000. There are also only 320 country years of autocracies past the $7,000 mark.241 
The fact that there are virtually no states with Institutional MCEs past the $7,000 mark 
suggests that MCEs are themselves primarily a mechanism to stay in power established 




                                                 
240 Autocracies have a coup risk of 1.2%, while democracies have an average of 0.8% at $7,00 0 GDP per 
capita.  
241 Those autocratic states past the $7,000 mark are a collection of Gulf Coast States, former Soviet 
Republics and satell ite states, Mexico, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Portugal, Spain, Taiwan and Uruguay.   
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Figure 9: Plot of Expenditures per soldier and GDP per capita by Regime Type  
 
Figure 9 displays a scatterplot of expenditure per soldier and GDP per capita, displaying 
democracies in red and autocracies in blue. While the estimations for the effect of 
autocracies with MCEs past $7,000 are not trustworthy, the effects at lower levels of 
income are substantively strong and suggest that leaders strategically respond to their 
environments by establishing MCEs to lower coup risk. As Figure 9 shows, autocracies 
tend to be poorer, and as a result the amount they are able to spend per soldier is quite 
low especially when compared to democracies.  There are some outlier autocracies when 
it comes to high GDP per capita, but they are somewhat evenly distributed among 
expenditures per soldier, all of which are Gulf Coast States. The above figure shows the 
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concentration of most autocracies in the lower clusters of both GDP per capita as well as 
spending per soldier.  
Figure 10: Plot of expenditure per soldier and GDP per capita, by presence of 
MCEs 
 
Figure 10 shows the same plot of expenditure per soldier and GDP per capita, but this 
time breaking the sample down by presence of MCEs. The pattern is that most MCEs 
tend to be clustered between the 8.8 ($7,000) mark and 6.5 ($700) mark, or 811 of 981 
cases. As the data show, MCEs tend to be located not in the most impoverished of states, 
but rather in the cohorts of development above the least developed countries and below 
the level of when development begins to act in the way that Przeworksi et. al. describe to 







Table 4: Average Spending per soldier by regime type and MCE presence   
Average Spending per Soldier 
 Autocracies Poor Autocracies Democracies 
Poor 
Democracies 
All 13,596.40 4,786.00 34,077.30 7,161.00 
With MCEs 8,492.70 7,948.00 15,027.30 8,420.00 
Without MCEs 15,257.10 4,347.00 35,921.80 7,061.00 
 
Table 4 shows the divergence in spending between autocracies and democracies, given 
the presence or absence of MCEs. Strikingly, across all observations democracies tend to 
spend more on their soldiers by a factor of double. Counter-intuitively, the average 
spending per soldier in both democracies and autocracies tend to also be much lower 
when MCEs are present. This seems a strange pattern, especially given that MCEs are 
supposed to help increase the incomes of soldiers theoretically.  
 
Remember though that the majority of MCEs are located in states in the lower income 
brackets, below the $7,000 mark. The 3rd and 5th column show the average expenditures 
of those same categories except only on the sample of states with GDP per capita below 
$7,000. There is a very clear reversal once the sample is cut: within autocracies that have 
MCEs the average spending per soldier is almost double that of the other autocracies, and 
in democracies with MCEs there is a roughly $1,000 increase in the average. Within this 
subset of income MCEs are clearly associated with a substantial increase in the welfare of 
that state’s soldiers, not even counting the benefits that may be included from MCEs. 
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Democracies do see an increase as well, but the divergence is not nearly as stark as in 
autocracies. This suggests that those lower-income autocratic states with MCEs are 
spending well above the average within their cohort, either as a result of higher coup risk, 
their income, and their security environment.  
The great divergence of coup risk in autocratic states between those states with MCEs 
and those without confirms the hypothesis that autocratic states will be more likely to 
enjoy the coup-proofing benefits of Institutional MCEs than democracies. Autocratic 
states have much to fear from the armed forces, and one avenue for armed forces to 

















Institutional MCE Run Model  
Table 5: Full Probit Models of Coup Attempt, Consecutive MCE Runs (Dates 1960-2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 - 
Primary Model 
Model 2 - 
Democracy Sample 




-0.0102 0.00443 -0.0287** 
 (0.00644) (0.0107) (0.0120) 
Coup Attempt, Lagged 0.313*** 0.0416 0.337** 
 (0.115) (0.348) (0.169) 
Number of Soldiers, 
Logged 
-0.0352 0.0210 -0.0598 
 (0.0287) (0.0702) (0.0394) 
GDP Per Capita, 
Logged 
-0.111** -0.236* -0.131** 
 (0.0487) (0.133) (0.0652) 
Change in GDP per 
Capita 
-0.836** -0.723 -0.0181 
 (0.357) (1.325) (0.271) 
Effective Number of 
Organizations  
0.0174 -0.0724 -0.0551 
 (0.0674) (0.157) (0.105) 
Years since Coup -0.0216*** -0.0360*** -0.0125* 
 (0.00507) (0.0111) (0.00658) 
Banks Index, lagged 1.73e-05 8.36e-05** 3.01e-05 
 (1.45e-05) (3.54e-05) (2.57e-05) 
Banks Index, lagged, 
logged 
0.0347*** 0.0273 0.0324* 
 (0.0120) (0.0315) (0.0181) 
Banks Military Regime 0.262**  0.350** 
 (0.124)  (0.151) 
Expenditures per 
soldier, logged 
-0.179*** -0.176 0.0405 
 (0.0496) (0.133) (0.0640) 
Constant -0.117 0.385 -0.0263 
 (0.387) (0.990) (0.498) 
Observations 5,517 2,119 2,125 
Number of ccode 154 97 100 
 
Table 5 displays the results of tests are on the effect of the years since the establishment 
of an institutional MCE. Both models utilized a random effects probit models clustered 
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on country.242243 The Institutional MCE Run variable is significant and in the expected 
direction, just as the dichotomous Institutional MCE variable. The variable is negatively 
associated with the chance of a coup attempt, with the older the Institutional MCE, the 
less likelihood of there being a coup.  
Figure 11: Predictive Margins of Institutional MCE Run on Coup Risk, Model 1, Table 5  
 
The substantive effects of Institutional MCEs in Figure 11 shows how the longer an MCE 
is in operation, the greater the effect on lowering coup risk. The first year an MCE is 
established the coup risk is 0.039, the 5th year an MCE is in operation the coup risk drops 
                                                 
242 Additional models were run with random effects by year, as well as regular probit models with 
standard clustering functions by both country and year. All  these tests are available in the appendix under 
Table 3A.  
243 Interestingly enough, Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 turned out to have coefficients roughly 21% larger 
than probit models without random effects and clustering.  
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to 0.035, while ten years out the coup risk drops to 0.030. When a full generation of 
military officers has been cycled through the armed forces, at roughly 30 years, the risk 
falls to 0.016.244  
Figure 12: Comparison of Coup Risk by Institutional MCE Run and Years after 
Coup Variable, Model 1, Table 5  
 
Figure 12 is a comparison of the coup risk of both Institutional MCE Run and the Years 
Since Coup variables.245 It is more useful to put these two time-dependent variables in a 
head-to-head evaluation of their effects than to consider them on their own terms without 
context. Figure 6 shows that there is a significant difference in coup risk one year out for 
each variable, with there being a lower risk for institutional MCEs at the outset and for 
                                                 
244 These were calculated using the margins command in STATA, using the observed value approach. In 
STATA 13.1 and above the default setting on the margins command is the observed value approach. 
245 Confidence Intervals are not included in this so as to not clutter up the plot, and to highlight the 


















Comparison of Coup Risk By Institutional MCE & Years After 
Coup Variable
Years After Coup Years of Institutional MCEs
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nearly 30 years. Coup risk declines at a much faster pace with regards to the Years Since 
Coup variable, whereas the Institutional MCE coup risk declines at a slighter rate. At 
around the 28 year mark, the relative coup risk of each variable is roughly the same, and 
that around the time when most senior officers at the time of the establishment of MCEs 
or perpetrators of a coup (Time 0) the risk of a coup attempt has been reduced by 
between one-half for Institutional MCEs and two-thirds for Years Since Coup. In terms of 
substantive effect, year to year the marginal effect of Institutional MCEs will be small, 
perhaps not substantively so. However, Institutional MCEs have an initial reduction of 
the latent coup risk from 0.061 to 0.039 even in its first year of existence, and the first 
year after a coup is the most vulnerable time for a state that has just experienced a coup. 
By comparison, Institutional MCE Run tends to outperform Years Since Coup in terms of 
reducing coup likelihood due to the initial reduction in coup risk in the initial 28 years. 
Cumulatively, the reduction in coup risk for those first 28 years is 0.22, a not 








                                                 
246 The cumulative coup risk from 1960-2010 (defined as the sum of the area beneath the curve of the 
years since coup variable) is 1.31, while the cumulative coup risk for Institutional MCEs is 1.14, with a 
difference of 0.16.  
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Control Variables  
Figure 13: Marginal Effects of Variables in Table 5, Model 3; Continuous Institutional MCE 
 
Figure 13 shows the control variables.247 The military characteristic variables also have 
mixed results. Expenditure Per Soldier is surprisingly not significant and has a positive 
relationship with coup risk. The Number of Soldiers is not significant in any model run 
below or in the appendix, though past studies had highlighted it as a possible causal link 
in coup risk. Interestingly enough, Effective Number of Armed Groups is not significant 
at all in any model, which is surprising since the earlier work of Bohmelt and Pilster had 
highlighted fragmenting of armed groups as a potential coup-proofing method. Their past 
                                                 
247 This figure excludes two variables from the original model in order to display the results with more 
clarity.   
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work had shown that the Effective Number of Armed Groups had a negative correlation 
with coup risk.248  
 
The economic variables also performed as expected, with of GDP per capita negatively 
associated with coup risk. This has been a consistent finding in the literature on coup risk 
for decades.249 The poorest countries in the world are consistently ranked as having the 
highest coup risk, and experience coups at a much higher rate than rich countries. Change 
in GDP per capita, (not shown)  has also been theorized in the past as being a catalyst for 
both coups and regime change, but in the model it is negatively associated with coup 
attempts, but not statistically significant. This is inconsistent with past literature on 
economic drivers of conflict.250  
 
The political variables, such as Banks’ Instability Index variables, show mixed results as 
instability in the past has been associated with coup attempts. The lagged and logged 
version of the Banks Instability Index does show significance. The coefficients are small, 
and the marginal effect of moving from 0 to 10 (the entire range of the variable) on the 
lagged and logged index results in a change in coup risk from 0.027 to 0.059, a doubling 
of coup risk. It is difficult to say how substantively important it is as a variable, given that 
one has to go from virtually no instability (0) to a very high degree of instability (8) on 
the logged Banks Index to even see a statistically different risk of a coup attempt.251  
                                                 
248 Pilster, Ulrich and Bohmelt, Tobias, “Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967-
1999”, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 28 (4): 331-350  
249 249 Collier P., Hoeffler A., “Military Spending and the Risks of Coups d’etats”, Centr e for the Study of 
African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, March 2007  
250 A full  graph of the effects of change in GDP per capita is available in the appendix.  
251 A further exploration of this variable is provided in graph form in the appendix in Figure 4C.   
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The years since coup attempt variable is also highly significant in all models, and is 
negatively associated with coup risk. The year after a coup has a risk of 0.061, 5 years out 
the risk of a coup is 0.054, while ten years on the risk has been reduced to 0.040. The 
time right after a coup is the most dangerous time for another coup to occur, and each 
subsequent year without a coup reduces the likelihood a coup is going to occur, on 
average, by 0.03.252 By the time a new generation of officers has been cycled into flag 
commands, and the older officers who took part in the coup have retired, roughly 30 
years, the risk of a coup has dropped to 0.014.  
 
Addressing Endogeneity  
There is a valid concern that, within this theoretical story and within the models above 
that there is an endogenous relationship between Coup Risk and Institutional MCEs. In 
the literature summarized in earlier chapters, MCEs are established for a variety of 
reasons, but chief among them may be that MCEs are a way of leaders attempting to 
coup-proof their regimes against a military takeover by the officer corps. Leaders 
establish MCEs as a way to lower coup risk, which means that the establishment of 
MCEs then, is not a random phenomenon, but rather is a strategic response by leaders to 
coup risk. The choice to create MCEs is an endogenous choice, meaning that the 
relationship between MCEs and coup risk is not in one direction.  
 
Simple model of endogeneity:     Coup RiskT0   Institutional MCET1   Coup 
RiskT2  
                                                 
252 A further exploration of this variable is provided in graph form in the appendix in Figure 4D.  
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In order to control for endogeneity, most models will be put through a two-stage 
regression using a cluster of different independent variables as instruments. Selecting a 
proper instrument is a fraught process, given the interconnectedness of just about all 
political variables but as a baseline there must be two conditions met in order to be 
considered: 1) the instrument must be correlated with the primary explanatory variable 
and 2) it must not be correlated with the error in the original model with the primary 
dependent variable.253 Instrument selection is a difficult process even in ideal conditions 
with a well-known and well-worn set of variables such as economic growth or GDP per 
capita.254 Papers on the study of economic conditions on civil conflict often rely on 
exogenous factors such as rainfall data as an instrument, which one can plausibly claim is 
correlated with economic conditions but not with civil conflict.255 In other studies on 
political behavior, the existence of proper instruments is much more fraught, and the 
acceptance of the use of instrumental variables relies upon argumentation and plausibility 
instead of verifiable exogeneity. Unfortunately, for a variable like Institutional MCE, no 
such exogenous factor exists or is even known, given how new the variable it.  
 
Instead of attempting to model the endogenous relationship using a two-stage estimation 
procedure, and running into issues of improperly specified models and poor instruments, 
                                                 
253 Sovey, All ison; Green, Donald; “Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science: A Reader’s 
Guide”, American Journal of Poli tical Science, Vol.00, No.0, xxx 2010, pp.1-13   
254 Heather Sarsons, “Rainfall and conflict: A cautionary tale” Journal of Development Economics, 
Volume 115, July 2015, Pages 62-72  
255 Thorsten Janus, Daniel Riera-Crichton, “Economic shocks, civil war and ethnicity”,  Journal of 
Development Economics, Volume 115, July 2015, Pages 32–44; Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and 
Ernest Sergenti. 2004. 




a much simpler solution to the issue of possible endogeneity can be applied. Consider the 
following models:   
P (Y1) = B1 + B2(X1) + e  
P (Xt+1) = b1 + b2(X1) + u   
In the first model Y1 is the establishment of an Institutional MCE in a given year and X1 
is the Coup Risk of the same year. In the second model, Xt+1 is a coup attempt in the next 
year, with X1 also being represented as Coup Risk of the year before Xt+1. There is a 
strong theoretical and statistical relationship between Xt+1 and X1, as well as a strong 
theoretical relationship between X1 and Y1. The model below is a truncated version of the 
primary model in Table 2 above:  
P (Xt+1) = B1 + B2 (Y1) + B3 (X1) + e  
The first thing to point out from the above equation is that there is not a truly endogenous 
relationship. Strictly speaking, while Xt+1 and Xt are going to be related, as previous coup 
risk is going to be highly correlated with current coup risk, it would be a stretch to say 
that there is a causal relationship between the two. While there is some correlation 
between past coup risk and current coup risk256, it is not especially convincing as an 
explanatory variable in and of itself. While there is a close correlation between the two, 
positing that coup risk predicts later coup risk is more an artifact of the stickiness of other 




                                                 
256 The correlation between Lagged Coup Attempt and Coup Attempt is 0.175, and in all  the models above 
Lagged Coup Attempt is significant.  
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Figure 14: MCEs by Coup Risk and Income  
 
As Figure 14 shows, Institutional MCEs are established as a combination of the 
interaction between coup risk and income, though income is a hard cut-off point. Those 
states with high coup risk and low income are more likely to have MCEs, while those 
with higher income are less likely to have any MCEs at all.257 The table shows the 
predicted pattern of MCE establishment, along with the number of cases of Institutional 
MCE existing and the percent of country-years within each category having Institutional 
MCEs. Far and away the biggest predictor of Institutional MCEs is income, with lower 
                                                 
257 Figure 8 was produced by using a predicted probabilities plot of the probability of a coup attempt in t-
1. High income was denoted as being higher than 8.2. High risk was denoted as having more than the 
median coup risk, which was 0.048.  
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income country-years accounting for 71% of all Institutional MCEs. High coup risk 
accounts for 28% of all Institutional MCEs cases. This shows that there is evidence for 
the theory of the establishment of Institutional MCEs being both the interaction between 
coup risk and income.  
Table 5: Breakdown of Coup Risk and Institutional MCE country-years258   
 Initial Coup Risk  
 Low  High   
 Introduce MCEs  Introduce MCEs  
  No Yes Total No  Yes Total 
Coup 58 12 70 167 12 179 
  3.0% 2.1%   6.0% 5.4%   
No Coup 1897 557 2454 2602 212 2814 
  97.0% 97.9%   94.0% 94.6%   
Total 1955 569 2524 2769 224 2993 
All percentages are column percentages 
 
Table 5 shows evidence that Institutional MCEs have some relationship with initial Coup 
Risk259, but that the relationship is actually reverse of the expected relationship. There are 
more than double the Institutional MCEs in lower coup risk country-years than in higher 
coup risk country-years, suggesting that there is a negative relationship between coup risk 
and Institutional MCEs if one looks just at the median of coup risk alone. Even in this 
broad tabulation, one can still see the effects of Institutional MCEs, as there is a lower 
percentage of country-years experiencing coup attempts between those groups with 
MCEs and those without, regardless of initial coup risk.  
 
                                                 
258 Table 5 uses the same breakdowns of high vs. low coup risk as Figure 8.  
259 Coup Risk at t - 1 
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While the above shows that there is more to the endogenous theory than simple coup risk 
and Institutional MCEs, due to the highly correlated nature of coup risk and Institutional 
MCEs, the theory is still inherently endogenous. If coup risk and Institutional MCEs are 
endogenous, as the theory states, then there is a relationship between Coup Risk t-1 and 
Institutional MCEs and Coup Risk t. If this is the case, then the estimators on Institutional 
MCEs will be biased. This resembles in many ways the omitted variable bias version of 
endogeneity where the true equation is given as:  
(1)          P (Y1) = B1 + B2(X1) + B3(X2) + e  
And the model tested above is:  
(2)          P (Y1) = B1 + B2(X1) + e  
Where X1 is Institutional MCEs, and X2 is Coup Risk. In the second equation, X2 would 
not be included, thus creating omitted variable bias.260 In omitted variable bias, the 
relationship between X1 and X2 can be either positive or negative. Likewise, B3 can be 
either positive or negative. Depending on which quadrant of those four possibilities the 
bias lies, then the equation can have either positive or negative bias. If the relationship 
between X1 and X2 is negative and the coefficient on X2 is positive then the bias of B2 
will be negative.261 What this means in practice is that the coefficient on Institutional 
MCE in equation 2 is actually biased against finding a result showing Institutional MCEs 
is correlated with Coup Risk. The fact that there is still a statistical and substantive 
relationship between Institutional MCEs and Coup Risk despite endogeneity suggests that 
                                                 
260 Wooldridge, Jeffrey, Introductory Econometrics: A modern approach, South-Western Publishing 
Company, Thompson Learning Company, 2000, pg. 89  
261 Ibid pg. 90  
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the actual relationship between Coup Risk and Institutional MCEs is actually stronger 
than what is found in the tables above.  
 
Even further, since each model actually has included Coup Attempt - Lagged, one 
particular measure for the coup risk for the previous year is already included. The fact 
that Institutional MCEs is still significant even with the Coup Attempt – Lagged variable 
suggests that Institutional MCEs is both substantively and statistically significant.  
 
Conclusion  
As the preceding analysis shows, there is evidence that institutional MCEs do have an 
effect of lowering the risks of a coup attempt. There is evidence that such MCEs could 
have a coup-proofing quality that satisfies the needs of armed forces and disparate 
elements of the armed forces that may otherwise have been unhappy with the status quo. 
By providing officers with both the immediate benefits of salary subsidization and longer 
term benefits of a secure retirement, Institutional MCEs can help stabilize some aspects 
of political life in the armed forces.   
 
While the above may suggest that Institutional MCEs are a positive arrangement for 
civil-military relations, it should also be noted that simply having larger expenditures per 
soldier also has roughly the same effect. The presence of MCEs may lower coup risk but 
there may be other costs associated with such institutional arrangements such as longer 
authoritarian regimes or corruption. A well-paid officer with some financial security is 
one of the best security assets that a state can have, while a poorly-paid officer with an 
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uncertain financial future can be a large political liability. Further research should delve 




Table 1: Coup Attempts by Region, 1950-2010 (Displaying coups included in model vs. full dataset) 
Region and Coup Attempts 
Region In the analytical models 
Full Powell and Thyne 
dataset 
Africa 94 169 
Asia 28 59 
Europe 8 12 
Middle East 44 72 
South & North America 76 145 
Total 252 457 
 
As Table 1 shows, due to several gaps in many of the control variables the model will be 
run on slightly more than half of the full Powell and Thyne dataset on coup attempts. 
This should not prove to be a large complication as the number of coups in the full 
dataset versus the number in the sample is roughly halved in each region, with a slight 
overrepresentation in Africa when compared to the original dataset. There should not be 
an issue with overrepresentation within the sample for any one region that is not also 
reflected in the original dataset. This variable is a high bar for military discontent, but 
there are few others that can be considered reliable barometers for such a measure. 
Within the dataset for this project there are 252 country-years in which coups occurred. 
Of all coup attempts, the majority occurred in Africa and the Americas, with the most 
attempted coups occurring in Africa, and the least in Europe. Unfortunately, the control 
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variables exclude multiple country-years from analysis, so the analysis could only be run 
on the 252 country-years with coup attempts.  
Table 3a: Full Probit Models of Coup Attempt, Institutional MCEs with Random 
Effects (1960-2010) using Alternative Measures of Regime Types262  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model 1 - 
Primary 
Model 




Model 3 - Non-
democracy 
Sample 
Model 4 - 
Anocracies 
Sample 
Model 5 - Non-
Anocracies 
Sample 
      
Coup Attempts, 
Lagged 
0.304*** 0.204 0.303** 0.254 0.257* 
 (0.116) (0.177) (0.132) (0.209) (0.151) 
Institutional MCE -0.262** 0.114 -0.398** 0.128 -0.336** 
 (0.130) (0.163) (0.159) (0.240) (0.150) 
Number of Soldier, 
Logged 
-0.0270 -0.0109 -0.0452 -0.0355 -0.0179 
 (0.0297) (0.0418) (0.0360) (0.0595) (0.0335) 
GDP per capita, 
Logged 
-0.119** -0.107 -0.0599 -0.00120 -0.173*** 
 (0.0501) (0.0699) (0.0603) (0.0990) (0.0574) 
Change in GDP per 
capita 
-0.836** -1.546** -0.659* -1.801** -0.179 




0.0207 0.0533 0.0485 0.140 -0.0312 
 (0.0680) (0.101) (0.0845) (0.148) (0.0799) 
Years Since Coup  -0.0218*** -0.0349*** -0.0207*** -0.0329*** -0.0240*** 




1.69e-05 6.09e-05** 2.17e-05 3.16e-05 4.50e-05** 
 (1.46e-05) (2.54e-05) (2.13e-05) (3.68e-05) (2.03e-05) 
Banks Instability 
Index, Lagged 
0.0344*** 0.0208 0.0294** 0.0228 0.0273* 
 (0.0121) (0.0189) (0.0146) (0.0246) (0.0152) 
Military Regime, 
Banks 
0.258** 0.514** 0.272** 0.468* 0.231 
 (0.124) (0.252) (0.132) (0.266) (0.148) 
Expenditure per 
soldier, Logged 
-0.178*** -0.396*** -0.133** -0.516*** -0.0129 
 (0.0499) (0.0822) (0.0575) (0.106) (0.0576) 
Constant -0.142 0.0590 -0.457 -0.376 -0.0154 
 (0.395) (0.553) (0.457) (0.722) (0.429) 
      
Observations 5,517 3,198 3,203 1,078 4,245 
Number of ccode 154 135 119 94 146 
                                                 
262 Alternative measures are as follows: Non-Autocracies are all  those with a polity score above -6. Non-
democracies are all  those with a polity score below 6. Anocracies are those between -6 and 6. Non- 
Anocracies are those less than -6 and greater than 6.  
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      Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 3b: Full Probit Models of Coup Attempt, Institutional MCEs with Fixed Effects (1960-2010)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model 1 - 
Primary model - 
Country and 
Year 
Model 2 - 
Democracies - 
Country 
Model 3 - 
Democracies - 
Country and year 
Model 4 - 
Autocracies - 
Country 
Model 5 - 
Autocracies - 
Country and Year 
      
Coup Attempts, 
Lagged 
0.365*** -0.241 -1.843 0.675*** 0.675*** 
 (0.132) (0.450) (1.262) (0.221) (0.221) 
Institutional MCE -0.776*** -1.222*** -3.453** -2.061*** -2.061*** 
 (0.209) (0.470) (1.463) (0.559) (0.559) 
Number of Soldier, 
Logged 
0.0435 -0.485* 0.264 0.0508 0.0508 
 (0.100) (0.283) (0.798) (0.189) (0.189) 
GDP per capita, 
Logged 
-0.161 -2.532*** -8.109*** -0.474 -0.474 
 (0.142) (0.609) (2.306) (0.296) (0.296) 
Change in GDP per 
capita 
-0.739* 1.554 21.22** -0.0681 -0.0681 




0.0508 -0.578 -2.213** -0.000640 -0.000640 
 (0.0975) (0.411) (1.066) (0.165) (0.165) 
Years Since Coup  0.0256*** 0.0458** 0.252*** 0.0803*** 0.0803*** 




2.02e-05 0.000122** 0.000300** 2.33e-05 2.33e-05 
 (1.76e-05) (5.13e-05) (0.000119) (3.94e-05) (3.94e-05) 
Banks Instability 
Index, Lagged 
0.0304** -0.0171 0.271** 0.0296 0.0296 
 (0.0149) (0.0440) (0.122) (0.0269) (0.0269) 
Military Regime, 
Banks 
0.203   0.414 0.414 
 (0.143)   (0.253) (0.253) 
Expenditure per 
soldier, Logged 
-0.0433 -0.0626 0.432 0.177 0.177 
 (0.0991) (0.245) (0.617) (0.162) (0.162) 
Constant -6.114 25.41 54.33 -1.460 -1.460 
 (123.5) (251.0) (450.2) (3.001) (3.001) 
      
Observations 2,709 515 267 914 914 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 







Scope Conditions: States with difficult Civil-Military Relations  
Table 4: Both Dichotomous & Continuous Models run on states that have 
experienced at least one coup attempt in the 1950-2010 period263 
 (1) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 - Dichotomous 
Model 
Model 2 - Continuous 
Model 
   
Institutional MCE -0.385***  
 (0.124)  
Institutional MCE Run  -0.0202*** 
  (0.00647) 
Number of Soldiers, Logged -0.0283 -0.0374 
 (0.0307) (0.0300) 
GDP Per Capita, Logged 0.00467 0.0146 
 (0.0472) (0.0467) 
Change GDP Per Capita, Logged -0.974*** -1.054*** 
 (0.373) (0.372) 
Effective Number of Armed 
Organizations 
-0.0157 -0.0352 
 (0.0665) (0.0667) 
Years Since Coup Attempt -0.0143*** -0.0107* 
 (0.00549) (0.00561) 
Banks Instability Index, Lagged 2.41e-05* 2.50e-05* 
 (1.42e-05) (1.42e-05) 
Banks, Military Regime, Lagged 0.318*** 0.344*** 
 (0.118) (0.119) 
Military Expenditures, Logged -0.188*** -0.192*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0507) 
Constant -0.839** -0.831** 
 (0.362) (0.359) 
   
Observations 3,075 3,075 
Number of ccode 83 83 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4 runs two models on those countries that have had at least one coup in their 
history.264 Both Institutional MCE and Institutional MCE Run are significant and in the 
expected direction. In terms of substantive effect, both variables have a larger effect. The 
difference in coup risk between those states without Institutional MCEs and those with is 
                                                 
263 The sample is run on 1960-2010, but those states that experienced a coup in the 1950-1959 period 
were included as having had at least one coup. There is not a good reason to exclude those states that 
experienced a coup in the 1950s as having never had a coup in modern history.  
264 All  models were probits run with random effects, clustered on country.  
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0.0449.265 The Institutional MCE Run risk at year 0 is 0.086, at year 5 the risk is 0.072, at 
year 10 the risk is 0.06. Finally, at year 30 the coup risk is 0.028. This is a strong effect, 
even in a sample of high coup risk states.266 267 With the exception of GDP Per Capita, 






















                                                 
265 The risk of a coup attempt in this sample is 0.0883 without an Institutional MCE, whereas the coup risk 
of those with is 0.0434.  
266 All  values come from the margins command using the observe value approach. Figures 8a and 8b in the 
appendix have a visualization of the marginal effects.  
267 The average coup risk in this sample compared to the larger sample is about 30% higher than in the 
other models.  
268 This is true of GDP Per Capita in all  iterations of the sample in which at least one coup attempt 
occurred in a state’s history. Thi s is l ikely due to the sample having a smaller GDP per capita than the full  




Chapter 5: Egyptian Military-Commercial Complex: Leviathan or 
Economic Rearguard?  
Introduction  
This chapter will be an in-depth exploration of the creation of the Egyptian Armed 
Forces’ commercial holdings along with an exploration of the mechanisms of how MCEs 
work to reduce coup risk. The chapter will begin with a short introduction to the 
capabilities and size of the Egyptian Armed Forces, setting up the scale and creating a 
comparison to Egypt’s near peers, as well as laying out the uncertainty surrounding the 
true size of the military’s economic holdings. Then there will be a short discussion of the 
theoretical expectations that one would expect from the model hypothesized in the theory 
chapter. The rest of the chapter will highlight the relationship between coup risk and the 
development of MCEs within the Egyptian context, highlighting how during periods of 
heightened coup risk political leaders were willing to contribute to the development of 
MCEs in order to ensure political stability.  
 
The chapter will be primarily chronological, but focus on how the three most important 
leaders of Egypt since the 1950s, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, tried to maintain political 
stability during their reigns and responded to challenges to their leadership by ensuring 
the armed forces were loyal to them through gifts of MCEs. The chapter will conclude 
with the military’s counter-narrative on the purpose and scope of MCEs, based on 
interviews conducted with experts and an Egyptian admiral.  
 
Introduction to the Egyptian Military  
The Egyptian military is the largest military in the Middle East by both active (470,000) 
and reserve personnel (800,000), and is ranked as the 11th largest in the world in terms of 
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size.269 It has a huge stock of both old and modern military weapons, making it by sheer 
amount of weaponry one of the most powerful armed forces in the region. Its stocks of 
military equipment in 2014 consisted of roughly 4,600 tanks (5th most in the world), 
13,000 AFVs, (3rd most in the world), 2,360 artillery guns (7th most in the world), 1,481 
rocket projection systems (4th most in the world), 1,133 total aircraft (8th most in the 
world) and 319 naval vessels (6th most in the world).270 In 2015 the Egyptian military’s 
budget was $5.4 billion, with an average budget of $3 billion dollars since 1988. The US 
has also provided an additional $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt annually since 1987, 
bringing the average financial capability of the Egyptian military to roughly $4.3 billion 









                                                 
269 CIA World Factbook, Egypt Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_eg.pdf (Accessed May 19th, 2016) 
270 “The Military Balance 2014: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities”, International 
Institute for Security Studies,  London, UK  
271 Sharp, Jeremy, “Egypt: Background and US Relations”, Congressional Research Service, February 25, 
2016  
272 This figure also discounts sources from other donors , such as Saudi Arabia and Gulf Coast States, who, 
since the ouster of Mohammad Morsi has been financially supporting the whole Egyptian state with low 
interest loans and cash infusions to the tune of $12.5 bil l ion. Example available at: 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2015/03/13/Saudi-announces-4-billion-aid-package-
to-Egypt.html   
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Figure 1: Egyptian Military spending by year 1988-2015  
 
Figure 1 shows military spending over time, showing how military spending vacillates 
between $2 and $5 billion over 27 years. On its own, this might not be terribly surprising, 
but for a nation with the 11th largest military force on Earth, and highly ranked in terms 
of military stock, the Egyptian defense budget only puts it at 45th in the world for military 
spending.273 This puts it into the same cohort as Denmark and Argentina, who in 2014 
spent $4.4 billion and $4.3 billion respectively. Denmark’s active personnel of 25,000 
men rank 88th in the world, while Argentina’s 75,000 personnel rank 57th in the world.274  
 
Some of this variation might be understandable from the point of view that Western or 
Latin American could be more technologically dependent and rely more upon more 
expensive weapon systems than sheer manpower, and the lack of existential external 
threats each faces. But then there are nations such as Oman that spent $6.7 billion in 
                                                 
273 Ibid, “The Military Balance: 2014” Egypt 
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2014, with an armed forces numbering 72,000 active personnel. By way of comparison, 
Brazil, with a modern and well-equipped army of 300,000 personnel, spent roughly $31 
billion in 2015.275 This suggests one of the following: that Egypt has found an incredible 
discount to military costs that no other nation has utilized, that Egyptian military is in 
imminent danger of financial collapse, or that the Egyptian military has substantial 
financial support that is off the books and not available for public viewing.  
 
That the Egyptian military has commercial and defense production interests is not in 
question here.276 There is ample evidence that the Egyptian armed forces have for 
decades been involved in commercial enterprises, and have a substantial economic 
footprint in its country.277 What should be apparent from the above though, is that in 
order to maintain its high level of military personnel and equipment stocks, the Egyptian 
armed forces’ economic footprint must be quite large to support such an organization. 
Egypt’s nearest peer competitor in terms of size and technological sophistication is Saudi 
Arabia, which spent $81 billion in 2014, leaving a difference of $76 billion between the 
two. Yet Saudi Arabia is not considered to be militarily as strong as Egypt, and has less 
than half of its armament stocks in almost all categories.278 While sheer equipment does 
not a strong military make, the above picture should give a sense of scale as to just how 
                                                 
275 This comparison is apt for several reasons: Egypt and Brazil  have roughly the same size of total 
personnel. But more importantly, both Brazil  and Egypt have conscript armies. Even within the same 
recruitment category, Egypt substantially underspends another power that holds roughly the same status 
in its own region.  
276 Shana Marshall, “The Egyptian Armed Forces and the Remaking of an Economic Empire”, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, April  2015 
277 Dr. Zenaib, Abul-Magd, “The Egyptian Military in Politics and the Economy: Recent History and Current 
Transition Status”, CMI Insights, October 2013, No.2  
278 Ibid, “The Military Balance: 2014”, Saudi Arabia  
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large the holdings of the Egyptian military might be in order to support such a military 
apparatus. At least on paper, Egypt is highly competitive with a country like Saudi Arabia 
yet with public spending on the military that is less than 14 times less.  
 
The size of the military holdings are unclear and have been for many years. Estimates 
range from between 1% to 60% of the Egyptian economy is either owned or managed by 
the armed forces, meaning almost no aggregate estimates are truly reliable.279 In speaking 
to Reuters, the then Presidential candidate and now current Egyptian President, Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi, insisted that oft-cited estimates of 40% were way off base, and that instead 
the Egyptian military only held enterprises consisting of no more than 2% of Egyptian 
economy.280 Still further estimates are that the military’s economic enterprises’ revenue is 
equal to roughly 1% of Egypt’s GDP, but again, most estimates are highly unreliable.  
 
By official military estimates, the commercial holdings in the past decade have earned 
roughly $750 million total revenue, while unofficial estimates of just one of the three 
major enterprise groups was $5 billion over the same time period.281 While it is highly 
unlikely that the military holds $185 billion (or 60% of the Egyptian economy’s GDP in 
2014) in enterprises, it is also unlikely that the lower end of the estimate are also true ($6 
                                                 
279The figures range quite dramatically based upon who is answering the question, but this article quote 
both sides of the range. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egyptian-
military-expands-its-economic-control/2014/03/16/39508b52-a554-11e3-b865-
38b254d92063_story.html  (Accessed May 19th, 2016)  
280 Reuters Interview Transcript, May 15 2014, Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-sisi-
transcript-idUSBREA4E08120140515 (Accessed May 19 2016)   
281 Zenaib Abul-Magd, “The General’s Secret: Egypt’s Ambivalent Market”, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, February 9th, 2012 Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=47137 
(Accessed May 30th, 2016)  
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billion at 2%) if the Egyptian military is as powerful as the earlier numbers in military 
stock make it out to be. Neither the 1% or 2% figure are enough to make up for the 
differences in military spending between Egypt’s near-peer competitors, Brazil and Saudi 
Arabia, if these are indeed appropriate comparisons.282  
 
Regardless of the true size of the economic holdings of the Egyptian armed forces, this 
chapter will examine the Egyptian military’s involvement in domestic production, with a 
focus on the origins and the effects of the military’s involvement in non-defense related 
products and industries over time.  
 
Theoretical Expectations from the Model  
This section will lay out the expectations from the model in the theory chapter as it 
applies to the Egyptian case. Recalling the previous theory chapter, there are two major 
factors that are important for the creation of MCEs: coup risk and resource endowments. 
Leaders facing a high coup risk will be hard-pressed to limit their exposure to a coup risk 
by the armed forces by spending their resources on them. Leaders without much in the 
way of resource endowments are in a theoretical trap: they can lavish goods upon the 
armed forces but could lose political power other ways. Given that removal by the armed 
forces is particularly terrible for leaders, they must find additional ways to reduce coup 
risk. It is expected that those nations with relatively little in the way of resource 
endowments will have a higher likelihood of adopting MCEs as a coup-proofing 
                                                 
282 Assuming that Egypt and Saudi Arabia are comparable, to make up the 2016 gap between Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt, the Egyptian military would have to own roughly $79.35 bil l ion or 29.1% of the Egyptian 
economy. There is a significant fudge factor here though, as Saudi defense spending has increased 
substantially in the wake of insurgencies in Yemen and Syria, and in l ight of Iranian-Saudi geo-political 
competition, and Saudi Arabia is one of the richest nations on earth, so it might not be a fair comparison.  
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mechanism, given that they are unable to offer immediate benefits to the officer corps. 
Offering military control of businesses in the form of MCEs is a politically cheap way for 
political leaders to assuage military needs.  
 
The expected behavior from Egyptian political leaders is to offer benefits to the officer 
corps as much as possible without breaking the limited funds available in state coffers. 
As a supplement to the Egyptian treasury, Egypt’s political leaders are expected to hand 
over businesses or properties to the Armed Forces with the expectation that the Armed 
Forces will be willing to support them politically. It is expected that during times of 
political instability and heightened coup risk political leaders will either offer whole 
businesses, turn over management of others, offer funding for starting up MCEs or make 
financial exemptions for MCEs. During times when there is little coup risk, Egyptian 
political leaders are not expected to meaningfully contribute to the expansion of MCEs.  
 
Egypt had historically been a poor nation even after independence, with a GDP per capita 
of roughly $165 in 1965. Even within its regional cohort, Egypt is on the lower end of 
GDP per capita, with less than half of its neighbor Jordan’s $536 GDP per capita in the 
same year of 1965.283 Only the Gaza Strip, Morocco, Djibouti and Yemen have 
consistently been ranked below Egypt in terms of GDP per capita since 1965. Even 
today, Egypt remains poorer than many other states in the region when it comes to GDP 
per capita. In addition, Egypt is a relatively resource poor nation with its greatest 
economic assets coming from its agricultural exports and the rents from ships transiting 
                                                 
283 World Bank Indicators , DataBank, Accessed (August 8th, 2016) 
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the Suez Canal. For all these reasons Egypt can be considered to be on the on the lower 
end of the spectrum when it comes to resource endowments, with leaders not having 
many resources available to them as the chief executives.  
 
As a relatively resource poor nation, Egyptian leaders are in the unenviable position of 
having multiple threats and not many resources to deal with them. Four broad groups 
pose threats to the leaders of Egypt: 1) removal via the armed forces in a coup attempt, 2) 
removal via assassination by radical Islamists, 3) popular uprisings by the people or 
lower-level security forces, and 4) removal by their large external threats from Israel in 
particular, but also at a certain point France and the UK.284 Egyptian leaders have had to 
balance between these four broad groups throughout their political tenures, allocating 
resources as threats arise. It is only when the threat of a coup attempt is high, or when 
political leaders need the support of the armed forces for a political change that we will 
see the establishment of MCEs.  
 
The following sections will be divided up by the leaders of Egypt, and show how they 
handled the threats to their rule. Nasser’s reign is characterized by his struggle to 
consolidate power both within the armed forces and outside of it. Nasser faced stiff 
political resistance by a fellow officer, Naguib, and in order to consolidate his power used 
establishing MCEs as a way to bring other Egyptian military officers to his side. Sadat 
faced similar issues in that he did not have many close political allies during his first 
                                                 
284 Removal by intra-party rivals mostly comes from the Armed Forces, and removal via election results or 
rival political parties, while nominally a possibil ity, has not been a real threat to any Egyptian leader given 
the tight control on political contestation by regime elites.  
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years as President, and faced heightened threats from Israel until his final years when he 
was assassinated by radical Islamists. Sadat deftly outmaneuvered his political opponents 
by providing the armed forces with support to establish additional MCEs, thus bringing 
on board key officers as his political supporters even under great stress. Mubarak’s reign 
is marked by relatively pacific civil-military relations as they faced a common threat 
from Islamists and an uprising from the national police. Mubarak supported the 
expansion of MCEs as a way to bring the armed forces on board with the eventual 
succession of his son, Gamal, by selling the armed forces state-owned enterprises at 
below market prices before he eventually stepped down in the wake of unrest during the 
Arab Spring. Morsi, in a stark departure from his earlier predecessors, attempted to 
establish a political coalition outside the military and even took steps to curtail military 
control of key enterprises like the Suez Canal. After Morsi was removed by the armed 
forces, Sisi has sought to consolidate his control by expanding the role of the military in 
Egyptian society, enshrining the military’s role in the Constitution as well as 
reestablishing it as the primary managers of the Suez Canal.  
 
Thus there should be two major trends that are clear throughout the case study: politica l 
leaders using the establishment or expansion of MCEs as a way to lower coup risk when 
military discontent is high, and political leaders establishing MCEs as a way to bring the 
military on as political allies during times of political instability and as allies in political 
consolidation. Both strategies have been undertaken by leaders as the level of threat by 




Early History and Nasser’s Egypt  
The Egyptian military was not at its outset a commercial actor, nor was it always 
politically powerful. Until the 1950s Egypt had no native modern arms industries, and 
was considered only a minor power for many years until its subjugation by the British in 
1882. A period of Egyptian resurgence during the early decades of the 1800s led to a 
foray into arms production that ended with the 1840s. A short-lived attempt at 
industrialization by the Pasha of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, had resulted in a small but 
robust arms industry that was eventually dismantled under pressure from the Western 
powers as the Egyptian government struggled to pay off war debts incurred by its 
leader.285 From 1882, with the British occupation of Egypt, until the end of World War II 
the Egyptian military was effectively politically sidelined, with British officers acting as 
leaders of a small constabulary force numbering between 6,000 and 16,000 over the 
ensuing five decades.286 The strict control of the British over the affairs of the Egyptian 
state created an underlying resentment of both the foreigners and of the political regime 
that was seen as subservient to the interests of non-Egyptians. This was especially true of 
newer entrants into the Egyptian military, which began allowing recruits from the middle 
and lower classes into the officer corps in 1937.287 The Egyptians regained nominal 
control of their armed forces with the 1936 Anglo-Egypt Treaty, allowing the armed 
forces to grow to a force of over 20,000 by 1937.288  
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It was not until the British ended their occupation of the state that the force was truly 
independent, and got its first real test in battle with the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. The 
poor performance of the Arab armies against Israel galvanized resentment against the 
ruling political class of Egypt, especially among the younger officers who saw their poor 
performance as indicative of how poorly they were supported in the war.  At the time, the 
Egyptian military’s leadership was composed of mostly wealthy Egyptians from good 
families who owed their positions in Egyptian society more to their relationship with 
King Farouk’s dynasty than their own skill at managing fighting men.289 The resentment 
and shock the younger officers felt at their military defeat at the hands of Israel 
contributed to the growth of a variety of revolutionary agendas and revolutionary groups 
forming within the officer corps, with their ire primarily aimed at their superiors and 
political leaders. The sentiment can best be summed up with the following statement 
about the political climate and the junior officers’ feelings about their superiors from a 
young officer with the “Free Officers” movement, Gamal Abdel Nasser himself:   
They  were overfed, lazy and selfish, and they spent their time eating, drinking, carousing, 
smoking hashish and engaging in m any different form s of tyranny and corruption. They were 
fawning and subservient to the British Military Mission and a disgrace to the uniform they 
wore. They spent money that belonged to the Egyptian army on food and drink for 
themselves.290 
 
The anger and desire for a change in leadership culminated with a coup in 1952 by the 
Free Officer’s movement. King Farouk had primarily relied upon the support of the older 
generals from elite families for support, and had taken very little action to suppress or co-
opt the younger officers into supporting his reign. Subsequently, the narrative that the 
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King and the political elites had neglected the armed forces and the younger officers had 
no counter and continued to turn the younger officers against the reigning political 
powerholders. The king was deposed in July of that year by a cabal of military officers 
led by Nasser and the first President of Egypt Muhammad Naguib, and Nasser spent the 
next five years consolidating the Free Officer’s rule under the Revolutionary Command 
Council.291  
 
During his reign Nasser was faced with a variety of both external and internal threats. A 
joint French-British-Israeli occupation of the Suez Canal in 1956 led to a military defeat 
but a partial political victory, leading to the withdrawal of foreign troops shortly 
thereafter due to heavy international pressure. Once the Western powers had departed, 
Israel became Egypt’s single greatest strategic rival, with clashes between the Egyptian 
military and Israel in the Gaza Strip in 1955, and a humiliating defeat for Egypt in the 
1967 Six-Day War. Starting a trend of antagonism that would continue into the present 
day, Nasser also faced internal threats to his rule from the well-organized Islamists in the 
Muslim Brotherhood, who were blamed for an attempted assassination of Nasser in 1954. 
Nasser was able to prevail against them with the jailing of thousands of alleged Islamists, 
effectively ending their threat to his regime.292  
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During the time of Nasser, the military was both the source of Nasser’s power and one of 
his greatest rivals. His focus on keeping control of the armed forces was developed not 
out of paranoia but out of well-founded fear that if the armed forces were not loyal to 
him, another coup may be in the making. One of the key grievances from the officers 
during his reign was that the civilian regime of King Farouk had completely neglected the 
readiness of its military, which had led to Egypt’s disastrous defeat in the 1948 Arab-
Israeli war. One of the demands of officers was the removal of corrupt leadership, but 
also that military needs actually take a much higher priority in government affairs. After 
all, it would not be the senior leadership that would be sent into battle with inadequate 
weaponry and equipment, it would be the junior officers paying with their lives for the 
lackadaisical attitude of their superiors. As such, one of the first initiatives of the new 
Nasser regime was to begin arms production to properly equip the troops in their fight 
against strategic rival Israel.  
 
In the years following the 1952 coup, the Egyptian military was quite fractured. There 
were many ideologies competing among the officer corps, as well as many senior officers 
from the previous regime that had to be purged. The Egyptian military inherited by 
Nasser and his successors was not monolithic. Rather there were major and deep 
cleavages between and among different factions of the officer corps. Former regime 
loyalists, younger revolutionary officers, communist sympathizers, senior officers that 
had been used as political legitimacy, Islamsists: this divided military is what Nasser had 
to somehow placate and secure the loyalty of, else the very same tactic could be used 
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against him. In addition, there were major disagreements between key officers even in the 
Revolutionary Command Council about the proper management of the country.  
 
Nasser’s survival can be attributed to him leveraging the armed forces’ newfound 
economic holdings and parlaying them into the loyalty of the officers. Nasser put officers 
in charge of state-owned enterprises, increased the military’s budget and turned over 
large tracts of land into military hands. The amiable Amer, one of Nasser’s closest 
associates and head of the army, was a pivotal actor in transforming the Egyptian military 
as well as utilizing economic resources for patronage purposes.  
 
Nasser faced significant challenges from the military itself, as evidenced by his purging 
of the top echelons of the senior officer corps upon his rise to power.293 Nasser officially 
left the military to run for the presidency in 1956, but constantly worried about the threat 
that elements within the armed forces posed to his reign.294 The political drama that 
played out in the early years showed the challenges that the Nasser faced as political 
leader. Early on during the Free Officer’s regime, the coup orchestrators had put a 
respected senior officer in charge as their figurehead, a General Mohammad Naguib, with 
the hope of giving their coup greater legitimacy. Deep divides began to grow between 
Nasser and Naguib, and while Naguib’s was eventually ousted and forced retirement, 
Nasser had to recruit other officers as political allies in his struggle for dominance. The 
rivalry became so intense at one point that Nasser tried to order troops loyal to himself to 
move against those loyal to Naguib in an attempt to disarm his opponent. Only the refusal 
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by the commander of the army at the time, Abdel Hakim Amer, prevented the power 
struggle from devolving into bloodshed. Amer, as commander of the Army, had no wish 
to see the Egyptian armed forces divided and killing one another, especially with Israel as 
a constant threat. From then on Nasser worked to bring Amer, who was a long-serving 
and very popular figure among the officer corps, on board as a political supporter. Nasser 
turned over to the officer corps, through Amer, state-owned enterprises, seized properties 
and other businesses that Nasser had been able to acquire through the army’s seizure of 
power in 1952.  
 
Through this political relationship, Nasser was able to use Amer to parlay the benefits 
and privileges that the armed forces were now accruing through its expansion into 
economic holdings into what some have termed a military “state within a state”, giving 
the military substantial autonomy within Egyptian society, and from Nasser’s 
government.295 Amer was able to guarantee the loyalty of the officer corps to Nasser, but 
in so doing also made himself very politically powerful as the voice of the officer 
corps.296 Despite Amer’s political clout, his lack of management acumen and battlefield 
leadership contributed to the disastrous performance of the Egyptian army in the Six-Day 
War. He was removed from his office quickly after hostilities ceased, but by then Nasser 
was firmly in control of the Egyptian state and faced a much reduced threat of removal by 
the army.297  
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As stated above, the Egyptian military was not at the outset a commercial actor. The early 
attempts in the 1800s to create a robust arms industry failed due to domestic and 
international pressure. After independence, domestic arms industries returned at the 
government’s initiative in the 1950s with the establishment of several low-technology 
firms, with substantial help from European experts.298 Many of these industries were 
founded to circumvent the myriad difficulties in acquiring foreign weapons for Egypt’s 
fight against Israel, the major suppliers of which were supporters of Israel. It was not 
until the 1952 coup under Nasser and his Free Officers that the Egyptian military first 
began to be a major player in the economic life in Egyptian society.299  
 
There were several concurrent streams within Egypt at the time of the 1952 coup and 
after which led to the development of the “military political economy” in Egypt today. 
The first was Nasser’s devotion to the creation of Arab Socialism in which his military 
government created or nationalized large state-owned enterprises, appointing military 
officers to manage them.300 These enterprises were still nominally state-owned, not 
officially owned by the military, even though the Egyptian government was itself 
military-run for a time. These enterprises were run by officers, and were developed under 
the vision of creating an Egypt that was economically and militarily independent. 
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Towards that end, nationalizations of a great number of industries producing critical 
industrial products and foodstuffs were seized by the military government and put under 
the management of the Egyptian military.  
 
The second stream that led to the development of an armed forces with commercial 
capacity was the fleeing of the previous Egyptian capitalist class, known as the 
mutamassirum, during the period between the coup and up through the 1960s.301 These 
capitalists had been the previous dominant class in Egyptian society, and their power was 
broken up by the new Nasser government, who proceeded to nationalize key industries in 
which the mutamassirum were heavily invested. The mutamassirum had been the owners 
of the largest industries in Egypt, and owners of some of the most lucrative real estate in 
the nation, including much of what would later become large resort towns along the 
Mediterranean and Red Seas.  
 
At the time of the coup, ownership of land in Egypt was highly concentrated in the hands 
of a few, with less than 0.1% of all landowners owning one-fifth of all the land in Egypt, 
with another 0.4% owning approximately one-third of all land in Egypt.302 The military 
regime enacted policies to redistribute the land in a more equitable fashion, but in reality 
mostly led to their seizure by the military government. These policies were in-step with 
Nasser’s new vision for Arab socialism, which saw these capitalists, who were a mix of 
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very wealthy Egyptian and non-Egyptians that owned the majority of all capital in the 
state, as a threat to the regime’s political survival. As industries began to be nationalized, 
many of the mutamassirum decided to flee instead of waiting for their own assets to be 
seized. Thus many industries lost out both on capital and management expertise as their 
owners fled, which the government was only too eager to scoop up as part of its 
nationalization program.  
 
The mutamassirum’s loss was Nasser’s gain, who utilized these newfound resources as 
bargaining chips to consolidate his rule. The network of state-run enterprises under 
military management was integrated into a larger Egyptian military patronage network. 
Officers, enlisted personnel and their families were the direct beneficiaries of the 
military’s state-ownership: benefits took the form of jobs for family members, well-paid 
jobs in industry after retirement from military life or larger paychecks that buttressed 
middling military salaries.303304 While it is difficult to say whether every state-owned, 
military-run enterprise was integrated into the patronage network to the same degree, 
nationalizations most certainly added to the Nasser regime’s stability and power- both 
over possible opponents outside the regime such as the mutamassirum, or possible 
opponents within the officer corps. Nasser was able to outmaneuver his rivals in part 
because he was able to empower Amer with the resources of the mutamurassim and use 
Amer as a channel through which to distribute benefits to the officer corps. Without 
access to these same resources, Nasser’s rivals were unable to command the loyalty of a 
critical number of troops. 
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It should be noted that within this patronage network, while wonderful for individual 
military officers and their material well-being, did not create many opportunities for 
economic growth during this period in Egypt. Corruption was wide-spread within these 
industries, as they were primarily vehicles for patronage within the military regime. The 
above mentioned General Amer was famous for spreading far and wide within the officer 
corps the economic possessions of the military establishment to enhance the loyalty of 
the officers. In addition to corruption, the public sector was wildly inefficient and poorly-
run during these years, as they were being run by officers with no experience in 
managing large companies, but who could rely upon state support in the event of 
shortfalls or mismanagement.305 By keeping Amer happy, and with Amer distributing 
positions to the officer corps at state-owned enterprises and businesses, Nasser was able 
to retain his position of leadership even through his transition from military to civilian 
clothes. 
 
Nasser concentrated control of the resources from the army’s seizure of power into his 
own control and deftly used them to shore up support for his reign. By providing Amer, 
an influential general and popular with the officer corps, with additional resources, 
Nasser was able to outmaneuver his opponents against whom he always feared removal 
via coup. It was during this heightened time of coup risk and political consolidation when 
the armed forces would definitely be the political king maker that Nasser chose to lavish 
them with properties and businesses, just as the model would expect. Once his primary 
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rival, Naguib, was removed from power the possibility of a power struggle faded and 
Nasser found himself able to also take the opportunity of the disastrous defeat at the 
hands of Israel to remove Amer himself, who had become a political rival in his own 
right. Nasser used the establishment of MCEs to shore up political support and undermine 
rivals until his death.  
 
Sadat, Israel, the quest for security and MCE expansion  
The role of Israel in Egyptian foreign and defense policy during this time cannot be 
understated. Israel, Egypt’s primary foreign security threat, provided the military with 
both a reason and an excuse to continue its control over the public sector. On the one 
hand, Nasser was able to parlay the Israeli security threat into public support for the 
regime, playing on anti-Israel sentiment in order to solidify his regime’s control. This 
justified larger military budgets with the central government, budgets that were used 
primarily for buying arms and equipment for the military and its eventual wars with 
Israel. The role of the public sector enterprises was to supplement the finances of its 
individual soldiers and officers in order to not overly tax the central government. Since 
these public enterprises were military-run, there was little in the way of transparency to 
monitor how funds were spent.  
 
On the other hand, the threat Israel posed to Egypt allowed Nasser to justify military 
control of the public sector, allowing his government to continue his reforms and 
nationalizations. Since the military regime had for the past two decades largely oriented 
its foreign policy towards defeating Israel militarily, it was able to justify its intense 
involvement in non-military affairs by pointing out that in order for Egypt to succeed, it 
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would need to be under a command economy, totally focused on eliminating Israel and 
ensuring Egyptian security.  
 
From 1955 onwards, Egyptian leaders looked for security in a variety of sources. In a 
major speech on the 3rd anniversary of the 1952 coup, the head of the army laid out the 
groundwork for the next generation of the Egyptian military: the armed forces would 
continue to develop a new corps of scientists and engineers, create their own indigenous 
arms production, and focus on building fire-power heavy mobile and mechanized 
divisions to meet their external security threats.306  The first domestic arms industries in 
Egypt began in the 1950s, but these joint-ventures between European firms and the 
Egyptian military were low-tech and fraught with the complex regulations that 
accompanied such transnational business ventures. Egyptian equipment was woefully 
inadequate against an Israel that was rapidly developing much more sophisticated 
weaponry, and had its own robust and technically superior defense industry.  
 
Egypt was not a very rich country at the time, and thus could not make the large-scale 
capital investments necessary to fulfill its visions of arms independence. In order to make 
up the gap, Nasser pursued good relations with the Soviet Union. From 1955 to 1975, the 
USSR provided Egypt with grants and loans to pay for equipment, training and services 
of Soviet military advisers.307 The Soviet aid was massive, and at a certain point there 
                                                 
306 Hasim, Part One, Ibid, pg. 6  




were upwards of 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Egypt, some even serving at the 
battalion level in the Egyptian military.  
 
When Anwar Sadat came to power after Nasser’s death, similar worries plagued his 
regime as plagued Nasser’s early years. Egypt was in a tenuous position – despite the 
armed forces’ relatively good performance in the 1973 war against Israel, the Egyptian 
armed forces continued to decline rapidly relative to Israel. Several high ranking officers 
posed political challenges to Sadat and the domestic economic situation continued to 
deteriorate leading to widespread unrest at several points during Sadat’s rule. The 
underpaid and conscripted internal security and police forces proved unreliable in putting 
down the unrest, many even joining the rioters.308 During one particularly bad spate of 
rioting, Sadat had to call upon the armed forces to put down the unrest. So tenuous was 
his perceived hold on power that when senior officers approached him to report that the 
situation was under control, Sadat initially thought they were seizing control of the state 
and placing him under arrest!309 In this climate of increasing strategic disadvantage and 
domestic instability, Sadat pushed for a peace accord with Israel that would reorient 
Egyptian security priorities, and eventually lead to his assassination by an extremist 
Islamist officer cell within the armed forces.  
 
Sadat was not initially considered a strong candidate for the Presidency, and was not 
expected to last long in his position by both regime insiders and outsiders. Sadat had no 
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power base, and despite his long history with both the Egyptian military and the Nasser 
regime he was considered a character easily manipulated. Nasser made several very 
astute political moves which endeared him to the military. The first was the cutting off 
Soviet support to Egypt. Despite the much needed financial and material support, the 
heavy Soviet presence was seen as both overbearing and ineffective. There were also 
tensions between the Egyptians and the Soviet trainers, who treated with more than a 
little contempt their Egyptian counterparts. Relations soured between Egypt and the 
USSR, leading to the expulsion of Soviet advisers in 1972, and leaving Egypt to resort to 
the international market for arms, and leading to a very quick degradation of Egyptian 
military capabilities.310 Eliminating this fraught relationship came at the expense of 
security, but dramatically improved Sadat’s position politically.  
 
The second astute move that Sadat made was establishing the Arab Organization for 
Industrialization. After the breaking of relations with the USSR, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar and the UAE came together to form the Arab Organization for Industrialization 
(AOI) in 1975. The organization was primarily created to create an indigenous Arab arms 
production that could serve the needs of Arab countries. This arrangement was 
particularly good for the Egyptians, on whose soil most of the facilities were created. 
This arrangement also helped jumpstart a much more technically- focused arms industry, 
one that could produce complex weaponry such as tracked vehicles, tanks and missiles.311 
The capital investment from the Gulf Coast states helped reinvigorate the Egyptian arms 
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industry, and provided confidence to international donors that Egypt could be a viable 
partner for defense production. However, this indigenous arms production was still not a 
peer competitor with the Israeli defense industry, and Egypt still fell further behind as it 
tried established its own more complex and capital-intensive arms industries. While the 
Egyptian army that had fought Israel competently in the 1973 Yom Kippur War had had 
ample Soviet supplies, the Egyptian army in the mid-1970s found itself increasingly at a 
disadvantage. The next war, if there was to be one, would entail massive Israeli air 
superiority against an Egyptian air force and air defenses that had not yet returned to full 
strength.  
 
Despite leaving Egypt worse off security-wise, Nasser’s moves helped secure his political 
position within the armed forces. The AOI allowed him to collect capital investment from 
the Gulf Coast states and turn it into much needed arms development. It also allowed him 
to show the armed forces that his administration was focused on military needs, putting 
military officers in charge of the enterprises and thus helping to placate junior and senior 
officers. By creating the AOI, Sadat was able to attract capital that would be poured into 
Egyptian modernization, even if it did very little initially to provide high quality goods in 
defense against Israel. By creating the AOI and turning over its operations to military 
officers, Nasser was able to silence his military critics.  
 
It was into this deteriorating security situation that Sadat made his third, and probably 
most astute move by pursuing peace with Israel, ending their long rivalry in the form of 
the Camp David Accords. With a permanent peace treaty now having removed a pillar of 
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Egyptian foreign policy, the large Egyptian military was now without its main reason for 
existence. While both Israel and Egypt both still posed threats to one another, the 
immediacy of the threat was greatly diminished.  
 
The peace treaty had two profound effects, both of which solidified Sadat’s position 
politically. Egypt was first and foremost able to secure funding and support from another 
donor in the United States- assuaging Egyptian fears of falling further behind the 
technology curve with Israel. The flow of money and equipment meant that Egypt would 
be able to upgrade its materiel to a competitive level at regular intervals with the blessing 
of the most technologically advanced international patron. This allowed Sadat to 
outmaneuver and stifled his opponents by pointing out that he had been able to acquire 
over $1 billion annually in US aid, softening the blow that many die-hard officers felt at 
having to make peace with their most hated rival Israel. The peace dividend and the 
influx of US dollars also meant that Sadat could release pressure on the strapped 
Egyptian budget, allowing him to loosen the tight grip the armed forces had on the budget 
and begin to spend money on non-military ventures. Egyptian domestic turmoil in the 
1970s had reached a boiling point, and being able to redirect some of the Egyptian budget 
towards food subsidies and development helped ease domestic tensions.  
 
The peace treaty also left Egypt with a glut of soldiers, a reduced military budget and a 
lack of enemies. This led to the fourth important move on Sadat’s part: allowing and even 
encouraging the establishment of wholly-owned and operated MCEs outside the control 
of the state. Before, under Nasser, the majority of MCEs had been officer-managed state-
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owned enterprises. Nominally, these enterprises were state-owned and therefore there 
was at least a de jure reason for them to have civilian oversight and staffing. Sadat was 
able parlay this peace dividend and led the military to invest heavily in its industries. 
Instead of manning foxholes, the conscripts were being used for labor in numerous 
construction, agricultural and industrial processes.  
 
With the establishment of large conglomerates such as the National Services Production 
Organization (NSPO), the armed forces were able to consolidate their holdings into 
gigantic institutionally-controlled enterprises. Allowing the armed forces to essentially 
run their own business empire allowed the officer corps substantial autonomy, allowing 
officers to accrue benefits without government oversight or control. This kind of 
relationship meant that the armed forces could take care of its own, and spread patronage 
and benefits as they saw fit. While it raised the profile of certain military characters who 
were in charge of these enterprises, it also meant that the military was less reliant upon 
the state. This relationship also led to a precipitous decline in the military budget that 
lasted well into the 1980s, as military assets could be taken off-book, allowing the state to 
spend more money elsewhere, such as on food subsidies.  
 
A new phase of Egyptian military-commercial relationships began with Camp David. 
With a large labor force of conscripted men under its control and a large residual budget, 
the military began to retool a good portion of its military industry towards civilian 
products. Beginning with agricultural production in order to provide the military with 
self-sufficiency, the military began to expand its holdings into other industries. This took 
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place under the umbrella of “state-building” and “national development” projects, with 
the military slowly butting into industries that had been under the purview of the private 
and public sectors. Egypt did not escape peace with Israel without consequence, however, 
as their Arab backers in the AOI pulled their support for the AOI and other projects. The 
Egyptian military assumed control of the AOI, but the loss of its primary financial 
backers left it at a distinct operational disadvantage since these industries required intense 
capitalization to grow.312  Egypt was able to make up part of this shortfall with aid from 
the US, which reached $1.8 billion annually in 1989, and allowed Egypt to maintain force 
readiness.313  
 
This new phase of military-commercial involvement departed from the initial relationship 
in a fundamental way: instead of the military running sate-owned enterprises through its 
officers, the military now began to directly own new industries through the Ministry of 
Defense and Military Production. While some of the investments made were still in the 
original manner- public sector enterprises controlled by the military, a new crop of 
directly-owned military enterprises were created. Direct military ownership of 
commercial assets had previously been prohibited under Nasser, likely to prevent 
alternative military-commercial competitors to his regime from forming.  Having been 
beneficiaries of public sector management for decades, the possibilities of growth into the 
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private sector probably proved too lucrative to continue to limit, and the civilian 
leadership too reticent to curtail.314  
 
These enterprises were not the result of nationalizations, as Sadat had begun to move 
away from command economies and socialism with his Infitah policies of free markets 
and capitalism. Rather, these enterprises were created from the military’s own budget and 
its substantial contacts both abroad and within already extant public sector enterprises. 
Thus the biggest characteristic of this new phase was the creation of directly-controlled 
military businesses that were under both institutional control of the military hierarchy and 
individual officers. The NSPO is emblematic of this trend, which was an umbrella 
organization that joined together new and old enterprises into a massive economic unit.315 
Established in 1978, the NSPO is one of a number of other organizations that produce 
civilian goods such as agricultural goods, construction equipment, pharmaceuticals, 
stationery, doors, clothing, microscopes etc. In 1985 alone, the NSPO was responsible for 
over 488 million Egyptian pounds worth of agricultural products, manufactured goods 
347 million Egyptian pounds, construction 174 million Egyptian pounds and other goods 
and services about 144 million Egyptian pounds. Military facilities were responsible for 
producing close to 18% of all food production in Egypt in 1985. The NSPO has only 
grown larger since with at least ten major subsidiaries in current operation.316  
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In addition to the creation of this new military-owned economy, under and after Sadat, 
various public sector and military-owned businesses began to conduct strategic 
partnerships between other Egyptian private sector companies. This was new to the 
Egyptian economy, as previously the public sectors had mostly kept to itself. This 
process of strategic partnerships between military-owned businesses and other private 
sector companies took off in earnest under Mubarak, and continues today.317  
 
Sadat was clever in that during the time when he was most vulnerable he was able to 
utilize MCEs to his advantage. Before the peace with Israel, Sadat was under an 
incredible amount of pressure, lurching from one political crisis to the next, typically 
facing the most pressure from the armed forces. He was an unpopular and relatively 
unknown political operator within the elite structure with the expectation that he would 
be removed soon or be a pliant vessel for other influential leaders. He faced constant 
political crises most of which originated directly due to his security environment, and he 
was very responsive to the needs of the armed forces: The presence of Soviet troops 
created resentment among the officers, so he removed them to increase his popularity. 
The establishment of the AOI brought in millions of dollars to Egypt, of which Egyptian 
officers were the primary managers and direct beneficiaries, increasing Sadat’s claims to 
have the military’s best interests at heart.  
 
Making peace with Israel was the riskiest move Sadat made, but it was in the long-term 
interest of both Egypt and his own political life. Peace would mean alienating large 
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portions of the Egyptian military, possibly violently so, who had spent their entire careers 
fighting or preparing to fight Israel, putting Sadat in a precarious position. The threat to 
Sadat cannot be overstated, as many generals were vehemently against peace, but Sadat 
was able to use both the US aid and his encouragement in the establishment of MCEs like 
the NSPO, AOI and the Ministry of Military Production to dodge a coup attempt. By 
funneling state funds and resources into greater commercial production by the military, 
Sadat was able to consolidate his regime until his assassination by Islamists, also angered 
by the peace treaty with Israel.  
 
Mubarak, détente and the Arab Spring  
This section will examine civil-military relations during the Mubarak era, focusing on 
how generally speaking, Mubarak pursued the same policies of turning over more 
enterprises to the armed forces as a way to curry favor with the officer corps. Despite the 
overarching narrative that Mubarak’s relationship with the armed forces was absent any 
controversies, this section will highlight several important elements of tension between 
Mubarak and the military. It will also examine the greatest challenge to the theory that 
MCEs reduces coup risk by taking on the issue of Mubarak’s resignation in 2011 under 
heavy pressure by regime elites by suggesting that it does not pose a serious challenge to 
the overall theory.  
 
Mubarak’s long tenure as Egypt’s president began soon after Sadat’s death. He was the 
former head of the Air Force, and like Sadat was not considered at the outset particularly 
capable. He would prove to have the longest continuous rule by a single leader in modern 
Egypt at 30 years. Like his predecessors, Mubarak struggled with both internal strife and 
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with the autonomous power of the armed forces. Rooting out extremism in the armed 
forces and in Egyptian society were the regime’s top priorities, as their strategic 
reorientation away from challenging Israel freed both the regime and the armed forces to 
do so. Mubarak’s reign lacked a great deal of the overt civil-military turmoil which 
marked his predecessors’ reign, for reasons of which Mubarak was both the beneficiary 
of good luck as well as his deft political handling of crises that emerged until his 
resignation in 2011.  
 
This reorientation was also facilitated by the fact that Mubarak largely left the military to 
itself, and allowed it to manage its own affairs. During this time, the armed forces turned 
inwards and continued to develop its own business capabilities, utilizing conscripts as 
labor or servants etc.. The military, though never absent from the political scene, was 
always in the orbit, of varying distances, from the most powerful Egyptian statesmen.318 
The military’s influence in political was never far away, and they cast a deep shadow on 
Egyptian politics. While there were challenges from the armed forces, Mubarak was able 
to weather nearly all. Mubarak’s policy towards these MCEs was to be completely hands-
off. There was no attempt by Mubarak to reign in MCEs or bring them under civilian 
control, quite the opposite. Mubarak made every effort to appear on the side of the armed 
forces and worked to expand their business enterprises when expedient, or when 
undertaking policies or actions for which he would need their support.319  
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During the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, Egypt was faced with significant 
internal dissent from Islamists and a revolt of its Central Security Forces (CSF). The 
unrest was fueled in part by the terrible economic conditions of its poorest citizens, some 
of whom turned to radical Islamism and sought the overthrow of the state. The CSF was a 
conscript force of 300,000 men that was used as the muscle of the regime. The personnel 
in this force were hardly trained, had little to no education and were generally poor 
peasants. They were used to try and quell some of the Islamist violence that would flare 
up in various parts of the country. The CSF had a brutal job on the frontlines against 
violent extremism, but were poorly treated, and ended up revolting over poor pay, 
horrible living standards and a rumor that their compulsory service was going to be 
increased by an additional three years without an increase in benefits or pay. The revolts 
lasted for three days in some of Egypt’s most populous cities, requiring the intervention 
of the army to put down. Instead of the armed forces considering the removal of Mubarak 
for the mismanagement of the CSF and causing a huge revolt requiring military 
intervention, Mubarak remained in power. Mubarak weathered the revolt and the 
aftermath, and remained in power another 25 years.  
 
This is likely due in part to the fact that during this time Mubarak and the armed forces 
worked very closely together, and was also during a time of rapid growth for the MCEs. 
Within a few years of the CSF revolt there were spates of privatizations of state-owned 
enterprises, of which the military was often a beneficiary. During these privatizations, 
while many ill-run or inefficient public sector companies were sold off, though the 
military’s public sector holdings were kept intact and not subject to the wave of 
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privatizations. In fact, due to the close association of many public sector managers also 
being military officers, the military was able to pick up many of these privatized state-
owned enterprises.320 During the privatization, the military was able to snatch up some 
companies for itself, at what some experts considered way below market value.321 
Military businesses had been largely untouched by these privatizations, and those public 
sector companies that had been privatized more often than not had retired army officers 
placed in prestigious positions on boards and in administrative positions.322  
 
Until the last years of Mubarak’s reign, while the military was most certainly an 
important military player, there does not seem to have been any substantial fears from 
Mubarak that the military intended to move against him. Indeed, the most contentious 
political issue seemed to be the eventual successor of Mubarak. There were grumblings 
from some officers about Mubarak’s son Gamal being groomed for the position of 
President after his father retired. Soon after this there was another round of privatizations 
of state-owned entities, again in which the military acquired several more poorly 
operating state-owned firms at low cost. 
 
It should come as no surprise that civil-military relations during the Mubarak era were 
quite pacific. Mubarak used the sell-off of MCEs and creating exemptions that would 
enhance competitiveness for military firms as ways to ensure that the military remained 
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loyal to him. But this does create a puzzle: if relations between Mubarak and the military 
were so smooth, what explains his resignation and their lukewarm support for him during 
the revolution? One would expect that, if MCEs are a way for reducing coup risk, what 
one should expect to see is the military coming to Mubarak’s aid during times of trouble. 
Mubarak’s resignation from power then is a powerful counter-example to the idea that 
MCEs can prevent leader removal by the armed forces.  
 
There are several points to address in showing why this is not a serious challenge to the 
theory. The first is that it is worth pointing out that the theory predicts that MCEs reduce 
the likelihood of a coup d’etat attempt, which was in fact not how Mubarak was removed 
from power. Mubarak resigned from his office, turning over power to his Vice President, 
who turned over control of the state to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces with the 
intention to hold elections Only later were Mubarak and his family arrested on charges of 
corruption.  
 
While the above is true, this is likely not a singularly satisfying explanation for most. The 
idea that the formal process of Mubarak’s removal from power was through resignation, 
and therefore does not meet the technical definition of a coup attempt as defined by 
Powell and Thyne, might satisfy academic coding requirements but not the skeptical 
mind. Not reaching the technical definition does nothing to allay concerns that Mubarak 
was in fact under intense pressure by the armed forces to resign, thus betraying the spirit 
of the argument. If one expands the definition of a coup attempt to include other forms of 
compulsion by the armed forces to step down, then this certainly does provide a 
216 
 
challenge to the argument. With this in mind it is a useful reminder to point out that the 
argument is probabilistic in nature, and even outcomes that are usually unlikely can still 
occur in extraordinary circumstances such as the incredible upswing of popular 
discontent as occurred during the Arab Spring, the likes of which had not been seen by 
these leaders.  
 
Even if giving ground on the issue of definitions and admitting that Mubarak was 
removed by the armed forces in a coup attempt, it should not take away from the fact that 
his reign did last 30 years – double that of either of his two predecessors. His resignation 
from power came at a very trying time in Egyptian politics. Mubarak’s reign was the 
longest in modern Egyptian history, and it also coincided with the time period in which 
the armed forces had their largest growth in economic power. The expansion of the 
armed forces’ MCEs likely led to Mubarak having very few crises in civil-military 
relations during his reign. Well into the 2000s Mubarak had largely been able to keep the 
armed forces complacent, and was positioning his son as his eventual successor.  Indeed, 
Mubarak himself apparently thought the political climate stable enough to begin 
grooming his own son, Gamal, for his position in the first place. For most of Mubarak’s 
reign, the most vexing threat to the regime was not from the armed forces but internal 
unrest. The threat posed to internal security by Islamist infiltration of the armed forces 
was of a much higher concern, and much energy was directed towards eradicating it.  
 
To explain why Mubarak was ousted, it should be used to contrast the CSF revolt and the 
Rosetta Revolution. One of the biggest differences between the CSF incident and the 
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Rosetta Revolution, and there are admittedly many, is that by the time of Mubarak’s 
resignation during the Revolution, most of the benefits and patronage flowing from the 
MCEs would have been out of Mubarak’s hands anyway. During the 1980s MCEs were 
still growing, and Mubarak was providing the armed forces with assistance in its business 
pursuits. Support by the state was still critical to MCE operations. Many of the state-
owned enterprises that are now under the control of the Armed Forces were still under the 
control of the state, and under Mubarak’s control. By the time of the revolution, these 
MCEs were large and providing significant amount of benefits to the officer corps, likely 
more than the Egyptian state budget if this chapter’s earlier projections are to be taken 
seriously. The marginal effect of additional MCEs in engendering the loyalty of the 
officer corps to Mubarak was likely reduced by this time, and most officers at the time of 
the revolution would see their benefits coming directly from the military leadership, not 
the civilian one. An entire generation of military leaders had rotated in and out of power 
during his presidency, so for the junior officers Mubarak was an anachronism, while for 
the senior officers Mubarak was no longer a benefactor of the same magnitude as in the 
1980s. While the MCEs were still active and supplying the military with its needed 
goods, and fulfilling basic military needs, Mubarak was not the source.  
 
One must also consider the position of the armed forces. During the CSF revolt, large 
numbers of armed troops were engaging in violence that clearly disrupted the state and 
posed a direct challenge to political stability within Egypt, including the position of the 
armed forces within Egyptian politics. The CSF revolt was undertaken by unpopular 
police forces in the employ of Mubarak, and were not largely missed once they were 
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disbanded. During the Rosetta Revolution the protests were largely peaceful and the 
protestors largely demanded the removal of Mubarak, not the armed forces, from power. 
In addition, the protestors were drawn from all sectors of Egyptian society, not merely an 
underclass of poor peasants.  
 
It is not clear that the political support from the armed forces would have guaranteed 
Mubarak’s political survival, in defiance of the protestors. It is fairly clear that for the 
military to remain loyal to Mubarak would have entailed a significant crackdown on the 
protests, which would have entailed much bloodshed and the sullying of the armed 
forces’ reputation among Egyptians. For the armed forces it was simply more expedient 
for them to remove an unpopular leader than fight to keep him in power, and it is not 
clear what Mubarak could have offered the armed forces that would be worth them 
engaging in a large scale crackdown on political dissent that seemed to extend across all 
strata of Egyptian society. Indeed, Mubarak made no attempt during the revolution to 
transfer control of more MCEs or enrich MCEs in the crucial months leading up to his 
resignation. Had Mubarak announced additional sales of MCEs, or transferred other 
critical businesses to military control, he might have been able to convince the armed 
forces to move to retain him as leader.  
 
Finally there is the issue of Mubarak’s moves pre-revolution. Despite the armed forces 
benefitting from the various rounds of privatizations, many military officers saw the 
privatization program as a threat, even though their own holdings had largely been spared 
the privatization: in a Wikileaks cable, US officials had interviewed Egyptian military 
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officers as saying that they had severe reservations about privatization.323 Egyptian 
officers saw the selling-off of public enterprises as eroding the power of the state, and 
likely were suspicious of Mubarak’s possible heir, Gamal, enriching his own political 
friends with cheaply sold state-owned enterprises at the expense of the state.324  
 
These public enterprises up for sale, many of which came under the control of the state 
during Nasser’s time, had been set up primarily as vehicles to provide services state 
control to enhance state control. Privatizing these enterprises left them open to sale to 
both Egyptian citizens and foreign entities, undermining the system of state control that 
has been around since Nasser. In 2011, with the fall of Mubarak, the privatization policy 
was quietly ended with the introduction of military rule. Going further, some of the 
public agencies’ sales were nullified by the court system, who found their selling price 
far below their market value, thus rolling back part of the privatization efforts of 
Mubarak.325  
 
Mubarak’s attempt to privatize the state was seen as a threat by the military 
establishment. Had the military been the only beneficiaries of such a privatization 
scheme, or the enterprises not been siphoned off to Gamal and his circle of friends, it is 
possible the military might have been stronger supporters of Mubarak. Before Mubarak’s 
ouster, there was a growing business class of wealthy entrepreneurs centered around 
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Gamal Mubarak and his circle of associates. Gamal, who never completed his military 
service, was not well-liked within the armed forces. While it is not known for certain 
whether this group of businessmen were considered by the armed forces to be a political 
threat to military political influence, Gamal and his brother were both imprisoned and 
accused of corruption and insider trading almost immediately upon the replacement of 
Hosni Mubarak in 2011.326 Regardless of whether the trial was politically motivated or a 
sincere corruption case, the result was the removal of a politically powerful individual 
from the previous regime.  Jealousies and suspicions within the military at Mubarak’s 
attempt to establish his son as his successor cost him his support within the military when 
the political environment turned against Mubarak.  
 
Mubarak’s ouster by the military in 2011 then, can be seen not as a huge challenge to the 
theory, but actually perfectly explicable: by the time of the Rosetta Revolution Mubarak 
had already turned over significant state resources to the armed forces, he neglected to 
turn over more during the lead up to the Revolution, and he actively lavished state 
resources to his son to enhance his political power which engendered jealousy and 
suspicion among the armed forces. When faced with the option of either a bloody and 
almost certainly wildly unpopular crackdown to keep an autocrat in power who was 
grooming a potential group of non-military political rivals for leadership, or removing the 
unpopular autocrat with minimal bloodshed, the armed forces chose the latter.  
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Morsi and his ouster  
The July 2012 election of Mohamed Morsi, an Islamist candidate who was a member of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, was in some cases the worst nightmare of the Egyptian military 
establishment. Morsi, already in a tough political position vis-à-vis the ruling body politic 
due to his ideology, did not navigate the political waters of Egypt well enough to survive. 
Mubarak had been a civilian, but at least a senior former military officer who had some 
ties to the armed forces. Morsi had never been a part of the Egyptian military-political 
elite or had ever served as an officer, and so was a total outsider to the political 
establishment. There was a great deal of tension between the military and Morsi’s 
administration to the point that some prominent analysts believe that the military was 
deliberately sabotaging Morsi’s government well before his removal.327 It was barely a 
year before another series of major protests, this time against Morsi’s rule, led to his 
ouster through military coup in June of 2013. The transitional government led to the 
promotion of the Egyptian defense minister, Adbel Fattah el-Sisi, to the office of the 
President in March of 2014, who still serves to this day. Within months of Morsi’s 
removal, the military began a bloody crackdown on counter-protests from Morsi 
supporters, removing the only serious remaining political opposition to military rule.328  
 
In attempting to walk the fine line of civil-military relations within Egypt, Morsi made 
several missteps in a system that was already heavily weighed against him. Indeed, it is 
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not clear that there was anything Morsi could have done to stay in power for long, but his 
political missteps ran him afoul of the military perhaps even more quickly than if he had 
done nothing at all. The Muslim Brotherhood and its associated parties and allies engaged 
in a number of initiatives that sought to unite disparate business interests in Egypt – 
excluding the major MCEs associated with the armed forces. Several business 
associations were founded, bringing together foreign and domestic capital into tight 
networks, including the Egyptian Business Development Association (EBDA), which 
sought to strengthen small-to-medium size enterprises.329 In addition, the Brotherhood 
tried to shift investment away from areas where military enterprises were concentrated, a 
clear affront to the military’s economic investments.  
 
These associations announced, with Morsi’s blessing, plans such as the Suez Canal 
Corridor project to develop areas of the canal that the military had little investment in, but 
would benefit those businesses outside of the military’s economic footprint.330 There was 
also an initiative to strengthen business ties with Western companies as well, outside of 
the military’s influence, perhaps to leverage international support. To the officer corps, 
this could most certainly be interpreted as an economic offensive against military 
interests. With the toppling of Morsi and the Brotherhood, these projects were halted, 
along with any efforts to supervise and monitor military production.  
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To illustrate the point more clearly: during his brief presidency, Morsi attempted an 
upgrade of the Suez Canal in a massive project that would have involved billions of 
dollars and thousands of workers.331 Perhaps fatally, Morsi did not include the armed 
forces in his initial planning for the mega-project. Morsi’s proposal entailed offering 
competitive bidding on the Suez Canal project internationally, and among the early 
promising bidders were a variety of European and Western construction companies. The 
Egyptian military balked at such a suggestion, and demanded to be let into the process, 
especially since, as they argued, the Egyptian military had much of the construction 
capability in-house themselves. The Morsi proposal never reached fruition, and the new 
President Sisi launched his own government’s Suez Canal Development Project in 
November of 2014. Among the winning bidders for Sisi’s Suez development projects 
were several Egyptian Army-owned or managed firms.332  
 
Morsi’s removal is understandable: he had no military experience, no relationship with 
military officers, had strong ties to Islamist organizations and did nothing to assuage fear 
from the armed forces that he sought to undermine them. Instead of trying to work with 
the military or trying to turn over any more business or other opportunities to them, he 
actively worked against their long-established interests in one of Egypt’s most key 
strategic assets: the Suez Canal. It is unlikely that, even if he had not attempted to lock 
the military out of the process he would have made any allies within the military 
anyways, but actively undermining military control of the Suez Canal was a clear affront 
to military priorities.  
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The attempt to create a political network of businesses, Islamist groups and political 
opposition groups under one banner was clearly a threat to military economic supremacy, 
and thus Morsi’s political activities were deemed a severe threat to the military’s core 
interests. Since his ouster, the Suez Canal Project has been completely managed by the 
Armed Forces, the Muslim Brotherhood has been denounced as a terrorist organization 
and thousands of Morsi supporters have been tried as terrorists with capital sentences.  
The Armed Forces later held elections, leading to the former chief officer of the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces, Sisi, to become the next President of Egypt.  
 
The Role of MCEs in Egyptian Civil-military relations  
Mubarak’s removal and Sisi’s ascension reflect the influence of the armed forces, and the 
reinvigoration of the armed forces’ role in Egyptian politics. With onset of the Arab 
Spring, and the 2011 “Rosetta Revolution”, the military once again became the most 
important political player in Egyptian society. Mubarak’s police and internal security 
services were unable to contain the mass protests and the Egyptian domestic situation 
was deteriorating rapidly – subsidies on foodstuffs had once again been cut and 
unemployment was high. Without the support of the armed forces, Mubarak was finished, 
and the military was not willing to shoot on the crowds to support him. With his ouster 
the Egyptian political system was still in the hands of the military, but they were faced 
with incredible pressure to hold democratic elections both from without and from within.  
 
From this short history of the armed forces’ involvement into Egyptian politics it should 
be clear that the military has played an important, and often decisive role in the politics of 
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Egyptian life. The number of years the Egyptian military outright ruled the government is 
fairly low, but the number of years a military-friendly, or former military member, was in 
power encompasses most of modern Egyptian history since its independence from the 
UK. Indeed, outside the national office of the President, military influence has been quite 
pervasive: out of 25 provincial governors appointed after Sisi took power, 17 were 
military generals.  
 
The military’s role in Egyptian society has been called that of a “state within a state” or 
“deep state” in which there is a public government that administers the affairs of state, 
and another strata of political elites that administers itself and the public affairs of the 
country that is largely out of control or oversight of the public government.333 The 
relationship between the two is both contentious and transactional – the public 
government seems to be tasked with maintaining domestic order and stability, while the 
military complex largely pursues its own economic development and arms production 
capabilities. During the Mubarak era this relationship worked remarkably well, with 
Mubarak steering any and all policies away from interference with military matters and 
the military only occasionally actively influencing policy. Given the milita ry origins of 
Mubarak, the interests of these two groups largely aligned for decades, and even into the 
Arab Spring the military supported his reign only until it was clear that largescale 
bloodshed would be required to keep him in power. In order to maintain the special 
relationship between the state and the military, it was much more expedient for the 
military to depose and exchange one unpopular ruler for a different fresh face, and 
                                                 




present themselves as the guardians of the people than it would have been to turn popular 
sentiment against the armed forces by killing large numbers of protestors. While the 
immediate candidate of Morsi was not to the military’s liking, his removal allowed the 
military to have its cake and eat it too: the civilian government was largely inept, faced 
with mass protests, and making what some interpreted as dictatorial moves in 
government.334 The military was able to sweep Morsi out of office with a justifiable 
causus beli, eliminate their most feared opponents, radical Islamists and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and install a pro-military regime in Morsi’s stead.  
 
Conspiracy theories aside, the above should show the considerable influence that the 
military had in the minds of Egyptian leaders. From actively working to assuage military 
concerns and rewarding military officers with lucrative economic benefits, to tacitly 
recognizing military supremacy in its own internal affairs, the activities of the Egyptian 
leaders have been shaped by this powerful organization.  
 
There are three concurrent strata of military control in Egyptian political economy: 
military ownership of public sector companies, military ownership of private sector 
companies and strategic partnerships between military-owned businesses and private 
sector businesses. The first, military ownership of public sector companies, seems to 
benefit officers and enlisted personnel as a supplement to their salaries (along with other 
benefits). The second, military-ownership of private sector companies, appears to benefit 
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a smaller cadre of officers, which has been noted as a source of tension between officers 
within the circle of owners and those outside of it. This smaller cadre is extremely 
powerful and seems to command the respect of the officers by setting up a regularized 
system of patronage for all officers. The third kind of relationship is based on past 
relationships between different officer circles, where officers who leave the military are 
able to leverage their contacts within the military establishment for business opportunities 
unavailable to those who did not serve in the armed forces. This kind of relationship 
means that current military officers are able to see the tangible benefits from their 
service, while former officers are able to reap the benefits of their service. These groups 
empower one another, as former military officers are much more likely to want to do 
business with military enterprises, and current MCE managers are more likely to support 
their friends and former comrades.  
 
While there are dozens of companies, and thousands of actors involved in Egypt’s 
military economy, there are three major actors that comprise a large portion of the 
Egyptian military’s holdings. These are the National Service Production Organization, 
the Ministry of Military Production and the Arab Organization for Industrialization. The 
following will detail the three biggest MCEs, but it should be noted that there are 
multiple other organizations that fall under the Egyptian military’s control that are not 
mentioned below. A more complete examination of each is available in the Appendix.  
 
In 2012, official statements about military owned businesses have asserted that combined 
all the industries bring in about $750 million a year, whereas other sources have claimed 
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that one company alone has brought in $5 billion in one year. Estimates about the exact 
size of the military’s economic footprint in the civilian sector have a great deal of 
uncertainty. 335 336 Again, estimates of the size of the Egyptian military’s economic 
footprint range from between five percent of the economy to over forty percent.337 In an 
interview with Reuters in 2014, Sisi dismissed such figures, saying instead that the 
military’s investment in the economy is less than two percent338, but did affirm the 
military’s continued economic role in Egypt.  
 
One thing to note is that there are a multitude of different forms of military-commercial 
interaction, and it is difficult to document them all: wholly-owned companies/factories, 
joint ventures, holding companies, state-owned but military-managed public enterprises, 
and a variety of strategic partnerships, but informal and formal, between military and 
private enterprises.  
 
 
Regulating military businesses are a myriad of laws, mostly laws exempting military 
businesses from common obligations. In terms of the legality of military-controlled 
enterprises, there is a wealth of laws permitting its existence, much of which was 
formalized during the Mubarak era. Profits from military-owned businesses are exempt 
from taxation and business licensing requirements according to Article 47 of Egypt’s 
2005 income tax law. Article 1 of a 1986 customs law on all imports of the Ministry of 
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Defense and Ministry of State for Military Production are exempt from any taxation. 339 
In addition to tax breaks, military businesses are the beneficiaries of subsidies, 
government contracts and are above the rules and regulations applicable to privately-
owned companies.340 Military businesses, usually their construction and farming 
enterprises, draw upon cheap conscripted labor from the ranks of the enlisted, giving 
military businesses further advantages in terms of labor costs when compared to private 
sector companies.341 Some conscripts have even been known to work as domestic help 
for high-ranking officers instead of in the businesses themselves. Workers in these 
companies are routinely denied unionization rights, and past attempts or organize labor 
have been violently suppressed.342 These laws allow MCEs to have a competitive 
advantage over their peers, giving government departments a justifiable reason to award 
contracts to MCEs instead of privately-owned Egyptian or foreign companies. These 
benefits, such as the ability to import goods without dealing with customs, allows MCEs 
to substantially undercut the rates of other companies, allowing the leadership plenty of 
opportunities to pass the inflated profits on towards other MCEs or officers.  
 
Reporting and civilian access to information about the extent of the Egyptian military’s 
economic footprint is extremely limited. Egypt has regularly been at the bottom of Global 
Integrity’s rankings of civilian access to government information in both law and 
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practice343. The most recent constitution also formalizes what had been a long-standing 
informal practice: that the civilian government is unable to monitor the military’s 
budget344. The new constitution ensures that the military’s budget cannot be scrutinized 
by any civilian government, and that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces will have 
the final say in choosing or dismissing the defense minister for two presidential terms.345 
In addition to a much strengthened judiciary, a body that has been closely aligned with 
the military in past decades, the military has significantly strengthened its hand de jure in 
economic matters.  
 
Conclusion  
While there are competing claims as to the roles of military enterprises, several things are 
clear: the military has created itself as by far and away the largest economic actor in 
Egypt, and have positioned themselves as indispensable actors within the economic life 
of their country. The way this was accomplished was through successive Egyptian 
political leaders empowering the military’s economic prowess through the turning over of 
enterprises to military control as a way to leverage their resources for political support.  
 
Political leaders seeking to secure their positions in power had for years lavished the 
armed forces with businesses in the hopes of winning the political support of the military. 
As the only actor truly capable of displacing leaders and installing their own 
governments, the armed forces were empowered by successive leaders with expansions 
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of their business holdings. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak all used MCEs to win over key 
political supporters within the officers corps either to placate dissidents or to 
outmaneuver rivals. All the while these leaders contributed to the economic holdings of 
the Egyptian military, creating a large military with a large economic footprint. As a 
result of their resource endowments, as well as their strategic environments, leaders had 
little choice but to reduce their risks of removal by giving up control of important 
enterprises or face a possible coup attempt.  
Appendix  
 
Official Public Information  
Despite the general prohibition of reporting on the military’s economic activities, the 
National Information Agency did publish a document detailing some of the military’s 
economic holdings, though the list was incomplete and did not give much detail as to the 
size or scope of the enterprises. The following are information posted to government 
websites that are publicly disclosed companies owned or managed by the military:  
 
National Information Agency: The Armed Forces and Comprehensive Growth 
1. National Service Projects in the Armed Forces 
2. Plastic material for packaging and agriculture (established in 1992 and began 
production in 1994) 
3. Victory (al-nasr) company for intermediary chemicals (primarily insecticide) 
4. Arab World Company for Optics (including laser and precision electronic systems. 
Established in 1982) 
5. National Company for Agricultural development in arid areas (established in 1999) 
6. Supreme Egyptian Company for Agricultural Industrialization and Land Reclamation 
(including two plants for dairy products, two plants for salsa, two plants for livestock 
fodder. Established in 1998). 
7. National Production for Nutritional Industry (comprises three inter-connected plants 
for the production of jams, juices and tomato paste; olive oil factory; and a pickle factory) 
8. Egg Production Factory (completed between 1979 and 1986) 
9. Food Security Sector (including production of agricultural products, food industry and 
honey) 
10. Nasr Company for Services and Maintenance (including transportation, container 
leasing, tourism and hotels, garages, security and guard word, cleaning and 
beautification, sea services and training.) 
11. National Company for Public Contracting and Imports (established 1993. Civil 
engineering and tourism) 
12. National Company for Road Construction and Maintenance (the company may enter 
into partnership with similar companies both in Egypt and abroad) 
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13. Mining Sector (May 1987. Mines across the country, development of Sinai in 
collaboration with the Second Army, building of a stadium, sports facilities and farms). 













Table 1: List of Ministers of Military Production 1981-2015  
Ministers of Military Production* 
Minister Years 
Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala 1981-1989 
Youssef Sabri Abu Taleb 1989-1991 
Mohamed Hussein Tantawi 1991-2012 








Profiles of Major Entities  
National Service Production Organization  
History: Established in 1978 with the express commercial purpose of expanding the 
military’s economic footprint.  
 (Current) Holdings:  
Its website lists ten companies under its control:  
 Nasr Company for Intermediate Chemicals  
 Al Arish Cement Company  
 National Petroleum Company  
 National Company for the Production and Packaging of Water  
 Quinn Pasta Company  
 National Reclamation and Cultivation of Desert Lands (East Owaynat)  
 Victory for Services and Maintenance (Queen Service)  
 Upper Egypt for the Manufacture of Agricultural and Land Reclamation  
 Food Security Sector  
 Factory Production of Plastic Sheeting   
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Estimated to be at least 16 factories, with multiple non-manufacturing industries also 
under its control.  
The NSPO is also involved to a great degree in agriculture, producing 18% of the 
nation’s foodstuffs, and 60% of the Arm’s required consumables in 1985.346  
The NSPO is also involved in national infrastructure and construction, in addition to 








Ministry of Military Production 
History: This is still the largest wing of the Egyptian military’s production of war 
materials, though it also has significant holdings in the commercial world.  
Estimated (current) workforce: 40,000  
Current holdings:  
8-16 manufacturing plants, with 40% of their production geared towards civilian markets.  
Some affiliated military factories: 
Hulwan Iron Foundries  
 Abu-Kir Company for Engineering Industries 
 Abu Zaabal Company for Specialized Chemicals  
 Shobra Company for Engineering Industries 
 El Maasara Company for Engineering Industries 
 Maadi Company for Engineering Industries 
 Hulwan Company for Non-ferrous Industries 
 Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries 
 Hulwan Company for Engineering Industries  
 Abuzaabal Company for Engineering Industries  
 Banha Company for Electronic Industries 
 Tanks Production and Repair Company  
 Kaha Company for Chemical Industries  
 Hulwan Company for Metallic Appliances 
 Hulwan Company for Diesel Engines 
 Hulwan Company for Workshop Tools  
  
Arab Organization for Industrialization  
History: Established in 1975 as a joint venture between Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE to develop domestic military production. It was capitalized with over $1 billion 
from all countries, and in 1993 Saudi Arabia and the Emirates gave their portion, valued 
at $1.8 billion, back to the Egyptian military, which is now the sole owner of the AOI. 
The AOI consists of a combination of wholly-owned and joint venture companies.  
Estimated (current) workforce: 16,000 – 19,000  
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Estimated (current) holdings:  
Eleven manufacturing plants, with 70% of their production going to civilian markets. 
Including:  
 AOI Aircraft Factory 
 AOI Engine Factory 
 AOI Electronics Factory 
 Sakr Factory for Development Industries  
 Kader Factory for Development Industries 
 Arab British Helicopters  
 Arab British Engine Co.  
 Arab British Dynamics Co.  
 Arab American Vehicles  
 
Other Major MCE Investments  
As stated above, the Egyptian military has a host of other commercial holdings outside of 
these three major holdings companies/entities. While the names of individual companies 
are difficult to track down, the Egyptian military is known to be involved in the following 
sectors from a variety of sources. Just a smattering of the diverse investments are:  
 “…vehicles, chemicals, mineral water, cement, consumer goods, and various 
types of foodstuffs including pasta, bread and olive oil.”347 
 “…car assembly… clothing, … construction of roads, highways, bridges. We’re 
talking pots and pans… of kitchen appliances. …the gas bottle will have been 
manufactured by the military. Some of the foodstuffs you will be eating will have been 
grown and/or processed by the military.”348  
 ”They range from consumer goods such as laptops, flat-screen TVs, sewing 
machines, refrigerators, pots and pans, plastic table covers, butane gas bottles, olive oil 
and bottled water to medical equipment, tourism, real estate and gas and energy. The 
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military also operates Wataniyyah gas station, maritime transport, heavy equipment 
leasing, and Queen cleaning services. In the agriculture sector, where young conscripts 
are often employed, the military grows what are known as ‘strategic crops’, such as 
barley, corn, wheat and clover, as well as mango trees, oranges and lemons and runs 
dairy and livestock farms and even a modern slaughterhouse.”349  
 
Alongside these wholly owned businesses, the military is also engaged in a series of joint 
ventures, typically with foreign firms dealing in high-technology products, in which the 
military usually owns 51 percent of the venture. These firms manufacture both military 
and civilian goods, both of which are sold domestically and abroad.350 An example of this 
kind of venture is the Arab International Optronics, a joint-venture between the military 
and France’s Thales, and the International Pipe Industry Company- the largest 
manufacturer or oil and gas piping in the Middle East- a joint venture between the 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion: Coup-proofed but waiting in the wings?  
 
Sometimes the business of the military is security, and sometimes the business of the 
military is business. In the preceding analysis, the product of military business is stability. 
MCEs are a route through which patronage and material benefits flow to the officer 
corps, enriching them and lowering the probability that officers will want to change the 
status quo through a violent regime change in a coup d’etat. These MCEs provide the 
military with the means to create their own income, equipment and material in-house, 
usually far from civilian or governmental oversight. From a political standpoint, this 
arrangement allows the officer corps and top-tier military leadership to provide for the 
welfare of their troops directly by shifting goods from state coffers into MCEs, and from 
MCEs to the officer corps.  
 
The preceding chapters show that MCEs are used as a coup-proofing mechanism by both 
civilian and military leaders to reduce their coup risk. MCEs come about as a direct result 
of high coup risk and smaller state resources. Leaders with high risks and few direct 
resources to placate the armed forces must come up with alternative ways to limit the 
risks that they face from the military. One alternative is for leaders to turn over control of 
state enterprises, resources or property to the armed forces for their use and control. For 
civilian leaders, the turning over of state assets or helping establish MCEs is a bargaining 
chip offered to reduce the likelihood of grievances developing within the officer corps. 
For military leaders, the development of MCEs is a way for leaders to show the rest of 
their military constituency that they are going to take care of the officer corps and 
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represent the interests of the officer corps. In either case, the establishment of MCEs is 
borne out of political considerations of leaders.   
 
MCEs contribute to regime stability, especially in autocratic states. As the analysis above 
shows, MCEs help reduce the likelihood of coup attempts, which reduces the likelihood 
of a successful coup as well. MCEs function as they were intended, which is to keep the 
military from seizing power in a brash demonstration of their capability and opposition to 
the government in power. MCEs are a tool of regime survival, for better or for worse.  
 
MCEs have differential effects, and seem to function much more effectively in autocratic 
regimes than in democratic regimes. There are several factors that could contribute to this 
difference, 1) democratic states face constraints that limit the establishment and size of 
MCEs, 2) democratic states have oversight and governance mechanisms that limit MCEs, 
3) democratic states tend to provide better benefits to their soldiers, which limits the 
impact of MCEs on placating the grievances of the officer corps.  
 
On the first point, in order to establish MCEs state resources have to be reallocated away 
from existing programs or groups, which can cause political turmoil, limiting the size of 
the transfer. In democratic states, opposition to large transfers of state resources, even 
under-utilized resources, can potentially be huge, limiting the ability of leaders to create 
very strong MCEs that are capable of having an appreciable effect. In autocracies, leaders 
face fewer limitations in transferring state resources to MCEs, or even of transferring 
civilian resources to state control. A clear example of this was in Egypt with Nasser’s 
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appropriation of the property of the mutamassirum, the wealthy landed class that 
dominated Egypt’s business sector. Through a series of land reforms that transferred a 
majority of the this wealthy class’s land to state control and outright seizures of their 
firms, Nasser’s government both quashed potential opposition and managed to redirect 
much of those resources to military control. With greater means, willingness and 
credibility to use force, autocrats face fewer barriers to these kinds of transfers of 
economic resources to armed forces control.  
 
On the second point, in democracies transparency and oversight means that one function 
of MCEs, to transfer resources to the officer corps, has to take place under more public 
scrutiny. This means that opportunities for corruption are much more difficult, and large 
movements of capital within MCEs have to be justified with an eye towards national 
security, potentially limiting the scope and impact of MCE activity. In autocracies, the 
explicitly political nature of MCEs is often kept secret, and it is easier to simply keep the 
details of MCE operations outside of the public eye. The lack of independent news 
organizations means that it is easier to move capital and resources without public 
knowledge, allowing a high ceiling for activity before anything is noticed by the public at 
all.  
 
On the third point, democracies tend to spend more per soldier than their autocratic 
counterparts. While democracies do tend to be wealthier overall and therefore their 
spending tends to be higher, even when controlling for wealth democracies do a much 
greater job of taking care of their soldiers. Poor democracies tend to spend roughly 
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double what a poor autocracy does per soldier, while the spending differential between 
wealthy democracies and wealthy autocracies is much lower. Democracies just tend to 
spend more on their soldiers, which translates to better pay, benefits and post-service 
care. This means that, where there are MCEs in democracies, the marginal impact of 
MCEs is much smaller, since the majority of their benefits will already be coming from 
the state. Within autocracies this trend is the reverse: because autocracies spend so little 
on their soldiers, the marginal impact of MCEs is much greater. The difference between a 
poor autocracy with an MCE versus one without was roughly $4,000, or almost double 
the poor autocracy lacking an MCE. This increase will have a huge impact on the 
material welfare of soldiers, meaning that MCEs will have a much greater impact.  
 
MCEs also have disparate effects with respect to development. At higher levels of 
development, especially past $7,000 GDP per capita, the impact of MCEs is negligible. 
This is likely for two reasons: 1) wealthy states tend to be more democratic, and 2) richer 
states are able to provide more for their soldiers. On the first point, as states become 
wealthier the mechanisms that lead to democratization become stronger, leading to more 
democratic states. As per the discussion above, democracies tend to have mechanisms 
that limit the effectiveness of MCEs. On the second point, states that are wealthier tend to 
be able to provide more benefits to their soldiers overall. This means that the marginal 
impact of MCEs will be smaller as the benefits provided by the MCEs account for a 




Interestingly enough though, the same goes for those states with extreme poverty: in 
those states with GDP per capita below $200, there is almost no effect of MCEs. The 
range where MCEs are most effective is between $200 and $7,000 GDP per capita. This 
poses a challenge to the theory, because at the extreme end of poverty the marginal 
impact of MCEs should be highest. Practically speaking though, most MCEs were 
established out of already extant industry or productive commercial enterprises. In states 
with extreme poverty, there are likely very few viable commercial properties to turnover 
to the armed forces without creating incredible political turmoil. In addition, the kinds of 
enterprises to be turned over to the armed forces in an impoverished country are likely 
not to be the most lucrative. Thus, an MCE from a medium-income state might provide a 
decent marginal impact in a medium-income state, but an MCE in a least-developed state 
might not be able to provide much benefit at all. In addition, there are very few MCEs in 
these extreme poverty states, which makes confidence in the impact of MCEs in the 
analysis portion difficult.  
 
Short-term benefit, long-term bedfellows   
 
Thus far the analysis has highlighted the stabilizing role that MCEs have on their 
respective regimes, but is there perhaps a political trade-off in the establishment of 
MCEs? Leaders establish MCEs in order to control coup risk by turning over economic 
resources to the armed forces. While this provides political relief for the leader, it also 
means that the armed forces now have an additional economic stake in their state’s 
politics in addition to security concerns. With this economic stake, the armed forces 
suddenly have additional concerns and interests that must be protected. If the armed 
241 
 
forces suddenly came into control of a certain mining operation, they suddenly have a 
stake in all national- level mining legislation and policies, and must also be included as an 
actor in any negotiations on future changes in policy which might affect them.  
 
The potential impact is that the officer corps, once included in economic considerations, 
will expand its political role in governance beyond strictly security matters. So a short-
term coup-proofing tool to keep the armed forces out of politics in the present in fact 
becomes a stepping stone for the armed forces to become more involved in politics in the 
long-term. Instead of being called up for matters of national security, the armed forces 
will need to be consulted as a political actor in their areas of economic influence. The 
economic life of a state is a series of interconnected networks, and no business is 
conducted in strict isolation. In the previous example of mining, the sector is 
interconnected with transportation, heavy machinery, refining, and a host of secondary 
and tertiary industries. This means that industries that are not directly related to the armed 
forces’ holdings could potentially be affected by the armed forces’ political influence as 
the armed forces seeks more favorable business arrangements or greater control of the 
other economic forces affecting its business.  
 
This recipe for the expansion of the economic and political role of the armed forces is 
compounded by the fact that, especially in autocratic states, the leadership of a state will 
occasionally face crises that require the support of the armed forces. With each 
successive crisis, if the leader so wishes MCEs can be turned over to the armed forces for 
support, increasing the influence and economic reach of the armed forces. The officer 
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corps can leverage their political influence for more economic resources, and in states 
where the armed forces have already intervened, the credibility of their ability to act as 
“kingmaker” will likely ring true for leaders in political crisis. This process can be 
incredibly damaging to what most Western analysts would call “healthy” civil-military 
relations, where the civilian government is supreme with respect to the armed forces.  
 
This is not to say that, once MCEs are established, there is only one inevitable process 
leading to the expansion of economic and political influence by the armed forces. Indeed, 
there have been several spectacular reversals of MCEs in the past thirty years. China and 
Argentina have notably rolled back the military’s influence in economic spheres, though 
the processes through which each occurred were quite different.  
 
In China, the Communist Party leadership was worried about the economic influence of 
the PLA, which they worried could potentially translate into political power capable of 
challenging the party. Through a series of reforms, the Party struck a deal with the PLA: 
the PLA would divest itself from all business holdings and in return the central 
government would increase military spending. This arrangement was mostly followed 
through, with tens of thousands of businesses of the PLA turned over to state control, and 
the armed forces gaining substantial spending.  
 
In Argentina the process was quite different, as the armed forces were in a much weaker 
position. Having been forced from power after the disastrous Falkland Islands War, the 
armed forces found themselves politically isolated, out of power and in control of several 
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enterprises that were an incredible drain on the state budget without much to show for it. 
Through multiple political deals over the course of ten years, the civilian government 
sold off economic holdings of the Argentinian armed forces, over their objections. 
Successive civilian government were able to leverage the political weakness of the armed 
forces to remove their economic influence.  
 
There is no inevitability to either process, as clever political actors can shape their 
environment according to their opportunities and strengths. What is clear from the above 
is that MCEs are an effective tool of autocrats to limit their exposure to the threats faced 
by the armed forces. MCEs are a tool of regime stability and survival, and function that 
way well for autocrats, though for democratic states MCEs have no impact. MCEs have 
disparate impacts in that there is clearly a short-term benefit to their establishment, but 
that a bargain struck in the present to prevent an armed takeover can also have the long-
term impact of ensuring that the armed forces have a much greater role to play in politics 
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